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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
Understanding access to markets and the institutions of the food sector is a 
major challenge for pro-poor growth. Pro-poor growth in the food sector will not 
only raise incomes (for poor producers, poor traders and the poor who operate in 
related sectors, notably transport), but will also reduce the cost of food for poor 
consumers.  It will thus reduce the vulnerability of the poor in general.  This 
report presents results of a short programme on access to different types of 
market (principally food and transport) and the linkages between markets (food, 
transport, credit etc.) conducted by 15 researchers across Nigeria’s major 
regions, using an innovative networked research approach.  The study 
incorporates syntheses of previous studies with new field research. It aims to 
make a significant contribution to building a food marketing policy evidence base 
across Nigeria.  
 
There is a shortage of specific knowledge and understanding of formal and 
informal market institutions and their impact on urban food systems in Nigeria 
today: most empirical information on Nigerian rural trade was conducted prior to 
the 1990s.The case studies of commodity types provide specific empirical 
information for different regions of Nigeria for the same period on specified 
marketing issues.  Conclusions from the project should contribute to policy 
agendas (within state and federal ministries, government agencies, donors and 
NGOs) for pro-poor growth in connection to rural livelihoods and food security. 
The studies of different commodity chains and market institutions demonstrate 
the important role they can play in reducing poverty, while also identifying those 
bottlenecks where the institutions may be acting to reduce access to markets for 
the poor. Where market institutions are working to support pro-poor growth, they 
can lead to greater private sector investment in agriculture and the food trade; 
increase competition amongst traders that can raise producer prices and reduce 
consumer costs; improve the livelihoods of poor producers, processors and 
traders; build up cross cultural social capital and reduce conflict potential.  
 
The evidence from this study has shown that the precise package of constraints 
shaping commodity chains differs from commodity to commodity, from market 
place to market place and from season to season, but that facilitating factors 
often exhibit similar characteristics (flexibility, informality and trust being keynote 
features).  Because interlinkages are commonly complex, injudicious intervention 
at one point in the chain can cause adverse repercussions for the poor 
elsewhere.  
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Policy recommendations  
The following recommendations are relevant for all donors. Where targeted at 
specific stakeholders, these are indicated.  Specific recommendations for 
individual government sectors are provided in the conclusion to the report. 
 
1. Promoting associations that support access of the poor to markets 
• Local (and state) government should recognise the roles of the trader 
associations and involve them in strategies  to encourage more trade, 
improved access to markets fro the poor  and competition 
• Evidence suggests that well intended resources put into producer 
associations may not be the most effective way of giving bargaining power to 
producers .  
• NGOs should be encouraged by donors and government to develop 
consumer associations which will give poor consumers more power.  
 
2. Identifying the appropriate role of the public sector in providing better 
market places for the poor  
• Local governments need to  ensure there is greater trader competition 
through providing more market space 
• State and local governments should stop selling subsidised market stalls 
since this does not tend to help the poor. These resources could be better 
targeted. 
• Poor services in markets and lack of security have resulted in more private 
provision through vigilantism and in some cases contracting out market 
management to private companies. Local governments should explore the 
benefits, difficulties and processes of this: donor and central government will 
need to commission studies. 
 
3. Expanding access to market information on prices and standards 
• Donors and NGOs should encourage linkages between poor producers, 
traders and consumers who need information by funding (i) access to 
telephones for the poor, (ii) networking exchanges and (iii) trusted suppliers of 
information for the poor that is not public sector or donor led.  
• NGOs and schools should offer market-based education on measures and 
quality standards. 
• NGOs should support the regulation of standards through collaborating with 
associations of traders, producers and consumers, as well as the media 
(using avenues such as radio phone-ins)  
 
4. Recognising the positive and negative impacts of intermediaries on pro-
poor growth 
• State and local government should make decisions concerning the impact of 
market and transport intermediaries on poverty alleviation based on the 
locally specific evidence base. This should identify both the benefits of 
intermediaries and those specific occasions where intermediaries exert 
excessive control over market places. 
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• When reorganizing urban markets, local government needs to take particular 
care not to disturb the employment niches occupied by the poorest (such as 
petty retailers and porters) 
• NGOs could provide local governments with information on potential cartel 
type behaviour by intermediaries affecting poor producers and consumers by 
carrying out price studies of particular markets and commodity chains with 
analysis of daily prices 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Understanding access to markets and the institutions of the food sector is a 
major challenge for pro-poor growth. Pro-poor growth in the food sector will not 
only raise incomes (for poor producers, poor traders and the poor who operate in 
related sectors, notably transport), but will also reduce the cost of food for poor 
consumers.  It will thus reduce the vulnerability of the poor in general.    This 
report presents results of a short programme of work on access to different types 
of market (notably food and transport) and the linkages between markets (food, 
transport, credit etc.) conducted by 15 researchers across Nigeria’s major 
regions.  The study incorporates syntheses of previous studies with new field 
research and thus aims to make a significant contribution to building a food 
marketing policy evidence base across Nigeria.  
 
Background 
DFID Nigeria is committed to supporting the food marketing system through a 
number of programmes in order to ensure growth in commodity and service 
markets that offer pro-poor opportunities. However a more comprehensive 
evidence base on which to base these policies is needed.   
 
The lead researchers carried out a scoping study (R8330) during which they 
identified a number of specific issues related to food markets where there is a 
severe lack of empirical evidence.  DFID Abuja selected three core themes from 
our list which could feed in directly to supporting their existing programmes. 
These topics thus form the focus of our current study: 
1. Understanding urban food markets: how can such markets best supply the 
urban poor consumer with good quality food at affordable prices. 
2. Understanding transport markets: efficiency of transport markets and 
means to improved market access. 
3. Understanding the linkages between different markets – transport 
markets, credit markets, labour markets, food markets - and making 
linkages in these markets across the formal and informal sectors.1 
 
                                                 
1 A study of the role of inter-ethnic trade and market interaction in conflict initiation and 
development and in conflict resolution has been undertaken as a separate project. Other topics 
which could form the focus for further research programmes include: a) Understanding credit 
markets: credit availability among different producer and food trader types and implications of 
middleman credit supply, b)Understanding how to support and facilitate entrepreneurship that 
contributes to local economies and improves urban food supply, c) Understanding the role of 
markets and trade in spread of STDs (notably HIV/AIDS) and the potential role of traders, 
transporters and market institutions in supporting HIV/AIDS programmes; d) Understanding 
current informal market information systems and how market; e) Understanding individual market 
chains/networks, notably the perishable vegetable chain (whose smooth working is essential to 
the health of urban populations); f) Understanding the informal regulatory climate which governs 
markets, market access and trade: vigilantes, trader and transport associations/unions etc.  - and 
gauging the potential for improvement; g)Understanding the role of private sector associations 
and organisations in lobbying for policy change and greater accountability. 
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Understanding markets and making them work for the poor in Nigeria 
To make markets work for the poor requires greater understanding of existing 
market systems.  The research problem addressed in this current project is the 
lack of specific knowledge and understanding of formal and informal market 
institutions in Nigeria and their impact on urban food supply systems. It explores 
the systems which govern the marketing opportunities for producers and the 
mechanisms of marketing food in urban areas.  
There is a wide range of highly complex formal and informal institutions that 
shape Africa's food marketing systems: different types of association and self 
imposed rules, in addition to national legal systems that affect how trade is done.  
Very little is known about how these formal and informal regulatory systems 
currently operate2.  For example, the positive contribution of both urban-based 
and rural-based traders in providing an essential service to urban consumers has 
not been adequately analysed.  We need this information if we are to improve 
access by producers to suitable markets and thus enhance urban food supplies, 
and also secure income and livelihoods.    
 
Project outputs 
Through our earlier literature review and Jos pilot (from R8330), combined with 
synthesis of the 15 centre-specific case studies of food marketing issues and 
related transport markets, and our analysis of market linkages, we have been 
able to explore the impact of market institutions on pro-poor growth in Nigeria. 
Benefits of the approach taken in this study include the following: 
• The studies provide specific empirical information for different regions of 
Nigeria for the same period on specified marketing issues. 
• Each case study provides basic information on markets for circulation to 
local stakeholders (state government, NGOs, local universities) and thus 
can help inform state development programmes and regional planning 
strategies.  
• Identification of good practice and understanding of the potentialities and 
constraints which may be imposed by specific local contexts.   
Dissemination of material on good practice and its potential for adoption to 
federal ministries, government agencies, donors, NGOs and other 
stakeholders should, where practicable, promote its extension across the 
country.   
• Our analysis of linkages between different markets (transport, credit, 
labour, food) in different areas of the country aims to contribute to a 
broader understanding of how, why and to what extent different markets 
interlink or fail to interlink on the ground and the role of both local and 
national context in shaping market interlinkages.  An understanding of the 
nature and scale of linkage is an essential precursor to interventions by 
                                                 
2 This argument is well supported by our project R8330 Literature Review: Gina Porter, Fergus 
Lyon, Deborah Potts and Tanya Bowyer-Bower, May 2004: available on the current project 
website. 
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policy makers, since inappropriate interventions in one sector of one 
market can have unforeseen and wide ranging repercussions across 
markets. 
• The training programme undertaken through our two workshops has 
contributed not only to promoting a focus on understanding market issues 
in Nigeria but also a network of researchers focussed on food supply 
issues which can be drawn on for future studies and policy advice where 
and as these are required.   
• Conclusions of the work should contribute to wider policy agendas (within 
DFID, other donors, national governments and NGOs) for pro-poor growth 
in connection to rural livelihoods and food security.  Our preliminary 
consultations in Nigeria, prior to the start of this project, indicated an 
urgent identified need for input on these topics into ongoing programmes 
within DFID (ProPCom, Drivers of Change/conflict resolution, 
development of Ekiti access project, ProFin S); the World Bank (Fadama 
II, RTTP); IFDC (Market information) and the ministries (notably transport 
– RTTP-related).   There is also potential for this evidence-based research 
to support other current and future donor programmes , other current and 
future government programmes,  current and future NGO, CBO/ civil 
society projects and programmes and private sector actors and 
institutions,  whenever knowledge of transport, labour, credit and food 
markets is required.  
 
Review of key themes 
A conceptual framework for this project was developed from a previous study 
(R8330) which reviewed the literature of market institutions and urban food 
supply for sub-Saharan Africa.  It suggested that there is a wide range of 
organisations and institutions that are used to enforce regulations and create 
new opportunities. These can range from illegally based organisations through to 
formal and less formal organisations and relationships, and even norms and 
customs in a particular cultural context. The table below sets out a simplified 
framework for classifying these types of organisation (while recognising that 
formal and informal categories may overlap) 
 
Table 1.1 Types of marketing organisations and institutions 
Formal Informal Cultural Norms 
   
National Government 
Local Government 
Parastatals 
NGOs 
Unions 
Large-scale private sector 
firms 
Co-operatives 
Consumer groups 
Legal systems 
Traditional authorities 
Trade Associations 
Community groups/CBOs 
Community membership 
Trust based relationships 
Youth vigilante groups 
Customs and trading 
practice 
Reciprocity 
‘Rules of the game’ 
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The literature review illustrated that, despite the presence of much detailed, if 
slightly outdated, empirical information on Nigerian rural trade (much of which 
was conducted prior to the 1990s), there is clearly a shortage of specific 
knowledge and understanding of formal and informal market institutions and their 
impact on urban food systems today.    
We list below some of the broad but key questions which emerged from our 
literature review and which have been pursued through the case study research 
in the current project. 
 
Key questions on commodity chains/networks  
• How do individual commodity chains work through from rural, peri-urban 
and urban producers to urban and rural consumers? 
• What are the implications for the livelihoods of the urban and rural poor? 
 
Key questions on trader roles  
• What roles are private traders currently playing in the urban food supply 
system?  What institutions and types of regulation shape their activities?  
• How are current trader patterns gendered in Nigeria?  To what extent 
does this gendering impact on formal and informal institutions? What are 
the implications for gendered livelihoods?  
• How does ethnicity shape current marketing patterns?  Can excessive 
ethno-domination be mediated/regulated by formal/informal institutions? 
 
Key questions on control of market space 
• To what extent and in what ways is access to market space controlled in 
Nigerian markets?   
• What are the consequences for individual trader and producer-trader 
types?   
• Who is currently excluded and with what consequences? 
• To what extent does central and local government currently regulate 
access to market space? With what consequences? 
 
 Key questions on market information 
• What are the principal channels of information currently used by traders of 
different types? 
• How important are personal networks for information gathering? 
• Are there specific information brokers? If so, how do they operate? 
• How much use is made of government information outlets?  
• What are trader perceptions of government information channels?  
• If these were improved would they be used more? If so, how could they be 
improved? 
• To what extent are mobile telephones used along different components of 
the marketing chain? What are the barriers? What is the future potential? 
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Key questions on credit provision 
• What credit provision is available to key trader types along the urban food 
supply chain?   
• What proportion at each level comes from formal as opposed to informal 
sources?  
• What interest rates are applied? 
• To what extent have microfinance schemes assisted in credit provision 
among the various trader groups? 
• Can credit provision be improved? How?  
 
Key transport questions 
• How is the existing transport system organised to bring food supplies to 
urban markets? 
• Who else may be able to provide transport but is not allowed access at 
present? 
• What are the regulations and institutions (formal and informal) regulating 
access to fuel? 
• What are the regulations and institutions (formal and informal) regulating 
access to routes and lorry parks? 
 
Key questions on consumption 
• What are the buying patterns of different types of consumers? 
• Where do poorer consumers buy their food? 
• What types of food do poorer consumers buy? 
• What are the restrictions on poorer consumers in accessing lower-priced 
or better quality food? 
• What progress have supermarket operations made in Nigeria and what is 
likely to be there impact on consumers over the next decade? 
 
Key questions on food safety regulation: 
• Which government regulations in place to protect consumers currently 
have any real impact on food safety? 
• Which regulations in place are enforced? Which are not enforced? Why 
not? 
• How can enforcement of regulations be improved? (including trader and 
government perceptions) 
 
Key questions on consumer associations: 
• What consumer groups are operating in Nigeria? 
• How do they operate and what do they do? 
• What political representation is there for poorer consumers? 
• Is there potential to increase their voice? 
 
Key questions on central and local government roles: 
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• What is the current pattern and level of central and local government  
involvement in urban food supply, marketing regulation and facilitation? 
• Is it sustainable? 
• Is there potential to increase their involvement? In which areas? 
• Is there need to reduce their involvement (i.e. reduce excessive 
regulation)? 
 
Key questions around legislation: 
• What are the laws and regulations  
• How do they affect (positively or negatively) different groups (in particular 
urban and rural poor) 
• How are these enforced (examples if known)? 
• What restrictions are there on enforcing this law? 
• What compliance costs? 
• How do people get around it? 
 
Key questions re standardisation of weights and measures: 
• What types of weights/measurement are currently prevalent among 
different trader groups and different markets? 
• What government legislation re weights and measurement is currently in 
place? 
• To what extent is it enforced and with what consequences? 
• How do different types of traders perceive the weights/measurement 
issue? How do regulators perceive it? 
 
Key questions on trader associations: 
• To what extent are trader associations active in different markets and 
commodities?  
• What is their role? 
• Do they improve the access of the urban and rural poor to safe, cheap 
food? If not, why not? 
• To what extent to do they include or exclude informal producers? 
• To what extent could they be improved to provide a better service to 
producers, traders and consumers? 
 
Key questions on pricing: 
• To what extent does price setting among trader groups occur in markets?   
• What are the consequences for individual producer and trader types and 
for rural and urban consumers? 
 
Key questions on youth vigilante groups: 
• How prevalent are vigilante youth groups in the study locations? 
• What do they do? 
• In what ways and to what extent do they improve or hinder food supply to 
the poor? 
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• In what ways and to what extent do their activities impinge on producers, 
specific trader groups and other stakeholders? 
 
Key questions on NGO involvement: 
• What is the current pattern and level of NGO involvement? 
• Is it sustainable in the long-term without large-scale subsidy? 
• Is there potential to improve NGO/Local government collaboration? 
 
Key questions on the role of traditional authorities: 
• What is the current pattern and level of involvement of traditional 
authorities in marketing regulation and facilitation in the case study 
locations? 
• Is it sustainable? 
• Is there potential to increase their involvement? In which areas? 
 
Key questions on alternatives to traditional intermediaries/ forms of supply 
to urban markets: 
• To what extent do the alternatives to traditional intermediaries (contract 
farming, coops, etc.) play a role in urban food supply in case study 
locations? 
• In particular, what progress have supermarket operations made in Nigeria 
and what is likely to be there impact on producers, conventional traders 
and procurement patterns over the next decade? 
• What are local attitudes to these various institutions? 
• Is there a potentially larger role for any of these alternatives in rural urban 
food supply (given that the volume of food items the marketing system will 
need to handle over the next 20 years will be substantially larger - possibly 
double - current volumes)? 
 
 
The Nigerian policy environment towards food marketing  
Tension and mistrust between the public and private sector in the produce 
marketing field has long been a characteristic feature in Nigeria.  Nonetheless it 
is important to examine ways in which the public sector can support private 
initiative, while bearing in mind the historical context of frequent antagonisms 
between the two.  Food insecurity in Nigerian cities is relatively invisible to policy 
makers and is still scarcely recognised in contemporary political debate. This is 
particularly disturbing since urban poverty will most probably become the 
dominant source of food insecurity in the 21st Century.  While democratisation 
and decentralisation, in theory, strengthen local and municipal governments, this 
places increased demands on their already strained capacities.  They are 
commonly unable to cope adequately because weak capacity and limited 
financial resources are characteristic of conditions at this level.  
 
In terms of central and state government, policymakers have tended to focus less 
on urban food insecurity than on food insecurity in rural areas, where it is 
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typically a more seasonal and community-wide phenomenon.  There has been 
little interest in produce trading systems. With regard to transport markets, most 
intervention is limited to infrastructure such as road building.  
 
In terms of Local Government, City and Local Authorities have a range of 
potential responsibilities that are associated with urban food security and food 
marketing.   However, as Ellis and Sumberg (1998) point out, it is important to be 
cautious about the capabilities and constraints faced by municipal and 
government authorities, “and not to advocate measures that are unenforceable, 
unsustainable or susceptible to capture by stronger social groups at the expense 
of the weak” (p.220).  The major constraints on local government include ill-
defined constitutional powers, lack of staff capacity to design and implement 
programmes, lack of financial resources, central/state government 
influence/interference, corruption and a lack of dialogue with the private sector.  
The fact that market taxation is commonly their main source of revenue, given 
the failure of other forms of taxation, is highly significant. They collect levies but 
fail to supply electricity, water or sanitation: this is a cause of substantial 
argument with traders and trader associations. Many of the public health laws, 
by-laws and ordinances are out of date and irrelevant to contemporary local food 
conditions. On the producer side, there seems to be poor representation and little 
ability to lobby local government among small-scale farmers.   
 
In Nigeria, producers, consumers and micro enterprise traders have a lack of 
trust in formal legal systems.  The problem of enforcement and its entanglement 
with rent seeking practices is widespread.  Successful use of legislation requires 
the ability to enforce compliance and transparency of the process of 
enforcement. Regulation of profit making activities can create substantial 
opportunities for corruption.  
 
Background and project framework 
The researchers leading this study carried out a scoping study of food supply 
issues in Nigeria (R8330) in January 20043.  This involved a literature review of 
market institutions and urban food supply in sub-Saharan Africa, field testing in 
one location with collaborators from the University of Jos regarding the relevance 
of issues identified through the literature review,  individual consultations with key 
federal government staff, NGOs, DFID and other donors and academics, and a 
seminar/stakeholder meeting in Abuja. This preliminary work led to the 
identification of a considerable number of specific issues related to food markets 
where there is a severe lack of empirical evidence on which policy makers and 
those advising them in Nigeria can base their decisions.   
 
The Jos study  suggested that marketing bottlenecks are commonly location and 
commodity specific; that transport bottlenecks are pervasive; that commission 
                                                 
3 Porter, Bowyer-Bower, Potts, Lyon, Adepetu, Olaniyan, Daloeng, Mulenga, Mumba:  
Improving market institutions and urban food supplies for the urban poor: a comparative study of 
Nigeria and Zambia: scoping phase, R8330 Scoping review inception report to DFID May 2004. 
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agents will probably continue to play an essential role in marketing until/unless 
alternative means of providing timely credit and inputs are available; that market 
interactions can both create and resolve conflict; that governance issues 
(insecurity, corruption, rent seeking, etc.) are a pervasive theme and encompass 
misdemeanours in both private and public sectors; and that poor urban and rural 
consumers have little voice in shaping and regulating the market environment.  
We needed further evidence to either confirm or refute these very preliminary 
perspectives on Nigeria’s urban food marketing system, given that they drew on 
one small case study and focused on just one commodity. 
 
Links to PrOpCom and Drivers of Change 
This project owes it existence, in part, to a peer review of four state marketing 
studies which we were asked to prepare for DFID Abuja. That peer review in 
turn, became one of two ToR briefing papers for the PrOpcom project.   We were 
subsequently asked by DFID Abuja to prepare this study of market institutions as 
a preliminary research resource on which PrOpCom could draw.  With DFID 
approval, the seven individual commodity reports have been forwarded to 
PrOpCom, which is only now embarking on its main programme of work.   
 
Drivers of Change provided an important political economy background resource 
and specific material on youth vigilantism, religious and ethnic context, anti-
corruption, etc. The interim reports have helped inform the approach taken in this 
study.  The complex mix of coercion with consensus, flexibility and 
responsiveness identified as key features of Nigeria’s structural environment in 
the Drivers of Change studies are mirrored in many of the specific conclusions 
reached here.. The gatekeeper organisations and interpersonal relations of trust 
between market actors that underpin market operations clearly resonate with the 
emphasis placed on gatekeeper organisations and agents (and their limitations) 
observed in the Drivers of Change report.  In both Drivers for Change and our 
own marketing study,  the ultimate key to improved conditions is identified as 
transformation of the institutional environment in which individuals and gate-
keeper organisations must operate.  
 
Developing the networked research approach 
Our current project design has drawn directly on the approach taken in a highly 
successful DFID/World Bank/SDA-funded transport project across Africa and 
Asia, Balancing the Load, in which one of the authors of this report was 
involved4.  The networked approach can enable the delivery of effective results in 
a short time period over a wide geographical area.  It provides a highly cost-
effective means of recruiting, training and employing a committed group of 
researchers, some of whom may have had had little previous research 
experience but are keen (and judged able) to learn.   
 
                                                 
4 Described in Priyanthi Fernando and Gina Porter  (eds) 2003: Balancing the Load, London: Zed 
Press. 
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We started with requests for expressions of interest to specific academics and a 
few NGO and government staff resident in different locations across Nigeria. We 
aimed to recruit about 12 researchers, with 2 working in each of 6 regions.  
Selection of participants was based on their ability to write clearly and their past 
experience. Each potential participant was required to sign up to the following 
agreement: (1) participation in a one-week project preparation/training residential 
workshop, where they would be helped to design an individual small project for 
execution in their own work or home location, (2) a short mid-project progress 
report on their small research study, (3) a second one-week workshop where 
they would present their research results, receive comments from all project 
participants, be advised if they needed to collect additional material, and be 
assisted in the preparation of a final report, (4) delivery of their case study report 
no later than one month following the second workshop.   
 
Our time frame was very short because DFID Abuja wanted results of the studies 
as quickly as possible.  The first project workshop was held in December 20045, 
the review workshop in March 2005 and the final reports from the Nigerian 
researchers were accepted in May 2005.  We contracted 15 researchers to 
provide studies (12 new researcher studies and three studies in the Jos region 
6to build on our earlier pilot).  All of the 15 researchers we contracted have 
produced reports.   
 
 
Using a networked research approach to address our three core themes 
Obtaining sufficient material to understand Nigeria’s transport markets, urban 
food markets and the linkages between markets, all within a 10 month period, 
with a very small budget, has been quite a challenge.  The networked approach 
has enabled us to achieve considerable regional coverage, but clearly we could 
not expect our collaborators to cover all themes and all commodities in their 
region.  Instead, we asked each researcher to focus on one commodity in which 
they had experience/knowledge and to focus on one or two of the key issues 
identified by our literature review and Jos pilot (see above), within a commodity 
chain/network framework and with particular reference to formal and informal 
institutions.   The key issues identified through the literature review are central to 
understanding our first two core themes: understanding transport markets and 
understanding urban food markets.  For each broad commodity type, in each 
regional context, we thus tried to achieve some coverage across these diverse 
but interconnected issues.   The project leaders have then synthesised 
information from the individual case study material to identify broad patterns and 
trends. 
                                                 
5 It was delayed by a threatened general strike.  
6 The Jos University collaborators (Professor Adepetu, Professor Olaniyan and Mr Daloeng) were 
to have organised the two workshops in Jos, but due to the conflict in Jos (and associated 
concerns about insurance cover), Durham University required us to hold the workshops in Abuja.  
We therefore asked our Jos collaborators to develop their work from the pilot studies because 
they could not organise the workshops.  The workshops were organised directly from UK instead. 
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Researcher background, case study topics and regional coverage 
All our Nigerian researchers came from academic institutions (universities and 
research institutions), because none of the NGO or government staff we 
approached expressed an interest in participating.  Their academic backgrounds 
are principally geography, food technology or agricultural economics, though one 
(Dr Adamu) is a sociologist.   These varied disciplinary perspectives bore positive 
fruit in our workshop discussions, helping shape both the field research and 
subsequent analysis.  
 
In selecting our researchers, we had to balance our desire for adequate regional 
coverage with researcher interest in the project and a very modest budget which 
only provided for researchers to undertake the study from their home/work base7.  
Consequently, our regional coverage was better in some areas than others: two 
studies were based in north-western Nigeria (Sokoto), one in north-eastern 
Nigeria (Maiduguri), four in Plateau State (three in the Jos region, one off the 
Plateau in Jengre), one in north central Nigeria (Zaria region),  two studies in the 
south west (one in the Ibadan region, one in Abeokuta), three studies in south-
south and south-east Nigeria (all comparative two-city studies in Enugu and 
Benin) and one in Delta State (Warri).   
 
Each researcher’s commodity focus and specific topic of research was not 
confirmed until after considerable discussion at the first workshop (held in Abuja 
in December 2004).   Although each participant came to the workshop with 
provisional ideas about their own topic theme and commodity, the final selection 
was based on a balance between their previous work, knowledge and interests, 
the limited funds and time available for the project, and the potential for linkages 
between studies. Generally, we asked researchers to build on their own previous 
work in their case study region. The commodities we finally selected were 
livestock, maize, cowpea, vegetables, fufu, gari, and fish, thus giving a 
reasonable diversity of food types and the potential to make some useful links 
and comparisons.   
 
Livestock is the focus for three researchers: two working in the north-east rearing 
region, one in the south-west consuming region: this allows us to follow the 
livestock chain from the collecting markets through to the city butchers in Ibadan.   
Trader networks, security, transport institutions and insurance and are key 
themes linking these studies.  We also have one study focussing on fish. We did 
not anticipate including fish in our project, but Professor Ikporukpo demonstrated 
to all the collaborators that this study could provide important perspectives on 
ethnic trade networks, transport and market access.  Both livestock and fish play 
an important dietary role, though in Nigeria the cost of animal protein, in 
particular, limits its accessibility to the poor.  However, a considerable number of 
                                                 
7 Each researcher received an honorarium of £1000 (paid in three instalments over the course of 
the project): this had to cover all their travel and other expenses pertaining to the research. The 
researchers obtained no other funds from the project, apart from travel to the two workshops. 
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very poor people obtain their livelihood through their participation in herding, 
fishing and porterage of these commodities.  
 
Maize features in two studies from northern central Nigeria: Jengre, in Plateau 
state, and Giwa in Kaduna State.  Both are major grain trading centres located 
within important maize producing areas.  The studies cover a wide range of 
issues from measurement and credit to the role of the diverse trading agents and 
transport and allow us to draw comparisons between arrangements in the two 
centres. 
 
We have two cowpea studies, one based at the centre of a major producing 
region (Maiduguri, in Borno) and one in a distribution and consumption centre 
(Abeokuta, serving consumers in south western Nigeria). Cowpea is a very 
important source of cheap protein for both the urban and rural poor in Nigeria.  
The Maiduguri study focuses particularly on measurement and access to credit, 
the Abeokuta study on measurement: both consider the role of trader 
associations. 
 
Gari was the commodity for three studies, all of which examined and compared 
marketing in Benin and Enugu.  Gari, manufactured from cassava, plays a 
particularly important role in southern Nigeria as an urban convenience food. The 
reports consider different aspects of the gari chain and the urban market 
institutions which regulate the trade, including market information, credit 
provision, transport institutions, control of  market space, security, trader 
associations, food safety and measurement. 
 
Vegetables are also included within the project, although they had also been the 
focus for our earlier pilot on the Jos Plateau.  The three studies extend the 
information gathered in January 2004, by providing further detail regarding 
producer-trader relations, market security and retail trade to Jos urban 
consumers. 
 
Evaluating the networked approach adopted 
The review of coverage above indicates that the networked approach allowed us 
to achieve:  
• Timely review of a complex topic across diverse regions of a large 
country.   While our regional coverage was not complete, and we have 
better coverage for some regions than others, there is no other way that 
we could have achieved similar coverage over the same short period.  If 
we had used one research team for the whole country, this would have 
had to be supported by local staff in each location, because of the 
diversity of local languages prevalent in market contexts.   
• Cost effectiveness.  Because each researcher was working in their home 
location, we did not have to pay extensive travel costs. The researchers 
incorporated the studies into their everyday work.  
• Creation and capacity building of a network of researchers 
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On the negative side, the fact that our team had diverse disciplinary backgrounds 
and interests meant that some studies are stronger on economic issues, others 
on food quality etc.  However, this was to some extent compensated by the fact 
that researchers advised and consulted with one another during the planning 
workshop.   
 
We were able to achieve adequate triangulation through the workshops and 
email exchanges between participant researchers, since although each 
researcher had a particular expertise in his/her own selected commodity and in-
depth knowledge of the research location, all researchers had broad knowledge 
of other commodities and substantial cross-regional research experience in 
marketing issues.   We were able to achieve further cross-checking through 
reference to earlier literature (fully researched for the literature review) and 
through the presentations made at the stakeholder meeting in Abuja to a wider 
audience of academics, practitioners and policy makers.  Finally, Professor 
Ayodele Ariyo (Department of Geography, Ahmadu Bello University), an 
internationally recognised food marketing specialist, who was unable to 
participate in the study due to prior commitments reviewed the reports, thus 
providing a final check.  
 
Overall, we are extremely pleased with the studies produced through the 
approach. While some may be considered stronger than others, they have 
allowed us to review a complex topic over a vast country, in an extremely short 
period of time, and at remarkably low cost.  In the longer term there are further 
potential advantages: since the marketing network has now been established, it 
has allowed academics from diverse disciplinary backgrounds to interact and, 
consequently in-country capacity has been enhanced.  Hopefully, this will lead to 
further collaborative work, Our Nigerian colleagues have also expressed their 
satisfaction with the results of this networked approach which has spread the 
opportunity to make a contribution rather more widely than is commonly the case 
in overseas-funded projects of this kind. 
 
Organisation of the report 
Ensuing sections of this report focus on major commodity groups. We have 
synthesised findings from individual papers to provide composite reviews and cut 
out overlapping material where there would be excessive repetition across 
studies. However, the individual reports can be consulted on the project website: 
www.dur.ac.uk/nigerian.marketing.  We conclude the report with our synthesis 
chapter, including a range of policy guidelines for Nigeria-based and other policy 
makers.   
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2. ETHNICITY AND SOCIAL NETWORKS IN A FISH MARKETING SYSTEM, 
WARRI, NIGERIA 
Chris O. Ikporukpo 
Department of Geography, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria 
 
 
Introduction 
Fish is an important source of protein for the middle-class and elites across 
Nigeria, and also for poorer people in regions close to producing areas. 
Additionally, the fish trade offers substantial employment opportunities in many 
coastal and inland areas where fish is caught.  
 
This study considers the marketing and transportation systems for fish in one 
coastal settlement, Warri, with particular reference to the socio-cultural milieu.   
The basic issues addressed are: 
? What is the pattern of gendering in the marketing and transportation 
processes? 
 
? How do ethnic networks operate to facilitate or impede the marketing and 
transportation processes? 
 
? What role do ethnicity and social capital play in the assignment, control 
and management of market space? 
 
? To what extent does social capital facilitate the marketing process? 
 
The attention on these issues may throw up other critical ones fundamental in 
marketing re-organisation and the access of food (in this case fish) to the urban 
poor.  For instance, in the process of analysing these issues, impediments to an 
effective fish marketing and transportation will be identified and examined. 
 
Study location 
This study focuses on Warri, a city located about 109 km. from the coast, and the 
largest urban centre in the Western Niger Delta Region. With an annual growth 
rate of 9.84 percent (Imoroa, 2000), its population is now (2005) estimated to be 
more than 800, 000 (it was 218,000 in the 1991 Census).  Three aspects of its 
location are of particular significance: 
? It is around the meeting area of three ecological zones: mangrove swamp, 
fresh water swamp and lowland rainforest. 
 
? It is at the boundary area of three ethnic groups: Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo. 
 
? It is the administrative capital of the petroleum industry in the Western 
Niger Delta Region. 
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The location of Warri around the transition zone of the mangrove swamp, fresh 
water swamp and lowland rainforest implies that, being the largest town in the 
western Niger Delta region, it is strategically placed to command the exchange of 
commodities from these zones.  Significant as these zones are, a much broader 
categorisation of the region into an “upland” and a “riverine” delta or an “inner” 
and an “outer” delta is more meaningful in the context of this study.  The upland 
or inner delta, made up of the lowland rainforest and parts of the fresh water 
swamp zones, is characteristically a producer of tuber food crops such as yam 
and cassava and related crops such as plantain.  Fishing is the main occupation 
of the outer delta with some cultivation of plantain and cassava.  Beyond Warri, 
towards the coast, only water transport is possible currently since there are no 
road links.  Warri is thus not only an agricultural production boundary but also 
that of transportation. 
 
Its location at the transition zone of three ethnic groups has resulted in its being 
one of the most, if not the most contested, urban areas in Nigeria.  Each of the 
ethnic groups lays claim to all or part of the city.  Consequently, ethnic conflict 
has become endemic in the city.  The ethnic factor has been complicated by the 
city’s significance as a centre of the oil industry.  Commonly referred to as the oil 
city, the contest in the city has both ethnic and economic coloration.  The control 
of the crumbs from the oil companies has been fundamental in the ethnic 
conflicts in and around the city.  This largely explains why the inter-ethnic 
conflicts in the city have been particularly violent since the 1970s when oil 
emerged as the mainstay of the country’s economy.  Of all the incidences, those 
of the late 1990s have been the most vicious, marked by unprecedented loss of 
life and property. 
 
The marketing and transportation processes of fish in Warri reflect this socio-
cultural and economic complexities that have become characteristic of the city.  
The processes throw up not only ethnic and gender issues but also those of 
exclusion/inclusion.  The largest fish market in the city - Ogbe Ijoh Market - 
provides an ideal setting for analysis.  Ogbe Ijoh Market, located at the water-
front is the first point of contact between riverine and upland traders.  It was the 
first area to be settled in Warri and hence provided the nucleus around which the 
city grew (Lloyd, 1974). Until the 1990s, it was the most ethnically complex 
market in the city.  
 
The inter-ethnic conflicts between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri and between the 
Itsekiri and Urhobo in the 1990s led to an ethnic segregation of fish marketing in 
the city. In particular, the Itsekiri and, to some extent, the Ilaje, generally 
perceived to be allies of the Itsekiri, regarded the market as unsafe, preferring 
Pesu and other smaller fish markets. Some Urhobos also preferred the inland 
Igbudu, which is generally perceived to be an Urhobo market. Although at the 
time of the fieldwork, Ilaje traders have started returning to the market, the 
population remained largely Ijaw and Urhobo, with the former predominating. 
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Methods 
Data were collected in December 2004 and January 2005 in Warri, Delta 
State, the study location.  A number of approaches were employed to obtain 
data from key actors.  These are: 
 
? Observation and reconnaissance. 
? Focus group discussion. 
? Semi-structured interviews. 
 
In addition to these secondary sources were useful. 
 
Observation and Reconnaissance were aided by the author’s prior knowledge 
of aspects of the market, such as its location and ethnic character of key actors.  
The reconnaissance was used to obtain details on various aspects of the 
characteristics of the market, such as unions and administration of the market.  
This proved very useful in subsequent stages of data collection.  For instance, 
whereas the author thought that there was only one central union of fish traders, 
it turned out to be two for each of Ijaw and Urhobo traders and another for Ilaje 
traders.  Furthermore, the existence of the position of a central market chairman 
distinct from a Union Chairperson, was not envisaged. 
 
Apart from observing the physical structure and arrangement of stalls in terms of 
the type of fish sold in given areas and the location of ethnic groups within the 
market, the haggling process in several instances was also observed.  The latter 
provided information on the price-fixing process and the peculiar language/idioms 
of the marketing process, such as fire-down and broke-manage. Fire-down 
means quoting an exceedingly high price and hence necessitating, in many 
cases, a rather long haggling process while broke-manage refers to relatively 
small-sized fish which has broken into several pieces in the course of 
transportation and handling. Although the market meets daily, there are specified 
four-day interval market days.  It was therefore necessary to observe the settings 
in both ‘ordinary days’ and ‘market days’. 
 
Focus Group Discussion: Six different focus group discussions (FGDs), one for 
each of the five market unions and for the union of porters (locally referred to as 
carry-carry were conducted.  The market unions are: 
 
? The two Ijaw unions: Abala Ere Igbe and Better Life Indi fe zere Igbe. 
? The two Urhobo Unions: Egherimo and Ufuoma Ineki Iyerin. 
? The one Ilaje fish sellers Union: the Young Shall Grow. 
 
In each case, the focus group was the executive committee together with a few 
others.  The varied issues discussed included among others the authority 
structure, the functions and functioning, the basis for membership, relationship 
with other unions, the control of market, aspects of the marketing chain, security 
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and problems.  All the discussions were tape-recorded with the facilitator (the 
author) taking notes where need be.  The discussions were in pidgin English 
except the first two which were, in addition, conducted in the native language. 
 
 The focus group discussion involving the carry-carry revolved around 
issues of unionization, membership, the organisation of the trade, ethnic, gender 
and age-group composition, and relationship with fish traders and boat transport 
operators.  Other issues included security and general problems.  The discussion 
which was in pidgin English was also tape-recorded. 
 
Semi-Structured Interviews: This was the most extensive survey, covering 
several members of each of the unions including the carry-carry and the boat 
owners/operators unions.  The number covered in each union was informed by 
its size.  For instance, among the traders unions, the largest number (fifteen) 
came from Abala Ere and the least (five) from the Ilaje union.  In addition, the 
Chairman of the market was interviewed.  At the time these interviews were 
conducted, so much rapport between the author and the respondents had been 
established that information was volunteered freely.  Whereas some were tape-
recorded, others were recorded through note taking. 
 
The interview of the traders focused on entry into trade, capital, fish procurement 
process, stall acquisition, control of market space, benefits of belonging to unions 
and other associations, links with other traders, carry-carry and boat operators 
and problems faced, among others.  In the case of carry-carry, the emphasis was 
on processes of the trade, reasons for choice and problems.  The role of 
transport in the marketing chain relationship with other actors were the central 
issues in the boat operators interviews while in the case of the Market Chairman, 
the emphasis was on the organisation and functioning of the market. 
 
Secondary Sources: This study relies overwhelmingly on primary sources of 
data.  However, secondary information such as population figures from 
publications of the National Population Commission and on the early settlement 
history of Warri, mainly from colonial intelligence reports have been useful. 
 
 
The commodity chain 
The fish marketing chain is an amalgam of economic, geographical and socio-
cultural orientations.  The chain itself (which is analyzed in a subsequent section) 
starts with the harvesting of fish in several fishing villages/hamlets and 
terminates in the consumption centres of several cities.  Each stage of the chain 
depicts varying intricacies of organisation and relationships.  These 
organisational structures and relationships provide the building blocks of this 
study. 
 
Different stages of the chain involve the participation of different age groups, 
different genders, various ethnic groups and people at different levels of 
INVESTIGATIONS ON BUILDING A FOOD MARKETING POLICY 
EVIDENCE BASE IN NIGERIA: November 2005 
 
23
prosperity/poverty.  The relationships in the interaction within a given stage and 
between one and others involve several networks of ethnicity, gendering and 
social capital particularly trust.  It is the pattern of interaction within the fish 
marketing chain involving several socio-economic and geographical networks, 
with varying ramifications that is the focus of this study. 
 
Gender and  ethnicity in the marketing chain 
Figure 1 shows the fish marketing chain from the point of production (fish catch) 
to that of the final consumers.  The functioning of the several stages reflect clear 
division of labour on the basis of gender and, to an extent, age.  The fish 
production centres are scattered over the creeks and rivers of Delta and Bayelsa 
States.  The most significant centres (according to the traders and the 
transporters) are Agee, Amatu, Agoro, Ekeni, Letugbene and Frupa (in Bayelsa 
State). and Odimodi, Ogulagha, old Forcados, Yeye, Yokri, Ikeremo, and 
Oporoza (Delta State). 
 
Although the fish harvesting process is the responsibility of both male and 
female, the initial marketing is the sole responsibility of women.  The initial 
marketing is a curious one.  The fish caught is usually sold to the local women of 
the villages normally to the wife or wives of the fisherman who caught the fish.  
Why is the fish which in certain cases a woman participated in catching sold to 
her?  The explanation by the market women in Warri is that this is a way of 
creating an alternative source of income for the local women.  It is also an 
attempt to replace women from outside the region, such as itinerant Itsekiri and 
Urhobo traders who hitherto bought the fish, smoke it and sold same in Warri and 
other urban centres.  The replacement of these women was facilitated by the 
ethnic conflict in the Western Niger Delta Region which made it unsafe for them 
to stay in these villages. Although, some of these ‘external’ women still continue 
to perform this function, the wives’ system is the predominant particularly given 
that some of these ‘external women’ sometime ultimately marry such fishermen. 
Such home-based commodity trade, though in a slightly different form, has been 
reported in other studies. For instance, in parts of northern Nigeria, women buy 
grains and groundnut from their husbands for resale after processing or even 
back to their husbands at higher prices during the pre-harvest period of relative 
scarcity (Hill, 1969; Jackson, 1985). In the Gambia, fishermen frequently sell fish 
to their women relatives, not necessarily be their wives, who then process same 
and sell to middlemen or in the towns (Barrett, 1988).  
 
The fish, either fresh or smoked, is loaded into boats usually by young males.  
These local carry-carry are usually supported by the “boat boys” who play a 
central role in protecting the fish during transport to Warri.  Although the local 
carry-carry and the boat boys are usually of Ijaw ethnic nationality, the boat 
ownership is much more diverse.  The boats are owned by not only Ijaws but 
also Urhobos and Ilajes.  Although, apart from the paddle-propelled canoe, there 
are three types of boats - in-board, out-board and speed-boat (Ikporukpo, 1985; 
1987), it is only the latter two that are commonly involved in the transport of fish. 
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The speed boat, being faster, is characteristically employed in the movement of 
fresh fish while the smoked, usually in larger quantities, is transported through 
out-board boats. 
 
As Figure 1 indicates, the discharge of the fish in the jetties of Warri, is the next 
stage in the chain and brings into contact the transporter, the carry-carry and the 
market women.  The relationship among these three actors will be analyzed 
further in the sub-section on trust in the fish supplier-transporter-trader link.  The 
movement of the boats is synchronized such that they arrive Warri the evening 
preceding the market day or early in the morning of the market day. 
 
The carry-carry who provide a direct link between the transporters and the 
market women discharge the fish.  They work in gangs of between 5 and 10 with 
each gang attached to specific boats.  The charges of these porters depend on 
the size of the basket of fish.  There are three types of baskets, viz: Lagos 
basket, Onitsha basket and market basket.  The first type, as the name suggests 
is for fish commonly bought by traders from Lagos on market days and is the 
largest attracting the highest discharging fee.  This is followed by the second, i.e. 
baskets commonly transported to Onitsha city and lastly the baskets terminating 
in the market at Warri.  The boat freight rates also vary on the basis of these 
baskets. 
 
The carry-carry gangs made up of young men from a diverse ethnic backgroup, 
such as Ijaw, Urhobo, Ibo and Hausa do not admit young ladies.  The exclusion 
of females was explained by the strenuous and hazardous nature of the trade.  
As one member of the executive retorted (when asked by the author why ladies 
are not among them): “Will you allow your daughter or sister to be a carry-carry”? 
 
Virtually all carry-carry interviewed and the executive committee perceives the 
trade as a stop-gap in the search for better jobs.  Many including the executive 
committee argue that since it is more or less a temporary engagement and given 
the harsh economic reality, there are no restrictions on entering the trade by any 
willing young man.  As a member of the executive committee put it: 
 
The economic condition in Warri is really bad.  Given the fact that 
there has been ethnic conflict resulting in destruction of life and 
property, the employment opportunities have dwindled.  Many 
individuals are suffering.  There are no good jobs available.  
Therefore we accept any one who wants to become a carry-carry.  
However, that individual must be willing to work under a gang head 
(translated from pidgin English by author). 
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Once off-loaded the next stage is the movement of the fish to the market by the 
carry-carry using mainly wheelbarrows.  From the Ogbe Ijoh market, wholesalers 
purchase and transport some of the fish to large cities such as Lagos and 
Onitsha while the market basket fish is either purchased by local consumers or 
bought and sold in other fish markets within the metropolis.  It is remarkable that 
all those selling fish in the market are female.  As one respondent put it, “it is only 
a shameless man that will come to the market to sell fish”.  The executive 
members of one of the unions emphasized the exclusion of men thus: “We 
cannot admit a man to our union.  He should rather tell his wife to apply to be a 
member”.  A predominance of females in the distributive trade and in other cases 
their significance have been widely reported in several studies in Nigeria and 
other African countries (Adalemo, 1972; Chilirambo and Kanyangwa, 1984; 
Adekanye, 1988; Porter, 1988; Osirim, 1994; Mathabane, 1994; Horn, 1994 & 
1995; Zhou, 1995; Tripp, 1997; Levin et al, 1999). However, such a sole female 
participation as observed in this study is rather unique. 
 
Control of Market Space 
The control of market space is a fundamental aspect of the functioning of a 
market and indeed of the market chain.  It usually reflects several aspects of the 
relationships among the actors in a market.  A central issue which shapes the 
nature of and the struggle for control is ethnicity and the related one of 
unionization given the fact that all the market unions, except the related ones of 
transportation and porterage, are based on ethnic association.  Three key 
aspects of control are of interest.  These are: 
 
(i) Geographic space (stalls and related ones). 
(ii) Selling space (entry to trade and general functioning). 
(iii) Security space (law, order and safety). 
 
For a proper appreciation of these issues, the structure of authority within the 
Ogbe Ijoh fish market needs be provided.  Figure 2 displays the authority 
structure.  The first hierarchy within the market is the market chairman.  He is 
appointed not by the various unions or even the local government but by the 
people of the settlement of Ogbe Ijoh, the owners of the land where the market 
is located.  Given the fact that Ogbe Ijoh is an Ijaw settlement and the fact that 
the Chairman must be an indigene of the settlement, the Ijaw ethnic group 
seems to have established a framework for dominance.  It is also a basis for 
male control in a market where only females sell as there has and may never 
be a female Chairman. This is because the chairman is usually chosen from 
the youthful male age-grades. According to the current Market Chairman and 
executive members of the unions, the position is a recent one emerging only in 
the 1990s when there was inter-ethnic crisis in the city.  The Chairman 
explained that the position emerged as a strategy for invigorating a market 
threatened by disintegration at a time it was very unsafe to buy and sell in the 
market.  Unlike, the situation during the Yoruba wars where women traders 
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from different warring groups could meet rather safely in neutral grounds 
between them (Hodder and Ukwu, 1969) in the Warri setting not even children 
were safe.  As the Chairman put it, the position was necessitated by the need 
to “hold the market together and prevent attack from the enemies”. 
 
As Figure 2 indicates, the next hierarchy is made up of the market unions.  In 
theory, the unions ought to have equal authority, rights and privileges.  Indeed, 
this was so before the Warri crisis of the 1990s.  In practice, the two Ijaw 
unions (Abala Ere and Better Life) have more authority and privileges than the 
others.  The Chairman explained the situation thus: “this is our market.  The 
Urhobos have Igbudu market and the Itsekiri, Pesu market.  We should be in 
charge here”.  The setting is that the ethnic crisis in the Western Niger Delta, 
particularly in Warri, polarized the ethnic groups with each curling into its 
ethnic space shell and attempting to protect its territory to the exclusion of 
other ethnic groups.  This largely explains why the Ilaje ethnic group union (the 
Young Shall Grow) is particularly disadvantaged as the group has only 
recently returned to the market after several years of absence.  The current 
absence of Itsekiri fish sellers is also due to the crisis.  Below this hierarchy 
are the carry-carry and security guards. 
 
There is a clear division of space in the geographic organisation of the market.  
The waterfront part of the market is occupied predominantly by the Ijaw with 
only a very few Urhobos and Ilajes.  This is the most strategically located part 
of the market in terms of access to the fish offloading jetties.  Across the road 
(Market Road), which divides the market into two, are the two separate areas 
occupied by each of Urhobo and Ilaje traders.  This part of the market has 
uncompleted buildings and stores and according to the traders was assigned 
to them by the local government (i.e. Warri South local government). Traders 
pay rent to the local government. 
 
The difference between this area and that occupied by the Ijaws is that the 
stalls in the latter were built by the traders.  The basis for this difference is 
embedded in the ethnic relations history of the city.  Although, Ogbe Ijoh is the 
first fish market, others notably Pesu were later provided by the local/State 
government.   
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MARKET CHAIRMAN 
ABALA-ERE UNION BETTER LIFE UNION EGHERIMO UNION UFUOMA UNION 
THE YOUNG SHALL 
GROW UNION 
PORTERS (CARRY-CARRY) UNION 
SECURITY GUARDS 
Fig. 2: Structure of Authority of Ogb-Ijoh Market 
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When a decision to rebuild and modernize the market was taken in the 1970s, all 
the traders here were relocated temporarily to Pesu.  However, when the ethnic 
crisis got to its zenith in 1990s, Ijaw traders were forced to flee Pesu, perceived 
as an Itsekiri market.  Meanwhile, construction in Ogbe Ijoh market had been 
abandon with no building fully completed.  Faced with this reality, the Ijaw traders 
together with a few Urhobos decided to erect stalls in that part of the market at 
the water front where no construction had started.  The result is that the stalls 
constructed are under the control of the Ijaw Unions which assign them to would-
be, largely Ijaw, traders.  This explains the Ijaw traders’ reluctance to pay dues to 
the local government.  The basic fact is thus that whereas the Ijaws have almost 
absolute control over the stalls they occupy, this is not true of Urhobo and Ilaje 
traders. The Itsekiri who under normal circumstances would prefer to trade in this 
market, because of its size and strategic significance, have remained in Pesu 
because of safety concerns. 
 
The increasing number of traders with a consequent shortage of stalls has 
complicated the issue of space control.  A situation where a stall is occupied by 
two or three traders, particularly in the water front section, has emerged.  The 
result is that a class differentiation of the traders based on “original stall 
occupant” and “new occupant” has emerged.  In most cases, the “new occupant” 
starts off as a table stall trader, displaying her fish on a table just outside a stall.  
She typically sells broke manage. This type of fish is typically bought by the poor, 
because, apart from its being cheap, the sellers also typically do not fire-down, 
i.e. quote an exceeding high price at the beginning of the haggling process.  The 
urban poor cannot afford a whole fish particularly the highly priced shine-nose 
(i.e. thread-fins), the haggling for which is typically characterized by fire-down.  
The table-stall trader becomes a full-scale trader as her resources grow.  Usually 
such a trader pays token dues to the stall occupant, the value of which depends 
on sales and relationship to the latter.  For close relations, no dues are paid. 
 
The control of selling space does not only reflect ethnicity but also unionization.  
The selling space is dominated by the Ijaw ethnic group who argue that since the 
market is theirs and the fish usually originates from their villages, all aspects of 
buying and selling in the market must be controlled by them.  There is thus an 
attempt to ensure that traders from other ethnic groups do not buy fish directly 
from the fishing villages but from them who will in turn buy from the villagers.  
Although this policy is enforced from time to time, it does not apply in all cases.  
For instance, most traders who have a long history of trading in the market are 
hardly ever affected .  In general, it is relatively new entrants to the trade that are 
subjected to such exclusionist policy.  Understandably, the Ilaje traders who are 
returning to the trade are the most affected. 
 
Exclusion based on unionization is a much wider practice.  As the focus group 
discussions and semi-structured interviews indicate, all the market unions do not 
allow non-members to sell in the market.  Indeed, non-members are even not 
allowed to claim their baskets of fish from boats berthing in the jetties.  Rather, 
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this can only be done on their behalf by a member who will also arrange for the 
sale, usually with a commission.  The control is so effective that even a carry-
carry will not convey a non-member’s basket even if discharged from a boat.  
Such controls by unions are characteristic of several West African markets 
(Smith and Luttrel, 1994; Lyon, 2000). 
 
The control of security in the market and the maintenance of law and order are 
shared responsibilities of the Chairman and the executive committees of the 
various unions.  Guards, made up of young Ijaw and Hausa men are usually 
employed by the Chairman who sees to their discipline.  However, the funds for 
their remuneration are provided by the traders on the basis of a monthly due paid 
by each occupant of a stall.  However, where there is conflict among members of 
a union, this is settled by the executive committee which normally imposes a fine.  
Where the executive committee is unable to settle the dispute, the Chairman 
becomes the final arbiter.  It is not usual to invite the police, even in cases of 
theft. 
 
The internal mechanism for settling disputes by the Chairman was emphasized 
by one respondent thus: “No police can come in here (i.e. the market) to arrest 
anyone without the permission of the Chairman.  The Chairman settles all 
quarrels”.  The Chairman himself put this more succinctly thus: 
 
Usually the police does not come here to arrest anyone without 
my permission.  There is an agreement (gentleman’s 
agreement) that if there is any breach of peace or any crime 
committed here, I am expected to resolve the issue.  It is only 
cases I cannot resolve that are taken over by the police.  Where 
I take over cases that have already been reported to the police, 
I inform them accordingly after resolving them. 
 
 
Social networks 
Social networks are key to understanding  relationships among actors in the fish 
marketing chain (Portes and Landolt, 2000, 532; Perreault, 2003).  This is 
particularly obvious in the relationship among traders, transporters and the 
fishing folk.  The trader-fishing folk relationship is examined here.  Other aspects 
are analyzed in a subsequent sub-section. 
 
Each market woman has a well-defined and usually more or less secured source 
of fish supply, apart from subsidiary ones.  The relationship is established 
through assistance to the fisherman/woman.  The semi-structured interviews of 
the traders reveal that it is a wide-spread practice by the more established and 
richer traders.  Typically, the trader buys a net or other fishing gears and in some 
cases a canoe (mechanically propelled or paddle propelled) for a fisherman 
(usually a relation or acquaintance) who in turn promises to send his catch to the 
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trader for sale in Warri.  The trader sells the fish and sends the money to the 
fisherman, although some form of commission is charged.  The trader gets an 
additional income through shed-money which is an extra payment on the basis of 
number of baskets by those who buy a large number of fish baskets. 
 
The fisherman/woman is expected to pay over a period of time the amount spent 
on the fishing gear.  Usually the trader does not deduct the amount, or part 
thereof, from the fish sold except the fisherman expressly so indicate.  The 
traders interviewed asserted that the fisherman gains because he in the process 
acquires a gear he cannot afford while the trader’s benefit is in terms of steady 
fish supply.  The system is obviously based on trust given that the fisherman 
believes the trader can not cheat him in terms of the price of the gear and the 
sale of the fish while the trader is convinced that the fisherman will send him the 
fish caught and at the same time pay the “loan” on the gear.  The traders 
asserted that this is an age long practice and has always worked out well.  Even 
in cases where the fisherman’s net gets lost in the sea, this is never doubted and 
any amount not yet paid by the fisherman is written off as a “bad debt”. 
 
Be this confidence in the system as it may, two respondents reported cases of 
betrayal of trust.  One gave her experience thus: 
 
I bought a powered canoe for a gentleman who promised to pay later and 
also send me fish for sale regularly.  He sent me fish for a while and 
stopped.  He bluntly refused to pay the amount I spent.  It was the 
cooperative society of my home-town association that facilitated my 
buying the canoe.  I have now lost all my contributions in the cooperative 
society.  Unfortunately, because the man is my husband’s relation, there is 
nothing I can do about it.  I do not want to create a problem within my 
family (translated from a local language by author). 
 
 
The second lady’s experience is slightly different.  She asserted, rather angrily: 
 
A woman appealed to me to provide her a canoe and nets, promising to 
send the fish caught for sale by me.  She really has been sending me the 
fish but has refused to pay the money I spent.  She has promised and 
disappointed me several times.  She is Urhobo.  I cannot unilaterally 
deduct the money from her fish I sell.  However, since it is more than two 
years now, I intend to get my money unilaterally.  I have been patient 
enough.  She can, if she so wish, stop sending me fish for sale (translated 
from pidgin/a local language by author). 
 
The contrast in the debt-recovery orientation of the two trader-actors, seems to 
suggest that the significance of trust does not necessarily depend on how close 
relationships are.  However, the reaction to a breach of trust may be determined 
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by factors such as closeness of relationships. It is usually more difficult to collect 
debts from close relatives. 
 
Trust in the fish supplier-transporter-trader link 
The issue of social networks and trust, which was analyzed in the preceding sub-
section, is also apparent in the relationship among fishermen, transporters and 
traders.  This is reflected in the approach employed in sending fish from the 
villages to Warri for sale. 
 
As indicated in the previous sub-section, most traders have secured fish 
suppliers.  The supplier usually does not take the fish to his customer in Warri.  
What he does is to send the fish through the transporters in clearly market 
baskets.  Depending on the level of literacy, some baskets have the names of the 
customer written on them.  Inside the fish basket is a letter to the trader in Warri 
indicating a recommended selling price.  The fish-supplier is usually abreast of 
the market situation and therefore is likely to indicate a realistic price. 
 
When the fish arrives the jetty in Warri, the trader negotiates with the boat 
operator/owner and pays the agreed freight rate.  The fish is then discharged and 
taken to the market stall by the carry-carry gang.  Even where the trader is not 
around when the fish arrives, it is taken to her stall and the necessary payments 
made later.  After sale, the money is sent to the fish supplier through the 
transporter. 
 
In spite of the efficacy of the system, failures are recorded from time to time.  The 
typical failures indicated by traders, transporters and carry-carry include: 
 
? Loss of fish in transit. 
? Non-delivery of money sent to fish suppliers. 
? Mix-up of the identification labels of baskets. 
? Disagreement on the freight rate. 
 
In each of these cases, attempts are made to resolve the issue amicably in order 
not to destroy the trust built over the years. 
 
Constraints in the marketing chain 
Some of the problems confronting an effective functioning of the marketing chain 
have been alluded to.  However, those expressly indicated by the actors require 
some attention.  The most fundamental of these are: 
 
(i) Infrastructural. 
(ii) Exclusion. 
(iii) Hidden Insecurity. 
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(iv) Inaccess to funds. 
 
The basic problem of infrastructure is the lack of stalls and stores.  This is a 
problem reported by all the traders and it is in part related to the fact that the 
construction of the market has been abandoned for a long time.  The sections 
occupied by the Urhobo and Ilaje traders are such that there cannot be any 
meaningful buying and selling when it rains.  The Ijaw unions argue that they 
cannot understand the situation where Igbudu (Urhobo market) and Pesu (Itsekiri 
market) were completed and theirs abandoned.  They assert that this is injustice 
and a marginalisation of the ethnic group. 
 
The issue of exclusion is one raised by the Urhobo and particularly the Ilaje 
respondents.  They argue that their Ijaw colleagues have consistently attempted 
to cut-off their fish supplies in order to establish themselves as middlemen.  They 
also argue that they have remained marginalized in the operation of the jetties 
along the waterfront, having to pay ground-money (i.e the money paid for the use 
of land around the jetty) in most cases.  
 
The problem of hidden insecurity revolves around the allegation of harassment 
by the military.  Consequent on the ethnic crisis in Warri, military personnel were 
engaged in the restoration of law and order.  The marketing actors assert that 
they are forced to pay rates on the fish moving into the market.  It is alledged that 
the money is collected through agents who harass those who are reluctant to 
pay. Similar problems of harassment by the police and the military were reported 
by transport eperators. 
 
Access to funds is a critical issue.  All the unions have attempted to address this.  
The Young Shall Grow (Ilaje) union attempts to solve the problem through an 
esusu system while in the case of the others, the approach is through soft loans.  
The loan given in each case, usually between 10 and 20 thousand naira, to be 
paid over a period varying from 6 to 12 months is perceived as grossly 
inadequate.  What is more, no loan is available to those starting the business 
with the result that personal savings or gift from relations is the common source 
of initial capital. 
 
Conclusion 
The operational characteristics and the constraints in the fish marketing chain 
throw-up a number of policy issues.  Social networks and trust have proved to be 
a fundamental facilitator of the marketing chain.  As experience has shown, this 
cuts across ethnic lines.  What seems to have been important is the relationship 
built over the years through interaction in the marketing chain.  This is a good 
basis for not only improving the marketing process but also encouraging ethnic 
harmony particularly in ethnically polarized cities and areas. 
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The exclusive female marketing system may be a basis for economically 
empowering women.  The experience of many of the traders has been such that 
the fish trade has provided an opportunity for them to break the poverty and 
unemployment circle.  Many of the women interviewed indicated that when they 
first came to Warri from their villages when they got married, they remained 
unemployed and depressed until they were introduced to the fish trade usually by 
their relations or acquaintances. 
 
Whereas the fish marketing system provides a basis for some meaningful 
policies, there are aspects that require reform.  One of the most critical is the 
issue of exclusion.  Whereas this is a fall-out of the ethnic crisis in the city it has 
the potential of engendering ethnic discord.  A more fundamental aspect of this 
problem is the categorisation of the various markets into ethnic possessions, 
such that one market is perceived to be an Ijaw one, another an Urhobo one and 
yet another an Itsekiri market.  Such polarization has the potential of complicating 
the ethnic problem. 
 
Another issue is the elongation of the marketing chain because of the 
intervention of several middle men.  Perhaps, this may in certain cases provide 
additional income for some rural dwellers.  However, this complicates the protein-
deficiency problem of the urban poor, particularly children, as the prices of fish 
may unnecessarily become unaffordable. 
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3. MARKET AND TRANSPORT INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA’S LIVESTOCK 
TRADE: CASE STUDIES FROM SOKOTO AND IBADAN 
 
Fatima Adamu, Michael Filani and A.B. Mamman 
 
(respectively Department of Sociology, Usmanu DanFodiyo University, 
Sokoto; Department of Geography, University of Ibadan and Department of 
Geography, Usmanu DanFodiyo University, Sokoto) 
 
 
 
Introduction  
Animal protein is an important dietary component for Nigeria’s middle and elite 
classes but its cost limits its accessibility by the poor. The relevance of livestock 
trade for the poor in Nigeria is less in the area of consumption but rather in 
employment generation and the inter-ethnic relations that it fosters. Traditional 
forms of production and marketing dominate Nigerian livestock commodity and 
operate at two levels. At one level are millions of individual and household 
producers who own a few sheep, goats and poultry and supply the market to 
supplement their income. At the second level are cattle holders (mostly Fulani), 
who owned large herds of cattle for supply into the market. The trading and 
marketing side of the livestock is dominated by the Hausas both at local and 
national levels.   
 
Livestock breeding to the majority of the poor and the vulnerable in the North is 
a form of banking. Simmons (1976: 10) writes thus, “small livestock production, 
a source of income for many women, is considered to be good “banking” 
procedure rather than an occupation. Sheep, chickens and goats serve as 
stores of value in a bankless rural society, bearing interest in the form of 
offspring and remaining available for liquidation when cash is required”.  A vast 
number of very poor people (of many different ethnic groups across Nigeria) 
obtain their livelihood through their participation in livestock-related activities 
such as small ruminant animal production, herding, animal and meat transport 
and porterage.   
 
This study focuses principally on cattle, mostly produced in the North and 
mostly consumed in the South (Frike 1993; Inuwa 1989; Olayemi 1974; 
FDLPCS 1992; Mamman, 2004; Muazu 2005). Thus, while the North is 
dependent on the South for livestock markets, the south is equally dependent 
on the North for the supply. The inter-dependency that cuts across different 
ethnic groups that the livestock trade builds is therefore relevant in a country 
like Nigeria that experiences many cases of inter-ethnic conflict.  Livestock 
production and trade is arguably a means through which Nigeria can build trust 
among different ethnic groups thereby fostering inter-ethnic understanding and 
unity (despite the fact that inter-ethnic herder-indigene tensions are widely 
reported). 
 
This report brings together two case studies (Adamu, Mamman)focussed on 
the Sokoto region, which is a major supplier of livestock for the country’s meat 
protein and leather needs,  and one (Filani) focussed on Ibadan, one of the 
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major southern cattle markets and centres of meat consumption. Trader 
networks, security, transport institutions and insurance and are key themes 
linking these studies. The goal of the report is to explore the major marketing 
and transport institutions which regulate the livestock trade and to identify areas 
where the potential for poor people to benefit from the trade could be improved. 
 
Study locations 
Two studies focus on Acida’s weekly livestock market in the north-west rearing 
region (one also examining Kara peri-urban market), one on Bodija market in 
the south-west consuming region: this allows us to follow the livestock chain 
from the collecting markets through to city butchers in Ibadan.   Acida livestock 
market in Sokoto is the biggest livestock destination for neighbouring Niger 
Republic and villages/towns from Sokoto, Zamfara and Kebbi States as well as 
livestock outlets in the region, supplying livestock to neighbouring markets as 
well as to other livestock markets across the country (Sokoto state is second 
only to Bornu in livestock production).  Bodija market, located in the Ibadan 
North Local Government area of Oyo State is the main recipient and distributor 
of cattle moved from different parts of northern states to Ibadan metropolis and 
parts of the Yoruba south west.  Although Bodija remains the main cattle 
market in Ibadan, the main Kraal for initially receiving cattle from the northern 
states was moved to Akinyele about 19 kilometers north on the Ibadan – Oyo 
road after the 1999 Bodija ethnic conflict.   
 
Methods 
The methodology used for these studies is largely qualitative. Qualitative 
method enables us to understand the actors and the nature of their interactions 
in the markets and the processes and dynamics of the markets. The approach 
was familiar to all three researchers, given their background in sociology and 
geography.   
 
Most informants were selected purposively. People of different social 
backgrounds such as those occupying leadership positions, and those who do 
not, were purposively sought out and interviewed. Other relevant characteristics 
such as ethnicity and gender were considered in the sampling. Snowballing 
technique was also used: for example, the sarkin Pawa in Acida market was 
first identified for interview and permission and he later introduced the 
researcher to other officials.  
 
A range of data collection methods was used: lurking (this proved useful in 
modifying the list of actors drawn), unstructured interviews using checklists, 
telephone interviews (with transport merchants as they were mostly in Kebbi 
State), group interviews, direct observation and secondary materials from the 
market (such as notices and published materials on market operations) and 
elsewhere. 
 
Social research has a social world of its own where the environment of the 
research, the researched and the researcher have impact on the quality and 
quantity of information collected. For example, the socio-economic position of 
the researcher such as ethnicity, religion, gender, class can be a hindrance or a 
facilitator in a research setting.  In Adamu’s case the researcher’s status as a 
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woman was anticipated to be a hindrance, so her husband’s contacts in the 
market were capitalised. He made contacts and other underground work as 
well as linked up the researcher with one of the actors in the market. Feeling 
that the gender of the researcher may inhibit them from talking freely, a male 
research assistance always opened the discussion and intervened when the 
researcher wants to add a question or probe an issue. However, other factors 
work to the researchers favour such as coming from the area and therefore 
familiar with the phrases used in the discussion as well as the social 
relationships of the area. For example, the researcher exploited the system of 
joking relationships in Hausa society to get  informants to relax. For instance, 
the researcher claimed to be a blacksmith because of the joking relationship 
that exists between the Blacksmith and Butchers and also that the researcher’s 
husband is Fulani, to allow for the establishment of informal and jovial 
environment during the interview with the Fulani. In the case of the Bodija 
study, arrangements for the different groups were made through Mr. Wasiu who 
is a main meat seller at Sango market in Ibadan.  He was introduced by the 
researcher’s wife, his major customer.  
 
The commodity chain 
 
Figure 1: Livestock Trading Chain (based round Acida Kara Market) 
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who have between 5 – 10 herds of cattle.  Dillali (selling commission agents) 
and yan kwamisho (transport commission agents) build up herds for 
transportation to the south of Nigeria.  At the market retailers operate through a 
host of intermediary traders who seek carcass butchers in the urban and per-
urban areas to petty traders who take the cattle into more  remote similar rural 
areas.  There the butchers and meat buyers form the last link in the chain.  
They either operate direct from their own retail outlets or through subagents 
who carry meat as itinerant meat sellers in the urban areas. 
 
Central to the livestock commodity chain in Hausa society is the Kara (Hausa 
for livestock market). Sources of livestock in Acida kara are breeders from 
villages and towns of Niger republic, Sokoto, Zamfara and Kebbi states. Once 
in the market, the sale is done by a Dillali (dillalai- plural, dillanci the system or 
practice) for a commissioned fee. The sale could be done either direct to a 
consumer, to a whole seller, to a butcher or to a long distance trader. At what 
ever stage, we have the drovers (Yan’kora,) who transport the livestock by foot 
to the abattoir, to the resident of a buyer or to the long distance trade section of 
the market for loading to other markets.  
Table 1- Actors in Acida Kara Market  
Actors Local Terms Roles  
Breeders Ma kiyaya Producers of livestock Men & women, 
Hausa & Fulani 
Brokers Dillalai Connecting sellers and 
buyers- selling to buyers at 
a % commission 
Men, Hausa 
Transport 
Commissioned 
agents. Also 
act as NURTW
Yan’kwamishon Linking long distance 
traders with drivers. Mostly 
retired drivers. 
Men, Hausa 
Long distance 
traders 
Falake Transport to sell livestock 
at a long distance market 
Men, Hausa, 
Fulani 
Whole sellers Yan Kasuwa Buy and sell in bulk Men, multiple 
ethnic groups 
Retailers Masu Saye da 
Sayarwa 
Buy and Sell in smaller 
quantity 
Men, Hausa, few 
Yoruba and Igbo 
Drovers Yan’kora They are transporters of 
livestock by foot for loading 
within the market or to 
various destinations out of 
the market.  
Young Men, 
Fulani and 
Hausa 
Loaders Yan,lodi They load and off-load the 
animals into a trailer 
Men, Hausa 
Guardsmen Yan’gadi Those who spend the night 
in the market to guard the 
cattle pending the time of 
transportation. 
Men, Hausa, 
Fulani 
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Actors Local Terms Roles  
Miyyati Allah Kungiyan 
Fulani 
A Fulani socio-economic 
organisation that facilitate 
interactions between the 
Fulanis and other ethnic 
groups and actors in the 
market 
Men, Fulani 
Butcher chief Sarkin Pawa Responsible for the 
Abattoir, meat sections of 
the market and the 
activities of the butchers 
and facilitates interaction 
between butchers and meat 
consumers relationships. 
He is the overall chief in the 
market and therefore 
manages the affairs of the 
market in consultation with 
other authorities in the 
market 
Man, Hausa,  
Consumers Masu saye Buy and consumers of  
meat 
Men and 
women of all 
tribes 
Fulani Chief Ardo (in Fulbe) 
who is also the 
Chairman of 
the Kara 
market 
The chief of fulanis in Acida 
town and doubled in the 
market as Chairman of the 
market  
Men, Fulani 
Butcher Ma hauchi Who slaughters and sells 
meat in the market 
Men, Hausa 
Vigilante Yan’banga Provide security in the 
market 
Men, Hausa 
Vetinary/health 
officer 
Malamin 
dabbobi 
A veterinarian officer who 
supervise the health of  
animals and the safety of 
the meat in the market 
Man, 
Hausa/Fulani 
Police Yan’sanda Provide security in the 
market 
Men of all 
tribes 
Food sellers Masu Abinci Sell cooked food and 
snacks prepared from the 
home and hawked by the 
girls or prepared in the 
market by both men and 
women. 
The girls are 
generally 
Hausas, snack 
and meal 
cooked in the 
market are 
made mostly 
by Hausa and 
Yoruba 
women and 
men  
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The buyers range from housebound breeders, merchants, butchers, and 
individuals for family consumption and for food businesses. For each livestock 
sold, the dillali gets a fee. A dillali can transact in tens of livestock in every 
market, an average of 20 animals per market day was often quoted.  
 
In southern Nigeria the sale of cattle at Akinyele Kraal is done by the Hausa 
dealers (dillalai).  The dillalai are under the control of the landlords to whom 
they report on transactions with buyers.  There are some middlemen called 
‘barandas’ locally.  These are people who stay around the Kraal waiting to 
work on new buyers who are not accustomed to the cattle business practice.  
They link the new buyer with the dillalai and often do the bargaining on behalf 
of the buyer.  After any successful bargain, the buyer then pays the middlemen 
fees, ranging from N500.00 to N1,000.00.  This is in addition to the N1,000.00 
paid as ‘la’ada’ to the dillalai.  In other words, it is more costly to buy through a 
middleman.  This is why they concentrate on new buyers.  A cow may change 
hands up to between five and seven times between the source in the northern 
markets to the slaughter slab at Bodija market. Good relationships develop over 
time among the various actors based on mutual trust. 
 
While at Akinyele only live cattle are sold, at the Bodija market cows are sold 
either live or slaughtered.  The majority of the dealers are retailers who buy 
different parts of the slaughtered cows for transportation to other markets in 
Ibadan metropolis.    
 
Formal and informal market institutions in the livestock trade 
Livestock trading in Nigeria operates principally within the informal sector. The 
informal institutions are the ones generally available within the market and 
are more likely to be utilised by the poor because of their simplicity, familiarity, 
and cost less. They are the main sources of market and trading information, 
provide credit and market security, enforce trade agreement and resolve 
conflict.  Some of the positions in the northern markets are hereditary. In Acida 
these are appointed by the Sarkin Acida (village head of Acida) such as Sarkin 
Pawa. The Chairman of the market, leadership of transporters, commissioned 
agents (dillalai) are elected by members and endorsed by the Sarkin Pawa. 
According to the Sarkin Pawa, membership to the market associations is open 
to everybody through registration and payment of dues 
 
All the dillalai in Acida kara are male because of the commodity (livestock) 
involved.  To become a dillali in Acida market, one has to pass through the 
Sarkin Pawa for allocation of space in the market. The requirement to become 
a dillali includes the origin of the person, that is whether he or his family is well 
known and respected, the character of the person and the person has to be of 
relative means. A dillali plays a central role in Acida Kara market. 
 
Related to the system of dillanci is the practice of la’ada. La’ada is the 
commissioned fee paid to the dillali or any person that may have witnessed and 
contributed in the trading negotiations. In the past, at the final selling of a good, 
the decision may be taken whether it is going to be paid by the owner and 
therefore la’ada ciki (fee payment within the selling price) or by the buyer and 
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therefore la,ada waje (fee payment out of selling price). However, with the 
expansion of Shariah to cover commercial and criminal law in the North, the 
requirement to pay laada is discouraged in Acida market according to the 
Sarkin Pawa. The decision to pay and the amount to pay to people or person 
who witnesses a transaction is left at the discretion of the livestock owner.  
 
Central to the dillanci system and the entire trading practice is the issue of trust 
which is built, in the case of dillanci, on the basis of religion, language and 
family background. The trading exists without any formal or written agreement 
between the dillali and the livestock owner. The livestock owner must have trust 
on the dillali he met for the first time to hand him over his livestock for sale and 
to expect the dillali to pay him the correct selling price. Similarly, the dillali must 
have trust on the livestock owner not to hand him stolen livestock for sale. The 
effectiveness of the trust lies in the permanency and reliability of the dillanci 
and other commissioned systems. It is the responsibility of the market 
traditional authorities to ensure that such trust is not violated. For instance, 
many cases of the dillali paying money to the wrong owner is reported by our 
informants and the traditional market conventions and authorities require the 
dillali to pay the livestock owner and bears the cost of the duping. The role of 
dillali in mitigating transaction risks and costs is central in a market that is 
temporary, transitory and most of its customers are from distance areas. Cases 
of selling of stolen livestock are reported in the market. The dilali and the Dan 
kwamishon provide some elements of permanency and reliability in the market 
where people from far distance places come and go with their goods. Faulty 
good bought can be returned to the dillali who is a permanent figure in the 
market. 
 
Another important practice is the norm of reciprocity which acts as an insurance 
policy for the livestock traders. There existed a practice of helping one another 
in a period of crisis or calamity. A dillali who was duped was assisted by his 
fellow colleagues to raise money to pay the livestock owner so also a falke 
(long distance trader) who lost his whole capital to armed robbers. Related 
reciprocal norms existed in terms of taking over a customer from a fellow dillali 
or trader. In fact it is an offence in the market to draw a customer from a fellow 
trader and it is socially and economically costly for a trader to violate such 
reciprocal rules and conventions. He can be fined ostracized and even expelled 
from the market by Sarkin Pawa if he is found to maintain such habit. So these 
kinds of norms and conventions seem to manage competition between traders 
and therefore, ensure a healthy environment for trading in the market.  
 
An important reciprocal relationship that exists is over shelter. A dillali is able to 
hold onto his customers of long distance livestock traders through provision of 
free shelter to them. A livestock trader transporting livestock to a far away and 
foreign distance, would require an accommodation, market information, food, 
water and other logistics to effectively function. Such services are provided by a 
trader’s dillali. If the trader incurs some lost, or the market is saturated and 
therefore, the trader is not able to sell, the dillali can assist the trader with some 
part payment to enable the trader to go back home and return later after the 
animals have been sold by the dillali. After the animals are sold, the trader pays 
the dillali his fee according to the quality of services he receives. This system of 
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shelter provision operates in all the livestock market centres of the North and 
South.   
 
The market is not a free and equal environment, social stratification on the 
basis of patronage exists and both the patron and the clients are expected to 
conduct their activities within an acceptable practice, both in northern and 
southern case study markets. For one to become an established dillali in Acida 
market, he must work and operate under a more established dillali. The 
apprentice gets his skills, garnered his customers and builds his reputation as a 
trust worthy trader through relating with his patron. Most of the dillalai, Falake 
(long distance traders), transporters, butchers and so on have their own boys 
who assist them to conduct their businesses and in the process learn the tricks 
of livestock trading and build their networks. A master may have as high as 7 
boys under him and do also assist their boys with credit and capital to start 
business. Obedience to establish traditional authority is an important norm that 
facilitates trading in the market. Every actor in the market is expected to obey 
the authority of the person above. The market customers are expected to 
accept the authority and arbitration of the Sarkin Kasuwa, similar expectations 
exist between a patron and his boy. Where the boy errs, it is the responsibility 
of the traditional authority to call the boy to order, discipline him and call the 
police if it is necessary”. Phrases such as ‘my boys’ ‘our boys’, ‘this boy’s etc 
were used by many of Acida informants to describe their senior position in 
relation to their boys who are themselves traders in their own right.  
 
The National Butcher’s Association regulates the activities of cattle dealers at 
the Bodija market. It sets and enforces rules for the dealers and performs a 
mediating role in the settlement of petty quarrels among dealers. For example, 
it determines how many cows can be slaughtered by a dealer in a day and any 
dealer that violates this allocation pays a fine of N5,000.00.  The allocation to 
dealers is based on the number of cows they bring each day and the total 
number to be slaughtered in the abattoir on each day.  If any dealer violates the 
rule regularly or is generally recalcitrant, he could be suspended for a period of 
6 months. Also, entry into the cattle business in Bodija can only be through the 
Associations. A new member is usually introduced by an old member and a 
registration fee is paid. However, those who just buy parts of slaughtered cows 
to sell do not need any entry permit.  (Almost all the cattle dealers in Bodija 
market are Yorubas. The few Hausa who buy parts of slaughtered cows are 
those who use these to make smoked meat. 
 
Formal institutions in the livestock markets include the veterinary officer, 
police, village leaders and Local Government Authorities.  The latter visits the 
markets, in most cases to collect revenue only (revenue at the gate, dues from 
the members of the various institutions in the market such as dillalai and 
yan’kwamishon). The Local Government may also provide fencing (Kara 
market), allocates space to traders (at a cost of N50.0 per month in Sokoto) 
and may settle disputes in conjunction with Miyyati Allah (a kind of Fulani 
cultural and economic association) or Livestock Traders Association. In 
general, respondents said they are constrained by the state institutions and 
parastatals in the operation of their businesses and that the overlapping 
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institutional rates roles and arrangement have made the situation worse for 
them.    
 
A similar situation regarding local government charging exists in Ibadan. 
Certain charges are paid in the movement of cattle from the open space 
(former kraal) at Bodija to the abattoir. On every cow that is moved either by 
rope or by carts, the owner pays N100 to the Local Government and for every 
cow slaughtered the payment is N50.00 to the Local Government. In other 
words, for every cow moved to and slaughtered in the abattoir, the Local 
Government collects a revenue of N150.00. Although part of this revenue is 
expected to be used for environmental sanitation, there is no discerning 
evidence of such in and around the abattoir: conditions are deplorable.    
 
Semi formal institutions are trade based organisations that are established 
and registered by the government to provide support to and protect the 
interests of its members. Such institutions include Miyyati Allah, an association 
of cattle rearers, and Road Transport Workers. Miyyati Allah is an association 
of cattle breeders mostly dominated by the Fulani. Membership of the 
association is opened to all ethnic groups according to its chairman. The 
Association functions in all major cities of Nigeria where livestock passes 
through or where trading in livestock exists. Leadership of the Association is 
elected and they perform several functions such as mediating between the 
livestock breeders and other stakeholders involve in livestock trade, providing 
security in livestock markets. In Acida Kara for example, the Association 
charges N20 for every cattle sold in the market.    
 
There is some cooperation between formal and informal institutions, as 
between the Local Government Authority and the Traditional Authority (box 1).  
 
Box 1: Example of Co-operation among Institutions in Acida market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some of the market institutions appear to be in transition in northern Nigeria. 
Those that are able to organise themselves may be transformed from traditional 
institutions into formal ones, but still retaining the traditional function of the 
institutions, hence referred here as semi-formal. The transformation is 
The Chairman of the Miyyati Allah group in the market provided us 
with an example of the nature of the co-operation that exist among 
the market institutions. According to him, “there was a time when 
the market was congested with cattle, sheep and goats crammed in 
one place- as a result security and hygiene was difficult to maintain 
and crowd difficult to manage and control. The space was 
insufficient- so we called on to the Sarkin Pawa for the re-
organisation of the market. He agreed and took the issue to His 
Royal Highness Dan Maliki and his highness took the issue to the 
Local Government Authority. The Authority then separated Cattle 
and smaller animals. That is why sheep and goats are now situated 
out of this area and this area is expanded. We now have enough 
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necessary because of changes in scope of their activities (covering more then 
northern part of the country) and their source of legitimacy (beyond power of 
the Hausa traditional authority). Such institutions as Miyyati Allah and Road 
Transport workers performing the functions of Ardo and Dan-kwamishon but in 
a different name and operating in a different format. Such positions have been 
formalised with elections and written rules and regulations governing the 
conduct of their activities. However, the Associations of long distance traders 
(Fatake) are in the process of such transition and have been trying to get its 
association registered as a union for over ten years, but they are not 
successful. So, they have to continue operating within the traditional structure 
which is limited to local environment and which make it difficult for them to 
lobby and take action nationally.    
 
Table 2 Market Institutions in Acida Kara Market 
 
Formal Semi-formal Informal Norms/practices 
 
-Local Government 
-Police 
-Ministry of 
Agriculture 
 
-Miyyati Allah 
-Road 
Workers 
Union 
 
 
-Traditional 
Authorities 
-Long distance 
traders  
-Dillanci 
-Commissioned 
agency 
-Vigilante 
 
-Trust 
-Dillanci (brokerage) 
-System of La’ada 
-System of 
Reciprocity 
-System of 
Patronage/clientele 
-System of Heritage 
ship 
 
 
Control of market space 
Market space in controlled substantially both in the northern and southern case 
study livestock markets by commission agents and others.  Allocated space in 
Acida market was alleged to have connection with the power that be 
particularly the ruling political party in the state.   According to almost all the 
informants, it is difficult, close to impossible to sell livestock in the Acida market 
premises without using the dillali. All the spaces in the market are allocated to 
the dillalai.  A livestock owner cannot have space within the market to transact 
trade with a buyer directly and selling outside the market is illegal. This 
therefore leaves the livestock owner little choice but to utilize the dillali. When 
the Sarkin pawa was asked about the possibility of selling livestock without 
using the dillali he responded: 
“No, whoever wants to sell livestock within the market premises 
will have to do it through a dillali. It is a law. Every selling or 
buying without dillali is illegal and therefore not acceptable”. 
 
The space in the Akinyele Kraal (which can accommodate over 1000 heads of 
cattle) is allocated by the Akinyele Local Government to the various 
Associations present in Akinyele Kraal (table 1).  There are about 20 landlords 
who control the space allocations in the various associations.  These landlords 
are the main recipients and custodians of the cattle from the north.  Each 
landlord is allocated space and he, in turn, allocates the spaces to individual 
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members of the various associations.  Sometimes such allocations to 
individuals are made on the basis of group affinity.  This group affinity could 
derive from people who come from the same towns or those who serve as 
apprentices under the landlords.  Consequently new entrants could easily 
locate their cattle in spaces belonging to individuals on friendship and affinity 
basis.  Some of the landlords also provide free accommodation for those 
traders who bring cattle to them. 
 
Market and price information 
The choice of the market by cattle dealers depends on information they receive 
about prices at various markets before embarking on their journeys, easy 
availability of transport and the varieties of cattle species in demand at any 
point in time.  Information on prices and markets is got from dealers on fresh 
arrival.  Most of the respondents in the north rely on trader associations, 
followed by personal links.  Only very few (i.e. large livestock traders) have 
access to GSM and telephone lines.  (However, drivers commonly have a 
mobile GSM which they use enroute to inform others about happenings on the 
route (e.g. where police check points are encountered).  Few government 
sources of information are used, largely because the information is obsolete by 
the time it is received.  The type of information mostly required includes supply 
and demand situation, prices of cattle, security and fuel situation. 
 
Within Acida market, on the basis of the market information on prices provided 
by the Dillali, the livestock owner fixes a minimum and a maximum fee for his 
livestock. The owner can decide to stay around or not, it does not make any 
difference. If a buyer comes, it is the dillali that negotiates the price and sells 
within the price fixed. If the market prices have fluctuated, the dillali seeks out 
the owner and informs him of the changes for a new price to be fixed or the 
owner may decline to sell. No sale is made without the consent of the livestock 
owner.  
 
Selection of southern markets is made through the dan kwamisho’s network of 
road transport workers across the country, now facilitated by the mobile 
phones.  The Dan’kwamisho is able to provide the trader with price information 
of all the livestock markets in the country. Armed with this information the trader 
can decide where to send his livestock for sale. 
 
The cattle traders in southern Nigeria at Akinyele have phones and those 
without have access to public mobile phones through which they contact their 
counterparts in the northern markets.  Through such contacts they exchange 
information on prevailing prices and the cattle market situation both in the south 
and the north.  They also get information on the dates of departure of drivers 
bringing cattle to the south. 
 
Credit provision 
Most of the livestock traders interviewed in northern Nigeria inherited their 
business from their fathers/relations.  None of them have had access to 
financial institutions.  Rather they depend on family sources (80 percent) and 
friends/co-traders (20 percent).  Their inability to source credit from financial 
institutions is related to the collateral security required by the banks, which they 
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are unable to provide.  Credit from friends and co-traders in livestock thus 
become the main sources of credit. 
In the past there was no written evidence of witness to the credit taken, given 
the element of trust which existed between them. These days however witness 
and written evidence are commonly used but the basic element of trust-
acquaintance, social interaction belonging to the same trade and religion as 
well as living in the same neighborhood still persist (see Cohen  1965).        
 
In Ibadan’s Bodija market, cattle can be sold on credit by the middlemen to the 
butchers and local cattle retailers. The dillalai can sell on credit through mutual 
trust which has developed between them and the regular buyers over a fairly 
long period of business interaction.  Default in payment of cattle purchased on 
credit is rare but when it occurs, the different Associations are involved in 
ensuring payment.   The buyer takes away the cattle without payment which is 
to be made at a later agreed date.  In some cases credit sale may attract 
additional payment of between N5,000 and N10,000 on a cow depending on 
the length of the duration for payments.  For parts of a cow, no additional cost 
is paid when credit is granted.  These middlemen stand as surety for the buyer. 
Such a credit process is based on mutual trust between the dealers and the 
middlemen on the one hand and between the middlemen and the buyers on the 
other hand.  After a fairly long period of business association, the dealers 
develop some confidence/trust for the middlemen who are their regular 
customers.  The same occurs between middlemen and the buyers.  The main 
reasons for selling on credit, however, include the buyers’ lack of capital, and 
the possibility of encouraging and retaining more customers for a dealer. 
Selling on credit also makes for faster sales. 
 
Market Security 
Considerable detail on security issues was collected for Acida market. The 
security situation at the Acida market is reasonably good compared to the 
general security situation in the country. The physical side of the market 
security has improved since the walling and reorganization of the market 
according to the market officials: “We used to have insecurity when the market 
was an open space- after complaints to the Sarki dan Maliki- he asked us to 
form a group and we did and he presented our case to the Local Government 
and that is how we got the market walled. Before then we had many cases of 
stolen cattle.” 
 
There are now fewer cases of stolen livestock at Acida market and this occurs 
mostly when the animals are being loaded into lorries. As quoted by the 
informants the number of times this occurred in the last year ranged from 
roughly 3 to 12 times. The failure to collect accurate statistics on stolen animals 
could be attributed to the unwillingness of the officials to disclose the number of 
such cases for fear of the market loosing its reputation as a secured Kara 
market, but it is possible that the statistics are just not available considering the 
informality involved and the fact that no information on the market is recorded. 
Whatever the reason for the non-existence or non-release of information on 
stolen animals, it is apparent that it is a major area of concern to the officials of 
the market. Both the Sarkin Kasuwa, Chairman of the market and the livestock 
market traders have mentioned it as a major security problem. Throughout 
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discussions with the market officials concern over the problem of stolen animal 
was mentioned several times.  
 
Another area of security concern in the market is the incidence of stolen 
livestock brought into Acida market for sale. It was reported that in many cases 
stolen livestock are handed over to dillali for sale. Before the animal is sold, the 
owner may come to the market to check for his animal. In that situation the thief 
never shows up again and the dillali is implicated. Transaction related security 
problem involved duping of dillali. One of the dillalai explains it thus; 
“A person brings his livestock into the market- he gives it to a 
dillali who is to sell on his behalf. In the process problems occur. 
The dilali may not know that this is a stolen animal- many cases 
of that happen. Or a livestock owner gives his animal to dilali for 
sell- the owner may be moving with a thief- the dilali assumes 
they are together. The owner goes his own way to do other 
businesses. The thief hangs around- when a buyer comes and 
the price is being negotiated, the thief comes closer and acts as if 
the animal belongs to him by agreeing to the price- the dillali 
assumes they are together and hands over the money to the thief 
who runs away with the money. The cattle owner comes back and 
asked for the condition of his cattle and the dillali tells him that it 
has been sold, the owner demands for his money and the dillali 
says I have given it to the person you were together with. Then he 
will reply we were not together. You see the cattle owner will not 
agree, the dillali will have to pay the money. It is a risky business. 
Something has to be done about it”. 
 
Smaller actors in the market such as the yan’kora and masu gadi equally 
experience some level of insecurity. According to one of them;  
“That is the security problem- you buy a cattle and you arrange 
with the dan-kora to take it home for you. The dan-kora ties the 
animal waiting for the day time to transport the animal for you. He 
is gone somewhere before he comes back somebody has taken 
the animal away or got it loaded into a lorry. This happens. 
Hence, our call for an end to movement of animals in the night- 
either to go out or for loading. 
 
The informal institutions engaged in Acida market security are many and they 
can be classified into external agency like the Vigilante, Market traditional 
authorities (Sarki), and the internal market Associations such as Miyyati Allah, 
Yan’kwamisho, dillalai and the market workers such as yan’lodi, masu gadi and 
yan’kora. Each one of them contribute collectively or singly in market security in 
Acida kara. 
 
Yan’banga is a vigilante group that emerged in the mid 1980s to provide 
alternative security protection in the North because of the failure of the 
government security forces to deal with increasing security problems in the 
country. It is organised and managed by the community, under the authority of 
the traditional authorities. Majority of communities in the North fund and utilise 
the services of Yan’banga. The yan’banga in Acida provides security to Acida 
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town and as the security situation in the market worsens, they were invited by 
the market traditional authorities to deal with the problem. The Acida vigilante 
group is inadequate to provide security in the market, so Yan’banga from 
neighbouring towns are invited to assist the Acida Yan’banga every market day. 
According to the Chairman of the Market as well as the Chairman of the 
Yan’banga in Acida, the Yan’banga provides security in the market by patrolling 
the market day to monitor and flush out suspected thieves. If a known thief is 
found in the market, he is asked to leave the market or apprehended and 
released at the end of the market day. 
 
The view of market customers on Yan,banga in the market ranges from 
indifference to support. There was only one informant with negative view on the 
security role of vigilante. He believes that security provision should be the role 
of the police, not the Yan’banga. However, for the majority of market users, 
yanbanga is a positive addition to the market security. In fact, they are 
preferred more than the police because of their closeness with the community. 
According to the market chairman “Dan’banga knows the bad eggs more than 
we (market customer) do because they interact with them outside the market. 
They know them and they ask them to leave the market or hand them over to 
the police. Similarly, a long distance trader said “we prefer the yan’banga than 
the police because the yan’banga are community members and therefore know 
the bad eggs in our midst, hence, they are likely to be more effective. It was 
when yan’banga starts operating in this market that theft reduced”. People have 
confidence on the yan’banga because of the belief that the yan’banga use 
charms for protection against fire arms. In fact, one of the dan’banga 
interviewed appealed for assistance from the public for funding to pay for such 
charms as it is now more expensive to pay for such charms.   
 
The above statement is confirmed by the Chairman of the Yan’banga. He 
states that “whoever said there is no yan’banga in this market is telling lies. 
There was a time in this market when people were forcefully stopped and 
robbed of their wealth because of lack of security. This has stopped for over 8 -
10 months now. Nobody can complain of such insecurity now because we are 
active in the market”.  From the above it is very evident that market security is 
provided by yan’banga in collaboration with the police. 
 
Perhaps one of the most important non-security structures engaged in market 
security is the traditional authorities. The traditional authorities are responsible 
for the management of the market and in the process responsible for market 
security. The traditional market authorities such as Sarkin Pawa and market 
chairman established some rules from time to time for market security and 
safety. The last rule passed is over taming animal when taken round the 
market. It is made a market rule that animals moving around the market must 
get their front and back legs tied up to prevent causing injury to people. The 
next rule under consideration is banning loading after 7 pm. They are also said 
to be responsible for calling to order disobedient ‘boys’ in the market and 
disciplining them as long as the offence is not criminal, if it is criminal, the 
offender would be handed over to the police.  
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All the informants mention the role of Sarkin Pawa in conflict management and 
dispute resolution. According to a Dillali, the Sarkin Pawa patrols the market in 
order to settle conflict and disagreement between people in the market. He is 
also responsible in protecting trading norms of trust and reciprocity in the 
market. A butcher said Sarkin Pawa “patrols the market all the time to prevent 
any conflict or theft. For example, if a dillali sells an animal and give the money 
to a wrong owner, the sarkin pawa intervenes to ensure that the issue is 
resolved by forcing the dillali to present the person who collected the money 
from him or pay the livestock owner. Or if a butcher buys an animal and refuses 
to pay the money, the Sarki pawa intervenes and forces the butcher to pay the 
person”. 
 
Market Associations in Acida market also play an important role in market 
security. The Miyyati Allah acts as a mediator between the Fulani and other 
market actors and also on issues related to cattle and Fulani. The Association 
also helps to detect and prevent stolen animals being sold in the market. So, 
every market day, the officials of the Miyyati Allah assemble in Acida to ensure 
smooth running of the market. In addition, the dillali accepts animal for sale 
from an unknown trader only after confirmation from the Miyyati that the animal 
is not a stolen one. The miyyati also assists and intervenes to resolve conflict in 
the market. 
 
Other workers in the market were also said to play some roles in market 
security. A trader said “We do not want any security personnel in the market 
unless invited. There is a group of boys who provide protection to our animals. 
They are called yan’lodi and Yan’gadi. A person buys and leaves his animals 
with the yan’lodi and Yan’gadi, and no matter their size if you return the 
following days- you will meet them”.   
 
The Relationship between the Informal Market Security Institutions and the 
Police 
It is apparent that the police operate in the market only when they are invited, 
otherwise they operate outside the market and come in only to apprehend a 
suspected criminal offender. Thus, the police operate in the market to 
supplement efforts of the informal market security arrangements and they are 
invited only as the last resort. When invited they collaborate with traditional 
security outlet as Yan’banga. According to the Chairman of Yan’banga, they go 
on market patrol with the police- “we go on patrol with them right from 12.00 am 
till 6.00 am. We know the bad eggs in our community. That is why we get the 
support of the police, traditional authority and Local Government Authority. This 
car I am driving belongs to the LGA”. 
 
The role of police in market security is not viewed favourably in the market by 
majority of the non-market officials. At best it is viewed with sceptism, and at 
worst with dislike and suspicion. Referring to the problem of pick pocketing in 
the market, a consumer said “let the police helps with the pick pocketing 
problem. They know them, let them deal with them, they cannot”. A trader said 
“if there is breakage of law and order you do not see them. They do not provide 
security to us”. Another one said “no, we do not relate with them since they do 
not protect our animal- you only see police if there is breakage of law for them 
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to get what they can out of it. Similar view was also held by a Butcher where he 
said “we have nobody to protect us. Look, what we want from the Local 
Government is the building of shelter for our boys and for them to send the 
police to protect us not to collect our money. If they are coming to provide 
security, not to disturb and harass us they are welcomed. What we do not want 
is for them to come and be harassing us”.  The sceptism is not related to the 
police alone, even the role of the Sarkin Pawa was questioned by two of our 
informants. The foregoing indicates the relevance of informal institutions in the 
overall management and running of Acida market. Without them, one cannot 
see how trading in livestock could be smooth and effective.  
 
Inter-ethnic conflict and the livestock industry 
A brief note on this security-related issue is relevant here, since settler-indigene 
disputes are reported to be a major source of inter-ethnic conflict in Nigeria. 
The Bodija inter-ethnic conflict between the Hausa cattle traders and the 
Yoruba marketers started from a dispute between a goat trader and some 
market women.  However, tt is worth noting that there was no 
disturbance/fighting among the Hausa and Yoruba cattle traders.  The main 
reason for this can only be attributed to the mutual understanding and 
friendship which trading in the same commodity has created over the years.  
Also many of the traders interact socially.  They attend one another’s 
ceremonies such as children’s weddings, burials and religious festivities.  It is 
common for Yoruba traders who are Christians to attend Muslim festivals (il-de 
filtri and ileya) and for Hausa Muslim traders to visit their Yoruba counter parts, 
at Christmas and Easter festivals.   
 
Consumption and food safety 
Veterinary staff are supposed to monitor the quality of livestock slaughtered 
and transported for consumption, as well provide veterinary services to the 
livestock traders. But, like many other things in Nigeria, it is not working that 
way because of lack of facilities and supervision.   
 
There exist no consumer group or structure in the markets, though some 
institutions in the market are expected to protect the interest of the consumer. 
The chairman of Acida market and the Sarkin Kasuwa are there to protect the 
interest of both the consumers and the traders. Sarkin Pawa is responsible for 
complaints from consumers on meat, Shugaban dillalai is responsible for 
complaints from livestock owners as regards to payment of livestock etc. The 
conflict of interest that is likely to emerge as a result of the Sarkin pawa position 
in protecting the interest of both the butchers and the consumers seems to be 
neutralised through the people’s perception of the Sarki as father of everybody. 
This observation is supported by secondary data where Adamu (1978:12) 
observes that one of the basic characteristics of the market system in 
Hausaland “was and still is the strict observance by the buyers and sellers of 
the authority and arbitration of the Sarkin Kasuwa appointed by the chief of the 
town”.  
 
Regulation in the transport sector 
In the case of the cattle trade, transportation constitutes a crucial function and a 
significant cost item.   
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Formal regulation in the transport sector includes vehicle inspectors who 
should normally check vehicles road worthiness, drivers and vehicle licences. 
Police are supposed to provide security through check points.  However, most 
of the check points have been turned into ‘toll gates’ where the Police are 
bribed.  The amount of bribe allegedly offered to the Police range from as little 
as N100.00 to as high as N10,000 depending on the alleged offence(s) 
committed.  Livestock truck drivers say that they just pay the bribe in order to 
overcome delays on their journey.  
 
Many other semi-formal and non-formal sector actors are involved in the 
conduct of livestock transportation business.  
The various cattle  dealers’ associations, the National Union of Road Transport 
Workers (NURTW), the Association of Cart Pushers and the loaders perform 
the regulatory role by ensuring good behaviour among their members, 
controlling their activities and settling petty quarrels which might ensue in the 
process of transacting business. Many of these Associations have no formal 
constitution but they rely on norms which they have developed after long years 
of existence and which they enforce with relative ease. 
 
After a cattle purchase the falke informs his Dan’kwamisho of his or his group 
transport requirements. Transportation of livestock depends largely of the 
availability of vehicles (trailers) most of which (95 percent) are owned by 
transporters in Jega town, Kebbi state.  It is organised through Yan 
Kwammission (commission agents) who are approached by potential livestock 
traders for a vehicle.  The yan kwommission arranges for the price, date and 
time that the cattle are to be transported.  Members of NURTW (yan union) also 
assist the yan kwommission in sourcing vehicles for livestock traders.  If the 
trader does not have enough cattle to load a vehicle, the yan kwommission 
approach or are approached by other traders who have few cattle to transport.  
The cattle are then combined with each trader marking his own cattle with a 
special sign and the agreed price is paid, the vehicle is loaded by masu lodi 
(loaders) and the journey is set to take place.  In some cases this process may 
take between 2 – 3 days before a vehicle can be fully loaded.  Usually 
departure to southern Nigeria destinations is on Tuesdays between 6 – 8 
o’clock in the evening when the temperatures are cooler.  
 
The livestock are looked after and guarded by the Maigadi until the following 
day for loading into the lorry the Dan’kwamisho has arranged. The 
Dan’kwamisho makes contact among his pool of lorry owners and drivers and 
negotiate with them on the fare on behalf of the trader. The dan’kwamisho 
performs similar function as that of the dillali such as mediating between 
livestock traders and drivers, provides security and insurance by settling the 
problem of stolen animals, issuing ticket to departing vehicle which is useful in 
the case of accident on the road or problem in area of destination etc. 
 
Livestock originating from the market are transported through yan’kwamishon, 
unless by foot.  Movement on the hoof is the oldest means of cattle movement 
and it now accounts for a very small proportion of the total cattle transport 
market.  The dwindling use of the movement on hoofs can be ascribed to the 
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harsh environment enroute and the transit animal mortalities.    Iro (1994) noted 
that a crude estimate showed that the animals loose up to 40% of their original 
weight during the more than 1000 kilometers’ journey from the northern to the 
southern markets.  However, movement on the hoof to the northern collecting 
markets like Acida is still common.  Although more costly than rail, the road 
now dominates the movement of cattle in Nigeria.  Road truckage is dominated 
by the private sector and, therefore, it is more efficiently run than the publicly 
owned and operated railways.  
 
The cattle traders who do not own vehicles rely on road transporters to haul 
their herds from northern sources to the southern markets.   Sometimes 5 or 6 
dealers join together to hire a vehicle and the cost of hire is shared according to 
the number of cattle owned.  Cattle movement by road is not without its own 
problems.  For example, the cattle are kept standing and in some cases laying 
in the vehicles throughout the long journey without food or water (Ademosu, 
1976).  Most rural roads are seasonal and inoperable during the rainy season.  
Vehicles are prone to accidents and cattle and freight insurance is absent in 
Nigeria. Numerous feeder roads were constructed by the Directorate of Foods, 
Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) between 1986 and 1990, mostly in the 
rural areas (Filani, 1993).  These link some of the cattle producing areas to their 
primary markets in the northern states, facilitating the cattle dealers’ movement 
of cattle to weekly markets.  Unfortunately due to the poor maintenance culture 
in Nigeria, most of these roads have deteriorated.   
 
Through his networks of road transport workers across the country and now 
facilitated by the mobile phones, the Dan’kwamisho is able to provide the trader 
with price information for livestock markets across the country. Armed with this 
information the trader can decide where to send his livestock to for sale. The 
livestock trader may or may not accompany the driver, but most of them said 
they select one of them to go with the animals but the person may not stay until 
all the livestock are sold. There is an element of mutual trust among the dealers 
in the transportation of cattle.  Some of the traders may return with the sales 
they have made before the week runs out to trade again in the Acida next 
market day, leaving the unsold livestock with a dillali to sell. Central to livestock 
transportation by road is masu lodi, that is, those who load and off load the 
livestock. Payment for the services of Yankwamisho, yanlodi, yankora are 
supposed to be a fixed fare, but the informality in the transactions has made 
most of the payment to be negotiated.  
 
Transporting livestock to the south is a costly and risky business.  In terms of 
transportation cost, it costs N2000 as transport fare per cattle to the South. 
Other levies are paid to the union of transporters, Local Government, Acida 
market authority and payment of taxes at about 8 checkpoints from Sokoto, 
Kebbi, Niger States to Kogi, Kwara, Oyo and Lagos States. In each of the state, 
there is at least one checkpoint where revenue is collected ranging from N50-
N100 per cattle. In fact tax, levy and other charges is a major complaint among 
the livestock traders.  Highway robbery is a further hazard. Few livestock 
traders utlilise modern banking facilities such as electronic money transfer.  
 Data analysis reveals that the cost of transporting one cow from Acida to 
southern Nigeria ranges from N2000 – 3500 per cow, depending on size and 
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distance that livestock has to be moved.  The costs reported at Ibadan range 
from as high as N3,000.00 per head of cattle from Gombe, Bauchi State (above 
1000 kms), to N1,300.00 in Birni-Gwari, Kaduna State (600 kms) and N700.00 
in Mariga, Niger State (400 kms) from Ibadan (Illiassou, 2000).  For a lorry-load 
of 15, the costs are N45,000.00, N19,500.00 and N10,500.00 from Gombe, 
Birni-Gwari and Mariga respectively.  This is much higher than the N15,000.00 
per lorry load given by Iro for movement from Kano to Lagos in 1993. Other 
factors which can influence the transport costs include the size of cattle, the 
number carried by each vehicle and the season of movement. Usually transport 
costs are slightly higher around festivals.   
 
When there is petrol scarcity prices also rise or frequency of movement is 
reduced.  In the last six months there has not been any petrol scarcity because 
of the effect of deregulation in the petroleum industry.  The cattle traders show 
a sign of relief.   Between 1986 and 2003, due to sustained devaluation of the 
naira on account of the implementation of the IMF Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP), in addition to the criminal non-maintenance of the four 
refineries in Nigeria, domestic production was overtaken through the imperative 
of petroleum imports.  Given the low capacity utilization, excessive unit of 
operating costs, low productivity amongst other factors, petroleum shortages 
became the order of the day in spite of substantial increases in the prices of 
products since 1990.  In very general terms, the impact of the fuel crisis was 
profound and having domino effects on the economy.  For example it has been 
stated that if there is 10% increase in the pump price of petroleum products, 
there will be an increase of 6.2% on transportation costs, utility 3% and 
petroleum sector 4% (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2000).  Obviously these 
figures are conservative and were computed from model simulation results. 
 
During periods of fuel scarcity, many petroleum marketers hoard the product to 
sell at astronomical prices. Although there was a law on fuel diversion, hoarding 
(for example the Special Tribunal on Miscellaneous Offences Act Cap 410, 
laws of Nigeria which prescribe stiff penalties for fuel diversion, hoarding and 
smuggling, but these acts continue to persist with impunity.  The reasons for 
the inability of the federal government to enforce the law has been succinctly 
captured by Ndefo (1999) when she asserts that: 
It may be because most perpetrators of these 
illegal acts are well placed wealthy men who 
seem to regard themselves above the law.  
Furthermore petroleum filling station attendants 
and law enforcement agents sent to enforce 
order in the sales of fuel at stations collude with 
hoarders who are frequently enabled to procure 
petroleum outside queues …… relapse of the 
supply situation tempts us to believe that either 
the powerful cabal holding the sector to ransom 
is yet to be dislodged or that the federal 
government has not told the nation the whole 
truth about what is going on in the petroleum 
industry. (Ndefo, 2000: 140, 141) 
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With particular reference to the Sokoto area, the fuel situation was made worse 
not only because the areas shares a border with Niger Republic, which has 
been a major outlet of petroleum smuggling but also because the powers that 
be in the state are themselves involved in petroleum marketing and its 
attendant sharp practices.  It is in this context that the high cost of 
transportation of livestock has to be understood. This notwithstanding, it has to 
be noted that the period of fuel scarcity provide succor for the unemployed 
youths as they all rush to take part in the lucrative black market in the sale of 
petroleum products. 
 
The cost of transport is calculated at the end of the journey i.e. amount at 
destination, taking into consideration cost of hiring the vehicle, incidental 
expenses on enroute the journey such as jangali tax, bribes to Police and other 
security operatives, feeding of animals on the way amongst others.  When the 
animals are finally sold, the amount realized is shared proportionately to the 
number of cattle owned by the individuals having subtracted all the incidental 
expenses incurred on the way.  In this process it is the poorer traders (with 
fewer cattle) who loose out given the high cost of incidental expenses incurred 
on the way and which are shared on pro-rata basis.  This explains why some of 
the poorer animal owners prefer to sell to larger traders in Sokoto and be paid 
cash outright rather than wait till the driver returns from the journey.  Again in 
this process, the price of cattle is generally lower at Sokoto given the 
anticipated expenses on the way. This is one of the ways through which drivers 
also act as traders thereby maximizing his profit.   
 
Usually it takes an average of between 1½ days and 3 days to move cattle from 
the various northern sources to Ibadan. Other costs are incurred in the 
transportation of cattle.  For instance, loaders charge between N100 and N200 
per cow, depending on the size of the cows.  Also cost of loading varies with 
the positioning of the cows in the vehicles.  Positioning could be by standing 
(N100.00) or by laying which attracts  N250 per cow.  This difference is said to 
be due to the fact that it is more difficult to load cattle by laying them in the 
vehicles.  The unloading at Ibadan attracts only N50 per head of cattle whether 
the positioning is standing or laying.   
 
Certain charges are also paid on each head of cattle during transit.  This, on 
the average, is N50.00 but it could vary from one state to another.  While in 
Sokoto, Niger, Kebbi and Kwara States the amount is N50.00, the Oyo State 
Government collects N100.00 per cattle in transit within the state before 
reaching the Akinyele Kraal.  Payment made in transit is borne by the cattle 
owners and not the vehicle owner/driver.  However, the owner/driver pays the 
police who collect illegal fees at various check points enroute.  The drivers 
encounter an average of fifteen to twenty check points on a single journey.  The 
legal check points are the 5 interstate junctions where the charges referred to 
above are collected.  Others manned mainly by the police are illegal.  Payment 
on each occasion also varies between N100 and N200.  In other words a driver 
can pay up to between N1000 to N2,000 on a journey.  Such charges are 
passed on to the cattle dealers in the charges originally paid to the vehicle 
owner. 
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About 50 vehicles move cattle from Akinyele to Bodija daily.  Unlike at the 
source in the North, the cattle dealers at Akinyele are not free to choose their 
vehicles, because the vehicles are arranged to move in turns depending on 
their time of arrival at the Kraal.  As stated earlier, the cattle traders in the 
northern markets arrange their own vehicles after purchase.  They then have 
the freedom of choice which is lacking in Akinyele market.  The National Union 
of Road Transport Workes (NURTW) is responsible for maintaining discipline 
and ensuring that the drivers obey their turns. 
 
Before leaving Akinyele the cattle dealers pay a tax of N100 to the Akinyele 
Local Government and another N100.00 to the Oyo State Government. The 
cows are moved to the vehicles at Akinyele Kraal park in either of two ways. 
These are by ropes used to drag the cows to the vehicles at N100 per cow and 
by cart pushers (omolankes) at N150.00 per cow. Loaders take N100 per cow. 
All cows are laid in the vehicles during the movement from Akinyele to Bodija 
market. 
 
The Association of cart pushers and loaders organize movement to and loading 
of vehicles. Each member of the Association has his own regular dealers and 
they stick to them in movement and loading on daily basis. 
 
At the Bodija market, the old pre-1999 Kraal is still used to accommodate the 
cows on arrival. A section of this is now fenced where cows that are not sold in 
a day are kept overnight for a payment of N50.00 per cow. Off-loaders take 
only N50.00 per cattle in Bodija and they are responsible for moving the cattle 
by rope to the abattoir in the market. The rope used costs N50.00 per piece.  
 
There is an Association of Cart pushers (omolankes) made up of 40 members 
at Bodija. All of them are males and of the same Yoruba ethnic group. Although 
there is no restriction to entry on ethnic basis, only Yorubas engage in cart 
pushing at Bodija market.  Cart pushing is also not a woman’s job. Only a few 
of them own one cart each and some own two. It costs about N15,000.00 to 
build a cart. The owners rent out the carts at N20 per trip from the Kraal to the 
abattoir. The cart pushers carry only ailing or tired cows (due to exhaustion 
during transit) to the slaughter house at N150.00 per cow. In essence, the 
pusher makes an average profit of N130.00 per trip. Average daily proceed for  
cart pushers is put at between N750-N1,000.00.  The owners of the carts 
themselves have to work in addition to renting their carts to others in order to 
make ends meet. 
 
Although the association of cart pushers has no written constitution, there are 
certain known norms which the members must not violate. For example, each 
regular cart pusher has his own customer among the cattle dealers and no one 
can move cows belonging to others’ customers. They hold their weekly 
meetings on Mondays starting at 1.00pm. Weekly payment of N100 is made by 
each member for maintenance and development of the association. Additional 
N20.00 is paid and put in a separate account for purposes of assisting 
members who may be engaged in any type of ceremonies ranging from naming 
of a new baby to burying parents or relations. 
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Another set of  transporters within the Bodija market are the head porters 
(Alaarus). These are all women who carry parts of slaughtered cows for 
themselves (if they are meat sellers) or for others at a cost of N30.00 from the 
abattoir to the vehicles on the Bodija – University of Ibadan main road. Each 
porter could make an average of N450- N600 per day, depending on the 
market situation. 
 
The road leading from the Bodija main market to the abattoir is in a very bad 
state of disrepair. Consequently, the vehicles that move slaughtered cows to 
the abattoir to other parts of the metropolis  charge fees which are generally 
higher than the normal. 
Movement of slaughtered cows (whole or parts) from Bodija to other markets is 
done mainly by taxi cabs and to some extent by ‘danfos’ and pick-up vans.  
Women head porters (Alaarus) carry the slaughtered parts to the vehicles 
either at the park near the abattoir or on the main road at a cost of N30.00 per 
trip load. There are a few male Hausa head porters also but they operate more 
in the non-cattle trading section of Bodija market. The ‘Alaarus’ are not 
organized in any way and entry is free and uncontrolled. Their ages vary from 
about 18 years to forty five especially for the women. 
 
To conclude this section, it must be noted that the task of estimating 
transportation cost in the cattle trade is more complicated once various legal 
and illegal fees paid in transit when cattle is moved from the northern markets 
to Ibadan are taken into account. Also some of such actors in the transport 
chain as the cart pushers and head loaders have not been reflected in previous 
studies on cattle marketing in Bodija market. Generally, transport cost of 
moving cattle from the source to Bodija market is made up of fees charged by 
the vehicle owners/drivers and the loaders at the originating sources in the 
northern markets, the fees paid to states and the illegal collections by the police 
enroute during transit. Also the fees charged by transporters at Akinyele market 
by the loaders and off loaders at both Akinyele and Bodija markets and the 
charges  by the head porters. Total transport rates for moving cattle from the 
northern states to Bodija market, therefore, include the vehicle hiring costs (at 
the northern market and Akinyele Kraal) plus the loading and off-loading costs, 
costs of attendants that accompany the vehicles, taxes paid to states enroute 
from the north, illegal fees collected by the police at check points, costs for cart 
pushers and porters at different levels before the cow reaches the abattoir at 
Bodija market. For the final consumer, the transport costs also include the cost 
of moving from the sub-markets to the consumer’s home. 
 
Livestock transport security and insurance issues 
Transporting livestock between the north and south west is not secure. All the 
informants in Acida market have a story to tell about their experiences or other 
people’s experiences with armed robbers on the road. One of the informants 
explains the problem of insecurity in livestock long distance trading:  
“Once you take your cattle to the Kurmi (South) to sell, you never know the 
money is yours until you get into your house. In as close as Sifawa (30 km 
away from Acida), our people were robbed of their money around 8 pm. That is 
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on the part of cattle traders. For the drivers- the major problem is that since the 
drivers do not have money, and the robbers can not steal cattle- they beat up 
drivers, sometimes even kill them. In the past, they block the roads, and when 
the lorry falls down they attack. Now they are bolder.” 
Another narrates: 
“We have robbers on our roads, two months ago- we were stopped by robbers 
around 8.00 am along Zuru road. I lost over 480,000 Naira. We were 8 in 
number and we all lost money to the robbers. We use to take 20 cattle every 
market to the south, now we can hardly afford 5 cows. If not because of the 
sutura (protection) of this business we would not have been able to have 5 
animals to trade today”. 
 
Since the traders carry a lot of cash on return journeys from the south, they risk 
attacks by armed robbers.  Unfortunately, cattle in transit are not formally 
insured.  Freight insurance is available from a few companies for freight 
transporters especially of export produce (cocoa, palm oil and formerly 
groundnut traders), and imported goods moving from the coastal parts to 
factories and individuals in the hinterland but Nigerians especially cattle traders 
are usually suspicious of insurance companies, which are perceives as quick at 
collecting premiums but always reluctant to pay claims.  They may be unwilling 
to go through the usually long and difficult process of making claims in case of 
losses.   Once traders incur some loss or misfortune in their trade, they seek 
solace in God. On what they do if they are duped or robbed of their capital or 
animals, they said they search, if they do not find their animal or money they 
resign to fate and seek for Allah’s protection against another time.  
 
 When we asked who is responsible for any loss if vehicles break down or are 
involved in accidents during transit, we were told that the cattle dealers take 
responsibility for their cattle.   However, informal means are use to serve as 
insurance for loses incurred through trading. Social networks and support from 
fellow traders and dillalai have pulled a number of the respondents from the 
brink of ruin. One of the informants quoted elsewhere describes such kind of 
support from fellow traders as sutura (cloth), signifying the protection, care, and 
status their network provides to one another. All the market Associations have 
the practice of helping one another in a period of crisis or calamity. If a member 
incurs any lost, he is assisted by his fellow colleagues either through a fixed 
amount charged to all members. The total amount raised is handed over to the 
affected person. If what is raised is inadequate, the association may lend the 
affected person some money to continue with the business. Thus, although the 
majority of the livestock traders and drivers do not utilize formal insurance 
services (for obvious reason of inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the system in 
Nigeria), they have nonetheless being able to utilize and benefit from informal 
insurance services from family, friends and importantly, association and its 
membership.  
 
  
Conclusions 
The livestock trade is overwhelmingly male-dominated and highly stratified with 
many different types of actor.  Improvements in livestock market transactions 
and transportation cannot be achieved without understanding the social context 
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within which the market operates and the norms and relations that define 
trading and transport practices. It is in this light that the findings of this research 
and the conclusions drawn are important.  
 
The importance and dominance of informal institutions and social networks in 
livestock market trading and the associated transportation business in Nigeria 
is obvious from the findings of all three case studies: the role of informal 
insurance is perhaps particularly noteworthy. What is also evident from the 
research findings is the low level of involvement of the formal institutions in the 
market. Both rich and poor participants in the livestock trade depend on – and 
in many cases seem to prefer - the informal market institutions. Within the 
livestock markets, vigilantes are preferred to the police for immediate local 
security, for instance. Similarly, in the cattle transport business, dealers’ 
associations, the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW), the 
Association of Cart Pushers and the loaders perform a crucial regulatory role by 
ensuring good behaviour among their members, controlling their activities and 
settling petty quarrels which might ensue in the process of transacting 
business. Many of these Associations have no formal constitution but they rely 
on norms which they have developed after long years of existence and which 
they enforce with relative ease.  (By contrast, the police and other highway 
authorities regulating transport movements are widely viewed as agents of 
extortion.)  
 
The role of commission agents and the livestock associations in the control of 
market space is more controversial. Our studies suggest that while these 
agents play a crucial role in the livestock trade, their ability to bar outsiders is 
considerable and arguably reduces the potential of poorer livestock owners to 
obtain a good price for their stock.  However, their role in the management of a 
relatively high-value trade with corresponding risks appears invaluable in 
Nigeria’s current trading and transport context and their returns merely 
commensurate with this. The role of dillalai in mitigating transaction risks and 
costs is central in a market that is temporary, transitory and where most 
customers are from distant areas. The dilallai and the Dan kwamishon provide 
some elements of permanency and reliability in a market where people from far 
distant places come and go with their goods. The widespread expansion of 
telephone use in collection and dissemination of information in the livestock 
trade is giving them increasing potential to adjust rapidly to market 
opportunities.  
 
Despite the effectiveness and advantages of the informal institutions in market 
and livestock trading, the increased insecurity in the transportation of livestock 
across the country makes the integration of formal institutions, particularly 
banking and insurance institutions with the livestock marketing essential. We 
suggest a programme is urgently needed, for instance, to enlighten traders on 
the availability and advantages of lodging their money in a bank for collection at 
their destination. For the most part, however, informal institutions are likely to 
provide the main route to effective market operations in the livestock trade for 
some years to come. 
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4. MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR MAIZE IN NORTHERN NIGERIA 
 
Benjamin Ahmed, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria 
and  Laraba Rikko, University of Jos, Jos 
 
 
Introduction 
Maize is produced by both small and large-scale farmers in the northern guinea 
savanna of Nigeria, where it is widely consumed as a staple food by poor rural 
and urban households. Green fresh maize is cooked or roasted and hawked by 
women and children, providing a livelihood for many urban poor households. 
Maize is also processed industrially for flour, animal feeds, biscuits, beverages 
and beer and in these forms is consumed widely across Nigeria.  The ban on 
importation of cereals by the Federal Government of Nigeria since 1986 has 
greatly expanded these latter uses and thus overall demand for maize.  
 
This report examines the maize commodity chain and the market institutions 
that regulate its operation, based on observations in two bulking centres. 
Attention is paid to gender and ethnicity, credit, security and safety, access to 
information and transport infrastructure.   
 
Study location and focus of research 
The studies focus on two major bulking markets in northern Nigeria’s main 
maize production zone, Giwa and Jengre.  Giwa market is located at about 30 
km from Zaria on the main Zaria- Sokoto high way, within the Moslem Hausa 
heartland. It is one of Nigeria’s four main bulking centres for maize and the 
study consequently focuses particularly on transport issues.  Jengre, about 
30kms from Jos along the main Jos- Zaria road, is located within Plateau state 
in a region peopled by diverse Plateau groups such as the Lere, Lemoro and 
Amo.  This market also plays an important bulking role, but on a rather smaller 
scale than Giwa. Here the focus of research was more on credit relations and 
security. Both markets deal in both yellow and white maize. 
 
Methods  
Both researchers used qualitative approaches with an emphasis on observation 
and individual and group interviews (using checklists).  The researcher in 
Jengre found it particular advantageous being a woman, since it was easy for 
her to sit among the women retailers and conduct interviews. The nature of the 
activities going on in the market did not allow group interviews, though a few 
took place after closure of market activities especially with the wholesalers.   
 
The researchers interviewed diverse market actors (traders, transporters, 
loaders etc.) and key informants such as the Sarkin Kasuwa (market 
administrator) and the chairman of the dillalai (commission agents) during 
repeat visits to the markets on market days in December 2004 and January 
2005. The emphasis in each case was principally upon maize traders and 
transporters, rather than on consumers. To achieve consistency and validity of 
information gathered, triangulation was used to cross check and confirm 
responses from 2-3 respondents, sometimes at separate visits.   
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One limitation to the Giwa study, which focussed on transport, was that it was 
not possible to reach actors like transport owners because they were not in the 
market. Such vehicles are bought and given to drivers to drive without the 
owner accompanying them.   
 
Results from qualitative research in these markets were compared with material 
from other studies of northern Nigerian maize marketing. 
 
The maize marketing chain 
 
There are many actors who play active roles at different times in the maize 
marketing chain. Understanding the role of each actor in the market is 
necessary because they determine how rural producers and consumers have 
access to the market and also how the maize gets to urban consumers and 
industrial users.  The actors in our two study markets vary slightly in their local 
names and roles since Giwa is located in a Moslem Hausa region, whereas 
Jengre is dominated by Plateau ethnic groups. In Jengre the September 2001 
crisis in Jos has indirectly affected the trust and interaction between the 
Christian and the Moslem traders. Thus roles that were exclusively played by 
Moslem traders are gradually being invaded and succeeded by the indigene 
Christians. This can be seen from the significant role now being played there by 
the indigenes as dillalai.  In both markets, women play a very limited role, 
though in Jengre women are more strongly in evidence in the retail sector. 
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Figure 1:  Marketing channel for Maize in Northern Nigeria. 
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Maize retailers (mai auna) 
In Giwa market the retailers are generally male, because this is a Moslem 
Hausa/Fulani market. The maize retailers usually deal in more than one grain 
at a time. The maize traded is obtained in two ways; first, the farmer/rural 
assembler brings the maize into the market in smaller measures (usually less 
than a bag) and gives it to a known or familiar retailer or if a first timer seller, 
to a retailer that must have been recommended by a relative or known 
person.  The farmer/rural assembler will leave the maize with the retailer to 
sell for him/her.  He or she may or may not disclose the quantity brought to 
the retailer at the initial stage until the sale has been made. The farmer/rural 
assembler might stay with the retailer while the sale is being made or might 
go into the market for other transactions but will return later to collect the 
money from the sale.  When the farmer/producer returns, the retailer will ask 
for the quantity brought (number of measures) if that has not been disclosed 
earlier to him and on confirmation by the retailer, he pays the exact amount to 
the owner of the maize.  The retailer is not paid for the services rendered to 
the producer/rural assembler but may receive a gift.  If however, after 
measuring the quantity brought there is a fraction of a measure left, that 
fraction is forfeited to the retailer. The retailer gathers such fractions from all 
the customers and sells that for himself as his gain from the services provided 
to his customers.   
 
The second way by which the retailers obtain the maize sold is by buying from 
farmers/rural assembler that brings maize to them.  In this case, the retailer 
knowing the likely prevailing price for the maize in the market for that day, will 
buy it from the farmer/rural assembler at slightly lower price and pay him/her 
on the spot.  The retailer then waits to sell the maize at the prevailing market 
price or he keeps it till the next market if the prevailing market price of maize 
that day was not good enough for him to make profit. 
 
Customers patronizing a retailer mostly come from the same village as the 
retailer.  The customer-retailer relationship is built on mutual trust, particularly 
if such customer always tells the truth on quantity brought for sale and if the 
retailers always pay correctly for quantity brought without dispute on price of 
sale. In the case of Hausa Giwa market, the trust as basis of transactions in 
the market is not just due to familiarity but also religion.  In most cases, the 
people involved know each other over some time, but the fact that they are all 
Muslims who believe in the supremacy and judgment of Allah, should 
anybody cheat the other, is an additional advantage.     
 
Giwa retailers were asked if there has been disagreement between them and 
their customers in the past and how such conflicts were resolved.  They 
agreed that there could be disagreement between them and their customers.  
An instance was given in which the maize brought to one of the retailers by a 
farmer/rural assembler turned out to be stolen.  Cases of stolen grains being 
brought to the retailers for buying are said to be common in the market and 
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therefore the retailers said they are often careful when buying from those who 
bring grains to them. According to them, those who bring stolen grain are in a 
hurry to dispose of it, so they sell at much lower than the prevailing prices and 
they often leave behind the container in which the grain was brought.  If 
somebody lost his/her grains and complains to Sarkin Kasuwa of the theft, the 
Sarkin would send his officials/ assistants to see if it could be found with 
anybody. The tracking team would first visit the retailing section of the market 
to see if it could be found through the recognition of the container of the grain 
or the grain itself. If it is found with any retailer, the case will be reported to 
their leader (Sarkin mai auna).  If the person who stole the maize has been 
paid and can not be found, the retailer on whom the stolen maize was found 
would be asked to pay for the stolen maize. Where the amount involved is 
more than the retailer’s immediate capacity, members of his association may 
be asked by their leader to contribute money to help him out to quickly offset 
the bill of the stolen maize. The contribution to bail out a member from a 
problem is not compulsory nor fixed but effective as members do this as 
insurance against the day they too might enter into a problem.  The 
experience from a past episode is described in the box below. 
 
 
Because of the danger of receiving/buying stolen grains in the market, the 
retailers are very cautious with their customers, particularly if they are first 
timers: they watch the price the seller is willing to accept (would sell cheap); 
find out the number of measures contained in the container (may not know if it 
is stolen); note whether the seller is going back with the container with which 
the grain was brought for sale.  
 
In Jengre, by contrast with Giwa, maize retailing is dominated by women.  
They purchase maize from the dillalai in bags or from the Uwarmudu (dillaliya) 
in measures (mudus) The retailer does not have direct access to the producer 
in the market area, by contrast with the situation in Giwa,  but may purchase 
maize from the producer either from the farm or from the house. In other 
respects their mode of dealing seems similar. 
b. Rural maize assembler/traders (mai mudu) 
The mai mudu collect maize from producers in small quantities (not in bags) 
and retail in mudus (measures) to consumers and retailers who also buy in 
relatively small quantities. The smaller rural assemblers brings about 2 – 3 
A thief stole 2 bags of cowpea in the market and sold it to a 
retailer in the market.  Later that day, the owner identified the 
thief and he was caught and taken to the Sarkin Kasuwa. The 
Sarkin Kasuwa asked the thief to lead them to the buyer, which 
he did but unfortunately, the thief pointed to a wrong retailer as 
the buyer.  Since the real buyer could not be ascertained the 
pointed retailer was asked by the Sarkin kasuwa to pay the 
money for the 2 bags and the money was given to the owner of 
the maize. The thief could not pay because he had spent it. 
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bags to the market but the bigger ones can bring up to 20 bags depending on 
their capital base and the season. The rural assemblers cover a distance of 
up to 30km and use vehicles to transport the maize to the market. 
 
Most in Jengre are women (uwar mudu), but in Giwa most are men, although 
young females of 11 -15 years may be involved (i.e. prior to marriage). The 
role does not necessarily require a large capital base, since they do not 
purchase maize in cash. Mai mudu are usually paid from the remains of the 
grains after measurement. This makes them measure with special skill in 
order to get left over after measurement as their remuneration. They also 
provide credit in cash and in kind to most of their patrons while they 
themselves receive credit from the farmers and sometimes from the bulk 
purchasers.  
 
In Giwa market, the mai mudu have to sell through a dillali and pay N 20 per 
bag sold to the dillali as commission. They bear the transport cost which 
ranges from N40 – N50/bag from near by villages and about N100/bag for 
distant places. If they sell at the retailing section, there will be no payment for 
commission but will have to pay dandoko (head load carriers) or maibaro 
(wheel-barrow carriers) to transport them from motor pack to the section at a 
fee of N 10 per bag. But because the retailer buys a very few bags at a time 
and may not pay until after sale, the rural assembler prefers to sell at the 
wholesale section through the dillali and get his full money. The dillali 
canvases for buyers, negotiates prices based on quality of the maize and 
consults with the rural assembler on the offered prices before the maize is 
finally sold, to ensure that that price is acceptable to him.  
 
The rural assembler’s benefits from going through the dillali are that he does 
not have to stay there to negotiate sale prices with the buyer which is a saving 
on time and energy in negotiation and he also gets his money in full once the 
sale has been made. The maize is given to a male dillali for sale but the 
actual buyer could be a male or a female.   
c. The maize bulkers (yan jabali) 
A group of traders called yan jabali were identified in Giwa market.  These are 
few in number and unorganized as they operate without an association.  They 
go round the retailers to buy maize in measures at retail prices and bulk them 
into bags (40 tiyas = 1 bag) and then resell wholesale in bag.  However, 
because the bag is not weighed before sale, they turned the maize into a 
smaller bag that contains less number of tiyas, usually 2 – 5 tiya less and sell 
it as if it is a normal bag of 40 tiyas. Sometimes, they use the same bag from 
which they have taken some tiyas out but which has been sew neatly so that 
unless you are highly experienced in the trade, you may not know. By the time 
they buy 2-4 bags on a market day, they would have obtained 8 - 20 tiyas 
extra which they now sell at retail price as their profit. Those who have money 
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to buy more could get an extra bag to sell at whole sale price, which is often 
less than retail prices. The retail price was     N 95 per tiya while the 
wholesale price was N 92.5 per tiya. The retailers may reduce N 1-2 for 
known customers depending on the quality of maize on sale.  The yan jabali 
are regarded as ‘cheaters’ because they play on the intelligence of those who 
do not know the market well in terms of sizes of measures used since sale is 
not by weight. 
 
d.  The yan wazai 
Yan wazai operate in many Plateau markets, including Jengre. They are a set 
of traders who are neither dillalai nor retailers, but operate both as 
wholesalers and retailers. Like the yan jabali they have a poor reputation. 
They purchase maize from the farms or houses of producers and sell to 
retailers or consumers in the market or give to the dillali to sell to wholesalers.  
They may also provide credit in form of cash, fertilizer and seedlings to the 
producers since they have direct access to them.  However, in Jenre market 
some respondents complained that their bags were usually not full according 
to the kilograms (kg) specified on the bags. In Jengre market efforts are 
reportedly being made by the market authority and the dillallai association to 
stop the activities of the yanwazai in the market.  
e. The company agents/merchants (yan kamassio) 
Company agents are common in Giwa market.  There are three types: firstly, 
those who come from the companies during the glut periods to buy maize 
direct from the market and store them until the maize could be evacuated. 
When they get to the market, they make use of the yan kamassio to buy the 
maize for which they pay N 20 commission for every bag bought. The second 
type of company agents are those who are contractors to companies and who 
get the local purchase order (LPO) to supply certain quantities of maize to the 
company. They are usually wholesalers of grains who also buy from the 
market through the yan kamissio in the same manner as company agents or 
sometimes, they may supply from their own production as most of them are 
also producers of maize.   The third type is that the yan kommassio may also 
act as company agents as they are approached directly by companies to 
make purchases for them as if they are wholesalers. In this case, they are 
given LPO like the wholesalers to supply the maize at an agreed price.  
 
The company purchases are usually made between November and 
December each year. At this period, they send out their agents to go round 
markets in the production zones to get information on supplies and prices 
from traders and farmers. When the LPO is given the unit price is Naira per 
tonne even though, the purchase is made in bags that have not been weighed 
at purchase in the market. The supplier therefore has to be careful of the type 
of maize purchased and the size of bags as not to run short when it is 
weighed in the company at delivery.  There is no specification in terms of 
colour and variety for the maize supplied to companies but the hybrid variety, 
which is denser and the yellow coloured maize are more preferred. 
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The yan kamassio who are general grain dealers are resident in the market 
and facilitate grains buying for large buyers for a commission. They operate in 
four ways:  
(1) they buy maize for wholesalers or contractors who have LPOs to supply 
maize to companies, (2) they buy for company agents that come to the market 
to make direct purchases, (3) they help individuals and wholesalers who want 
to make large purchases to carry away or for temporary storage in the market 
for sale later, or (4) they get LPOs from companies to supply maize. 
 
In the first and second cases, the yan kammasio would be approached to help 
buy some specified quantity of maize for the wholesaler or contractor.  The 
buyer may or may not be physically present in the market during purchase.   
The buyer if present will pay the full cost of the grain plus the cost of 
transportation to the destination. If the owner is not physically present, he 
would deposit 50% of the transport money and pay the balance on delivery.  
The arrangement for the conveyance of the maize is done by the yan 
komassio if the buyer did not come with his own vehicle. The risk of given 
load to an unknown vehicle is given below in the box. 
 
 
 
After this incident, the yan komassio no longer use vehicles where they don’t 
know the owner or driver or they have to send an escort to follow the driver to 
the destination. 
 
The yan kamassio receive N20/bag of maize purchased.  In the 3rd case 
where the buyer is on the ground and the maize is to be conveyed away, the 
same process for the 1st and 2nd cases are followed. If however, the maize is 
to be bought and stored in the market, the yan komassio will buy the maize 
based on the amount brought, rent a store in the market and store them until 
the buyer wants to sell or carry them away. If the sale is to be done in the 
market, the yan komassio will do the selling either in the presence or absence 
of the owner and his money is returned to him. The yan komassio will take 
N20 per bag of maize sold again. In the fourth case, the yan komassio will buy 
and supply the company as required in the LPO and get his pay on delivery. 
f. The commission agents (Dillalai) 
Whereas the yan kamassio act for buyers, dillali act for sellers. In many 
markets across northern Nigeria, farmers are not allowed to sell maize in 
An Igala man paid for 5 trailer loads of cowpea to be delivered in 
Lagos.  He paid the advance of 50% of the transport cost to the yan 
komassio but only 4 of the trailers reached destination as one driven 
by a Ghanaian disappeared with the transport deposit and the 
cowpea.  The yan kommasio was made to pay for the cowpea 
diverted and the transport fee to the owner when the case was 
reported back at Giwa market through the association. 
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quantity directly but must deliver the produce to a dillali who is mandated to 
sell the produce to traders and consumers.  New producers or suppliers to the 
market who don’t have a dillali are quickly identified and attached to a dillali by 
the Chairman of the dillalai.  This relationship continues as long as the 
producer brings his produce to the market.  A producer can choose to change 
the dillali, through the chairman of the association, if he encounters problems. 
 
The dillali- seller relationship is built over time on mutual trust. Usually it start 
from a maize seller being personally known to the dellalai (family relations, in-
laws or friends) or he was introduced to the new customer by an old customer 
who has previously sold through him. As the trade interactions continues over 
time (possibly after 2-3 transactions), the trust is built a round themselves to 
the extent that the seller can freely bring his maize for sell and don’t have to 
be present when it is being sold and the dellali can hand over the sale money 
to the owner without any argument or doubt from the seller. The length of 
interactions between a new customer (seller) and the dellali is a function of 
the extent of this trust because when doubts and arguments over quantity 
brought and the amount remitted to owner start arising, then the trust has 
broken down and the seller would look for a new dellali for his future 
transactions. 
 
The commission agents in Giwa market were all Hausa men and they 
dominated the market in numbers (up to 60% of all participants/actors).  They 
get a commission of N20 per bag of maize sold or 0.55% of the producer 
price. The commission is deducted from the money paid by the buyer.    The 
commission received is more or less fixed by the Dillalai association in the 
market but usually, it is the same amount for all the markets in the zone at 
that time. There could be increase in the commission if the general prices of 
grains increased. Sometimes however, the seller may give some token 
amount of money to the dillali over and above the commission received from 
the buyer as a show of appreciation. 
 
Even though the activities of the dillallai are conceived as excessive and 
seem to exclude the farmer from having direct access to consumers, the 
associations have in many instances provided mediation. They arguably 
protect the farmer from being cheated by buyers and also allow the farmer to 
transact other business in the market while the dillali does the selling. In 
Jengre market, , only the dillali association members are allowed to collect the 
commodities from the farmers and sell. Therefore, the fear of farmers loosing 
substantial income is minimized especially considering the fact that the dillalai 
as well as the farmers are indigenes.  
 
ACCESS TO CREDIT 
Credit arrangements permeate the maize chain. Many small farmers, for 
example, depend on financial assistance or assistance in kind based on their 
personal relationships with the dillalai. The dillalai organize and collect 
fertilizers for them and they pay with their produce after the harvest.  Retailers 
also depend on the dillali for credit assistance, in this case the dillali giving 
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them 1-2 bags of maize to sell and pay directly after the sales (in Jengre 
market with extra cost/interest (riba) of N50 per bag per day). The retailers 
consider the charges of the dillalai high as complained by Rhoda Tanko – a 
23 year old woman who has been retailing for the past four years.  She 
exclaimed that even though the charges are high “we don’t have a choice 
since we cannot afford to pay cash for the bags; we have to depend on them 
and pay their charges until the day we are able to afford it”. 
 
Retailers may also provide credit to their consumers, usually base on trust, 
since most of them are familiar with each other.  Access to credit is a major 
constraint to the retailing business, which limits and sometimes cripples their 
activities. These difficulties are linked to retailers’ low social status and lack of 
collateral. Thus, in Jengre, the only solution has been to rely on the dillalai to 
collect produce on credit or through informal savings (weekly adashe) and 
credit associations where they exist to obtain business finance. The adashe is 
usually collected weekly on market days by the organizer (uwaradashe).   
 
In Giwa market sale of maize to consumers and other buyers on credit by 
retailers was not common because of past experiences. One of the retailers 
told the story of how he sold on credit to a customer and the credit turned out 
to be a bad debt. Since then, he has learnt not to do so again.  Mallam 
Mu’azu, the retailer gave an example of how he sold maize worth N350 to a 
co-retailer who lives near the Giwa market to sell and return the money to him 
in the next market day but has not been paid two years after the credit was 
given. The man has changed business from grain trade to selling water in the 
market. When the retailer was asked why he didn’t take action on him, he said 
that having persistently asked him to pay and he has refused to pay, he has 
left him to God since he no longer belonged to their association where report 
could have been made and perhaps sort the intervention of their leader and 
members. To him that debt has been written off as bad debt. Forcing 
somebody to pay debt especially small one like this is not common in the 
community, as everything are often left to God by virtue of their religion. One 
of the retailers however said that he sells on credit to other retailers in the 
market but such person will have to return the money plus any unsold grain at 
the end of the market that day. This usually happens when a retailer runs 
short of a particular grain type and his customers are looking for it to buy. 
Those retailers who have more sell through those who do not by giving the 
sellers some discount on the bag. One of the trader said that his credit sale is 
about 10% of his total sale on any market day.    
 
The provision of assistance establishes and strengthens relationships among 
traders due to the interdependence on each other.  This in turn sustains and 
encourages market operations and networks.  Table 1 illustrates the credit 
relationship between the market actors. 
Table 1:   Credit relationship among the maize market actors  
 
Credit receiver Credit provider 
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Dillali Producer, wholesaler 
Producer Dillali, Transporter, Yan Wazai 
Wholesalers Dillali, Transporters 
Retailer Dillali, Transporter, Yan Wazai 
Yan Wazai Producer, Transporter 
 Source: Field Survey, January 2005, Jengre market. 
 
The table above shows that the dillali plays a dominant role in the provision of 
credit to almost all the actors in the maize chain. This suggests some form of 
confidence and trust placed on him by the producers and other traders.  Other 
sources of credit included personal savings, relatives, friends, personal 
relationships and associations. Only one actor (wholesaler) had ever received 
formal credit for reasons given on table 2.  
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Table 2:  Reasons adduced by market actors for not obtaining 
loan from theformal credit institutions (banks) 
 
Reasons for not obtaining loan No. of 
respondents 
Lack of awareness/ignorance 18 
Lack of collateral/security 15 
High interest rate 14 
Cumbersome bank processes 10 
Fear of default 5 
Corruption of bank officials 3 
Source: Field Survey, January 2005, Jengre market. 
 
An official of National Agricultural Credit and Rural Development Bank 
(NACRDB) confirmed that, until recently (about 5 years ago), credit was only 
available for large scale purchasers/traders and even the present 
government’s policy on providing credit to rural producers/traders is not 
known to the small scale traders due to lack of information.  Some of the 
traders complained that they applied for loan for more than a year now (since 
2004) and they have not received any information on that. This probably 
explains why the traders rely on the informal credit providers which are easily 
and readily available. Most of the small traders, especially the uneducated 
seem to have a phobia for formal credit.  This can be observed from the 
response of Madam Alisabatu Ishaku given below: 
  “What do I have and who knows me that I will 
  go to the bank to look for money” 
Trust was discovered to be the key condition attached to credit provision and 
repayment. This trust is established through long time transactions between 
the actors. 
 
Similarly, in Giwa, none of the market intermediaries used formal loans to 
pursue their business. The reliance on credit from family members and friends 
by traders is traced to the difficulties associated with getting formal credit and 
with repayments when there is a problem that cause default.  With informal 
credit, there are no repeated visits and filling of forms; where there is default 
there may be no seizure of property but re- scheduled. Furthermore, the credit 
may be a seed capital to purchase grains for the merchant relation at an 
agreed price and whatever the person can save from it becomes his own 
capital. This is very common among grain merchants who have boys or 
agents in the field. They go to the bush markets to buy at cheaper prices and 
from the difference in prices can make substantial money over time to start 
their own business.  In Giwa, as in Jengre, the rural assembler’s sources of 
trading capital were personal savings and borrowing from family member. 
 
Trader associations  
Membership in market associations can play a crucial role in marketing. Each 
category of middlemen has a structure built around it – an association with a 
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chosen leader to whom all members respect and goes for arbitration in time of 
conflict.  The various association members rally round one another in times of 
needs which may be social or financial that may or may not be related to the 
actual businesses. For instance, in the social circle, when a member is 
marrying or having naming ceremony or is bereaved, members will be present 
on such occasion and would likely present gifts which may be in kind or cash. 
As a business security, members rally financial resources to members who 
are in financial distress or run into business trouble. Thus, there is some kind 
of social insurance for members whom the formal insurance system does not 
provide for, particularly as the market intermediaries have in most cases no 
formal education and may not be rich enough to afford formal insurance 
Most dillali in Giwa market belong to an association and have membership 
cards for the association which they carry.  The role of the association is to 
help solve conflict whenever it arises either between members or between 
members and customers.  The registration fee is N1000 per member and the 
payment is once and at registration.  However, some dillali operate without 
being a member of the association. The un- registered dillali are said to be 
dangerous to deal with by the public as they may be thieves and dupes.  The 
dillalai do not force sellers to bring the maize to them but it is an accepted 
norm among the Hausa people so everyone complies. A seller who wants to 
sell by himself might face frustration from the members of the association by 
ensuring that customers are lured away. 
There is no regulatory body controlling the activities of the retailers in Giwa 
market as such, although there is an association of the retailers whose 
membership is very loose as there is no membership register. The association 
has a leader that is appointed by members and such leader in most cases has 
a bigger share of the market and share the interest of the people under him. 
The association binds the retailers together in fighting for their common 
interest, providing space for new entrants in the market and for helping one 
another in times of need or problem. When a member is in financial problems, 
members may rally cash assistance in form of loans or give grains at slightly 
lower prices to the person to sell so that after the sale, he can make some 
profit while returning the agreed amount and still remain in business. They 
also help settle disputes among members whenever they arise.  
 
Although there is, in theory, free access to membership of the associations, 
screening occurs. This involves putting prospective members on probation to 
study their character before full acceptance and, essentially, being a moslem. 
Leadership is built round the associations and the local authority that owns 
the market and which is represented by the market chief (Sarki Kasuwa).  
By contrast with Giwa market, in Jengre maize market about 70% of those 
interviewed disclosed that they do not belong to commodity associations 
except the National Union of Traders and Marketing Association (NUTMA), 
which is the general association for the traders.    This is a great departure 
from Giwa and other markets. 
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In Jengre, only the dillali/transporters belonged to the commodity association 
while that of the transporters was based in another town.  This suggests that 
the control by some of the associations such as retailers, producers and ‘Yan 
wazai‘and wholesalers in this market are not as strong as it is in some other 
markets in the region.  Some retailers suggested this enables them to 
participate freely in buying and selling even though they may not benefit from 
privileges enjoyed by associations members else where.   The traders 
explained that to belong to any association, it is mandatory to register 
financially.  For the dillalai, they pay N300.00 for initial registration while the 
labourers (that is, loaders, off-loaders) pay N500.00.  This may be a key 
constraint to other traders participating in such associations. 
 
Space allocation is made by the local government in Jengre market and this is 
a major issue.  This means that access to space is on first come first served 
basis,  especially for the retailers whose wares are small.  This has 
encouraged disputes and quarrels among traders since permanent spaces 
are not allocated to individuals. Storage facilities were also not available in the 
whole market.  Traders (wholesalers, dillallai, retailers) therefore store their 
maize in private stores outside the market.  They therefore pay extra money 
to secure and store their goods. 
 
Security  
The maize market in Giwa is segmented into a retailing section, which is in 
the main market and a bulk buying section, which is separated and walled 
round for security. 
The Giwa market authority has hired guards (maigadi) for the market and any 
unsold maize can be left in the market till the next one at a fee of N20/bag.  
Although the market is generally safe under the maigadi, there may be theft 
on market days.  An example of what happened during the last Ramadan 
fasting (September 2004) was given.  A bag of cowpea was stolen from a 
Dillali in the market.  The Dillali was asked to pay 66% (2/3) of the cost of the 
stolen cowpea to the owner while the owner bears 34% (1/3) loss.  It was said 
that if the theft was done while the maize was at custody of the maigadi, the 
maigadi will have to pay the full cost to the owner. 
Each trader pays N30 per stand/stall as revenue for the LGA per market and 
from this, the LGA supplement the salary of the maigadi. 
 
In less organized Jengre market, absence of security is a major concern to all 
the actors in the market. This result in constant breaches of security in terms 
of fighting, disputes, theft cases (recorded every market day). Therefore the 
safety of goods is not guaranteed in the market.   As a result, the market does 
not function beyond 6pm due to fear of uncertainty, attack by robbers and the 
safety of trade.  Only 4 night watchmen (Maigadi) are engaged in providing 
security, and even then it is not officially arranged as individuals have the 
responsibility to make arrangements for the safety of their goods at their own 
risk with the informal security providers in the market. Four of these informal 
security men were engaged in Jengre market. They watch over and protect 
produce that are left in the market over night.  They also make arrests of 
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thieves on market days and they are taken to Sarkin kasuwa who resolves the 
issue. Where the matter is beyond him, it is then reported to the Nigerian 
police outside the market. The maigadi explained that although theft cases 
are reported almost every market day, they are not able to arrest all the 
thieves because of their limited no which makes it impossible for them to 
cover the large market area. Three reported theft cases had been made since 
the beginning of 2005 and handed over to the police. They further explained 
that thieves are usually thoroughly beaten when caught before they are 
handed over to either Sarkin kasuwa or the police to serve as a deterent. It 
was discovered that their services are privately arranged for by 
traders/producers whose produce are left in the market. The maigadi only 
work on market days and are only engaged when goods are brought into the 
market. Once they are evacuated, their services are over.  This seems 
inappropriate for a large regional market such as this 
 
Weights and measures 
In both markets, lack of standardisation of measures leads to occasional 
disputes. In Giwa market, the retailers use two types of measures for the 
grains in the market.  They are tiya and mudu (½ tiya).  These measures 
looked standard but the retailer said that each type has smaller and bigger 
sizes, which is only known to the retailers (difference not visible to ordinary 
buyers and sellers). The difference was demonstrated by the retailer who 
used his long finger to measure the surface diameter.  The buyers (rural or 
urban) may not know this difference unless he/she is told.  These measures 
were bought from open markets and were not regulated by anybody but are 
accepted by both buyers and sellers since weights are not used in the market 
for measuring grains.  When asked if the retailer use the same measure for 
buying from farmer/rural assembler for selling to the urban and rural 
consumers, the answer was affirmative but they cautioned that if a retailer 
wants to cheat he would use the bigger measure to buy and will sell with the 
smaller measure. The implication of this practice is that the rural poor farmers 
and assemblers are cheated as they receive smaller prices while the rural and 
urban consumers are made to pay more prices for getting less quantity of 
maize.   The Dillalai sells in those bags brought by the owners.  According to 
the dillalai, even though the sizes of bags are different, it is the business of 
buyers to know which size is smaller or bigger and that is why buyers may 
need the services of the yan komassio for buying because they know what 
should be the big or small bag, have idea of what the price should be and 
arrange for the transportation.   
 
In Jengre maize market, similar variations in price occur as a result of 
differences in the size of bags or mudu used. Again, sharp practices are 
observed in the use of different measures for buying and selling. For instance, 
while a bag (100kg) of maize sells for N3,350 at the dillalai (commission 
agents) while, a similar bag sells for N3,450 – N3,500 (less transport and 
commission charges) at the retailers in the same market.  It was also noted 
that the measure (mudu) used by the retailers to buy maize differed from that 
used for selling. Such measures are manipulated and mutilated and, 
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additionally, the style of measurement is so fast and with skills such that the 
consumer goes home with less quantity of grains than was paid for.  Due to 
the ineffective regulation, these practices are not checked and therefore not 
penalized by the authorities. This sometimes generates much debate and 
argument between buyers and sellers as they haggle over the price of the 
commodity and the mudu to be used. 
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Market information 
 
Table 3: Sources of market information in Jengre market 
 
Source of information Frequency of Users 
Face to face (trader- 
trader) 
24 
Market associations 15 
GSM 3 
 Source: Field survey, January 2005 
 
Personal networks are the major sources of information in Jengre market.  All 
the traders interviewed have personal networks through direct contacts which 
they trust to provide information on prices, demand and supply from other 
markets as well as other information relevant to their businesses. Fifteen 
traders indicated that they also rely on information provided by their 
associations.  Just three (out of all 24 interviewed) traders (wholesalers) 
indicated that they own and use GSM as a major source of information in their 
business (though they do not use it in Jengre market due to lack of service in 
the area).  The cost of owning and maintaining GSM is beyond the reach of 
poor traders whose profit margins are minimal.  This explains why many 
depend entirely on face to face (personal network) and their associations for 
information. 
The use of radio/television and government bulletins were not common 
sources of information.  They complained that the media/government were not 
interested in marketing activities and therefore are not in the position to know 
daily or weekly trends in the various markets.  Consequently, they cannot be 
relied upon to provide information on price, demand, availability, quality, credit 
opportunities and general market behaviour. 
 
In Giwa market, information on sources of supply, demand and prices is more 
freely discussed on phones. Cellular phones and line phones have become 
popular with traders, particularly dillalai, yan komassio and wholesalers.  
Price determination  
The price of maize in Giwa market is not fixed but determined by the forces of 
supply and demand in the market on that day. The reference price however, is 
determined by the price of maize in the last nearest market, which the 
itinerant traders and the dellalai always know.  The prices also depend on 
whether it is morning, afternoon or evening on a market day. The afternoon 
prices tend to be higher while evening ones are generally lower. However, 
through bargaining, some few Naira may be reduced from the prevailing 
market price for a buyer depending on his/her bargaining ability. 
 
Regarding the role of the associations in fixing the price of maize, Jengre 
respondents varied in their views.  While 50% of the respondents explained 
that price was determined by the market forces of demand and supply, 25% 
argued that it was the dillalai that determine prices, and 12% said that it was 
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between the farmers and the dillali.  However, for the transporters, the 
transport charges were determined by their association.  Further 
investigations into the pricing issue confirmed that the dillalis were responsible 
for fixing pricing by observing the demand and supply of the produce, 
transport costs and charges which they said starts from Saturday evening 
when the goods are being brought into the market and when the buyers 
arrive. The more the quantity brought in, the lower the price and the more the 
buyers in the market, the higher the price.   
 
Transport institutions  
a. Within-market transportation  
In Giwa market wheelbarrow transporting seems to be an occupation mainly 
for poor young boys, as elsewhere.  Those interviewed were all between 13-
15 years and in Koranic (Islamiya) schools.  Their main role is to carry loads 
for those who need their services. They were found in both the wholesale and 
retail sections of the market.  They carry loads into the market from one 
section to another, from and into Giwa town and to the motor park.  The 
wheel-barrow can carry up to 4 bags of maize at a time, depending on the 
strength of the pusher. The charge is paid after the maize has been delivered 
at the destination.  The wheel-barrow pushers have no association and 
indeed, most of the wheel-barrows being pushed are rented from people who 
themselves don’t push wheel-barrow but are engaged in other businesses.  
The wheel-barrows are hired at N50/day (market).  The wheel barrow pusher 
pays a market rate of N10 and could earn between N150 – N200 per market 
day while spending about N55 for feeding. 
 
When the wheel-barrow pushers were asked who bear the loss if the maize 
got damaged or stolen in transit, the wheelbarrow pushers said they bear the 
loss - they are sometimes asked to pay for damaged grains where the bag 
burst in motion. 
 
Yandoko (Loaders/Off-Loaders, etc) load and offload maize as well as 
packing/stalking maize in different vehicles for onward transportation. In 
Jengre each loader is usually attached to a driver (master) during each 
market day to carry out his function.  Their income depends on the number of 
bags carried per market day.  
Carrying the bags within the market attracted N10 – N20 depending on the 
distance and quantity. The charges were usually paid by the maize owners 
while the drivers paid for the packing/stalking. 
 They belong to an association known as National Union of Labourers 
(yandoko) through which they gain access to employment. They however 
complained that they do not have a branch in Jengre.  It was observed that 
the traders/drivers and the yandoko have a strong linkage which makes the 
transportation of their goods easy. 
  
b. Transport to and from market 
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From the villages, pick-up vans and buses are the common means of 
transportation of grains to the market.  From the remote villages, the maize 
is conveyed on motor cycles and cart or donkeys to a central point where 
the pick up vehicle is available. Sometimes, the driver could be invited 
home if the available quantity is enough to fill the truck.  If there is a vehicle 
break down while carrying the maize, the driver arranges for another 
vehicle to complete the trip once it has been paid by owners.  If however, 
there are damages like burst of a bag as a result of a bag falling off or an 
accident, or the maize is stolen in transit, the owner shares the cost of the 
loss with the driver. The proportion of share is often negotiated between the 
owner and the driver on the basis of who was careless in causing the loss. 
If the owner followed the vehicle and there is a missing bag, he bears the 
full loss as it is taking that it was his own carelessness.   
 
For onward transit of maize from the markets, contact is made with drivers in 
the market or transport is pre arranged outside the market by the yan 
kommassio (see trader section above) or owners of the grains to be carried.  
The yan kamassio deals with maize buyers from all parts of Nigeria.  The 
vehicles patronize several markets.  Some may go to 5 or more different 
markets in a week.  The owners of the grains may or may not follow their load 
to its destination.  In fact, instances were given where owners of the grains 
join a taxi to go ahead of or behind the lorry.  To avoid the risk of diversion of 
the grains on the way, some owners only use the vehicle whose driver is 
known to them while others ask their agent/boy to follow the vehicle as escort.  
The escorts normally carry the way bill for the grain. The driver is responsible 
for any repair on his vehicle while the owner of the grain takes care of 
damages to his grain such as burst bags due to accident of the vehicle. Most 
of the actors like dellalai and yan komassio have little or no capital of their 
own, so a number of valuable the innovations that have been introduced to 
sustain the system. For the yan komassio, the introduction of waybills and 
escorts for hired vehicles to deliver the grains at destination has made it 
easier for delivery to be made anywhere in the country and even to other 
countries without the owner of the grains accompanying the vehicle.  
 
Where a trader does not have enough maize to take a full lorry, he may be 
joined with one or more traders going the same direction and they will share 
the full cost based on the number of bags for each person in the lorry. This 
arrangement is made between the driver and load owners or their yan 
komassio. 
 
In most cases, the driver does not own the motor he drives (all are male). The 
typical case of driver/ motor relationship is illustrated in the box below. 
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One of the drivers interviewed in Giwa market was going to Katsina, a 
distance of 250km away from the market. He has a Mercedes lorry that can 
carry 200 bags of maize at a time.  A typical breakdown of a trip was 
illustrated as follows for the driver who carried 200 bags of maize from Giwa 
market to Katsina town. 
  
Income  = N150 per bag x 200 = N30000 
Less expense: 
 Union fee in the market  = N200 
 LGA produce loading revenue = N700 
 Loading N10 x 200   = N2,000 
 Way charges (unofficial)  = N500 
 Gas/Diesel    = N16,000 
 Total expenses   = N19,400 
 Net income    = N10,600 
The driver makes a return of N10600 less the money he spent on feeding and 
any repairs. Out of the balance returned, the owner of the vehicle sometimes 
takes ⅔ and leaves ⅓ for the driver but at times, the driver may not be given 
anything, particularly if he has not returned any money for a long time. The 
driver does not have to be a member of the union to load in the market but he 
must pay N200 for the union before he can load (or N150 in Jengre market).  
The driver is responsible for paying road charges (unofficial charges) which 
include, police check points, highway patrols, road safety, and vehicle 
inspection officers (VIOs) who mount many such checks and expect a fee 
along the way.  
 
The National Union of road Transport Workers of Nigeria (NURTWN) fixes the 
transportation fee for the loads and passengers where the union exists. 
Otherwise this is done by the driver.  The amount charged is supposed to be 
a function of the prevailing fuel prices (should increase with increase in petrol 
and diesel prices and vice versa) and the distance of travel. In most cases in 
Nigeria, once the transport charges goes up even if the fuel prices comes 
down, the transport charge remains on top and when the transport prices are 
increased due to increase in fuel prices, the proportionate increase in 
transport charges is often higher. Once the transport fee for the load and 
The owner of the lorry called me to take the lorry and drive and make 
money for him. From the money made, the driver should take care of 
the lorry fuelling and minor repairs,take care of himself and brings the 
balance to him. The balance account is given at the return from every 
trip and after checking on the expenses incurred and explanations 
provided he accepts the balance as the returns. If the owner believes 
the driver, he continues to drive the vehicle otherwise he seizes the 
motor and look for another driver. 
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passengers have been agreed and paid, any other charges on the road which 
usually are illegal is born by the driver of the vehicle. 
 
The improvement on the availability of petroleum products following 
deregulation of the petroleum sector and agricultural produce marketing in 
Nigeria have contributed significantly to the sustenance of the maize 
marketing chain. There is not much scarcity of motor fuel now and prices are 
fairly stable, which makes load costing easier. This is good for consumers and 
producers.  
 
Factors that influence transportation costs apart from fuel are the poor 
condition of the rural and urban roads particularly during the rainy season, 
various charges by associations, extortion by the policemen on the roads, 
loading and off loading charges etc.  The extortions by the policemen, Road 
safety officials, Vehicle Inspection officials and Local Government officials are 
most resented by the traders and motorists. The final price of maize paid also 
depended on the number of checkpoints, distance and the amount of money 
given as tips in any single trip, which may range from N2000-N4000. This 
further increases food costs for the urban poor. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Studies in both Giwa and Jengre markets show the complex organisation of 
Nigeria’s maize market and the importance of services provided by a range of 
intermediaries, notably the dillali and other commission agents. The dillalai 
facilitate selling of grains for the owners using their familiar knowledge of the 
market in terms of ability to negotiate prices with customers and read market 
forces: they also provide an important source of credit to many small maize 
producers.  The Yan kamassio’s role, in contrast is to facilitate buying, 
particularly for buyers not familiar with the market in terms of pricing 
mechanism, size of bags and quality of maize makes the marketing process 
more efficient and beneficial to buyers. The provision of security for maize in 
transit through provision of escorts for vehicles going to companies/buyers at 
distant places is another function for the yan komassio.  In this study, the 
market margins have not been determined, but the dillali’s commission was 
estimated to be 0.55% of the producer prices in Giwa, market while the rural 
assembler‘s profit was 6.2%. These figures suggest that the markets are fairly 
competitive.    
The retailers and rural assemblers also play major roles in the maize 
marketing chain, because they are the direct link with the producers, the rural 
consumers and sometimes, urban retailers. Their conduct in efficiently 
determining the prices and using correct measures determines to some extent 
how much income is earned by the farmers and the access of both rural and 
urban consumers to the maize market. If the prices are fair at this stage, more 
rural poor and urban poor will be able to buy maize.   From this perspective, 
the current diversity of measures in use needs better regulation and 
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standardisation, since this is a major source of disagreement among market 
participants.  
There are certain restrictions of access to the maize market.  Women are 
almost absent, especially in Moslem areas like Giwa, and restrictions based 
on membership of the relevant associations exist, again particularly in Giwa 
(as in other large markets of the Hausa heartland). Membership of an 
association confers considerable advantages to traders, ensuring safety of the 
business and confidence based on mutual trust.  So long as there is 
inadequate access to formal credit assistance, inadequate security provision 
by the Nigeria police, and inadequate market infrastructure, the role of trader 
associations is likely to remain vital to successful operation of the major maize 
markets like Giwa.  In Jengre, recent changes in trader composition 
(associated with the Plateau crisis) appear to have reduced the formal 
organisation of the market. Whether new forms of association emerge as the 
emerging market structure becomes more established, remains to be seen.  
The transport sector plays a crucial role in the maize marketing chain.  
Diverse forms of transport are available to deliver maize across Nigeria and to 
neighbouring countries, accompanied or unaccompanied by the owners 
(although, it requires transparency and mutual trust to be able to do the latter 
successfully).  However, numerous hazards make transport expensive: bad 
roads, unofficial charges by a diverse range of officials, lack of formal 
insurance etc.  One positive recent feature is the deregulation of petroleum. 
Poor people gain income from some elements of the maize marketing chain 
as it currently operates (notably as small-scale producers and in other areas 
such as porterage and petty retailing), but standardisation of measures, 
greater access of women to trading opportunities in bulking markets, and an 
overall reduction in rent seeking by officials (especially in the transport sector) 
would substantially improve their potential to benefit from the trade. 
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5. INSTITUTIONS AND INTERACTIONS IN VEGETABLE MARKETING IN 
JOS: THE CASE OF FARIN GADA TOMATO MARKET 
 
A.A. Adepetu, J. A. O. Olaniyan and H. O. Daloeng, 
University of Jos, Nigeria 
 
 
Introduction 
The study has set out to investigate the major actors in tomato marketing on 
the Jos Plateau. The study has focused specially on the Farin Gada tomato 
markets. The key questions asked include: 
What is the interaction chain between (a) the tomato farmer and the trader? 
And (b) the trader and consumer? Who are the actors in tomato marketing 
and what are their roles? What are the regulations and institutions that 
regulate those roles? What are the security institutions? What effects did the 
2001-2004 ethics- religious crises in Jos have on Farin Gada tomato market? 
 
The answers to these questions will enable us to identify the strong and weak 
links in the tomato marketing chain. This will provide policy makers valuable 
information for evolving appropriate measures that will further reinforce the 
strong links and/or remove the weak ones. Such a development will not only 
facilitate tomato marketing, it will also ensure the sustainability of its 
production on the Jos Plateau. 
 
The Place of Tomato 
The Jos Plateau has long been associated with dry season irrigated vegetable 
production. The activity which was initially carried on in small areas by 
immigrant Hausa farmers from the Northern part of Nigerian was encouraged 
in the early 20th century to meet the vegetable demands of the substantial 
European employees of the tin mining industry. Over the years dry season 
market gardening has experienced and continues to experience significant 
expansion both in terms of the number of farmers practicing it and the area of 
land under dry season irrigated vegetable production.  
 
Among the wide range of vegetables grown, the tomato very clearly stands 
out as the most important both in scale of production and level of 
consumption. The tomato is grown by all dry season market gardeners who 
regard it as the principal crop. It also occupies more land than any other crop; 
indeed it occupies more land than all the other vegetables combined. And 
whereas the other vegetables have restricted demand, as they are consumed 
exclusively only by the urban affluent/elite class, the demand for the tomato is 
universal, for it is consumed by both the affluent/elite and poor classes. 
Furthermore tomato has great poverty alleviation capacity. Its production, 
handling, transportation, distribution and marketing employ a large number of 
people. In addition the replacement of the traditional shadoof irrigation system 
with petrol pumps also holds considerable job opportunity potentials as the 
pumps will require regular servicing and maintenance/repairs. 
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Porter et al (2003) highlighted how expansion of dry season market gardening 
has affected inter ethnic relations on the Jos Plateau, Adepetu’s (1985) study 
at four locations on the Jos Plateau, showed a predominance of Hausa, but 
also indicated a growing interest among the indigenous Berom in irrigated 
vegetable production. This has resulted in ethnic competition for production 
resources (notably land and water) and marketing. Porter et al (2003) noted 
that by 2001, migrant Hausa farmers were finding it increasingly difficult to 
obtain land for dry season farming a factor that has been exacerbated by the 
recent conflict.  
 
Location of study 
Jos is one of the very few large towns in the middle belt of Nigeria with a 
population at near to 1,000,000. It is located almost in the geographical centre 
of Nigeria nearly 300km north of Abuja and 400 km south of Kano. Farin Gada 
Market in Jos receives supply of tomato from four major production zones at 
different seasons of the year in a rather complementary manner. They are Jos 
Plateau (January – June), Gboko (June-July), Gombe (August-September) 
and Zaria (October –December). The market thus remains open and very 
active throughout the year unlike the Mararaba Junction and Foron Junction 
tomato markets which are active only in the dry season as their sole source of 
supply is the Jos Plateau. Generally produce is moved from Farin Gada to 
markets within Nigeria, but substantial trans-border movement of produce was 
reported by one of the transporters interviewed at Farin Gada on 25th January, 
2005. In addition to Farin Gada Market, interviews for this study were 
conducted in two retail markets: Kwararrafa Market, a district market, and 
Terminus Market, in the Central Business District of Jos.  
 
Methodology 
Interviews were conducted with tomato retailers, wholesalers, consumers, 
bulk purchasers, contractors, processors, security personnel, local 
transporters and head porters. A combination of personal field observations, 
formal and informal interview of key informants and focus group discussions. 
Specifically, the method used to collect data was individual interview using 
semi-structured checklist of key questions, grouped into a set of background 
questions and a set of core questions aimed at the actors.  
 
The interview teams consisted of the researcher, a male, and research 
assistants.  As most of the retailers were women, interviews with them took 
the form of the questions being asked and responses recorded by the female 
interviewers, while the researcher watched and minimally interrupted the 
process. The interviews with wholesalers were done by Hausa research 
assistants. 
 
Following the recommendation of Gosling (1995), the rather long and diverse 
answers were analyzed by summarizing each interview into the main points 
raised. The responses were categorized and an idea of how many people 
agreed or disagreed was formed. Particularly interesting views are reported 
verbatim. 
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The position of the researchers as male did not negatively affect the 
openness of the female respondents as most of the women traders were 
Christians, who do not normally shy away from discussing in the presence of 
men. There was nothing sexually or culturally sensitive discussed, and most 
of the discussions were with female assistants, as described above. The fact 
that we were strangers was significantly toned down by several situations: 
1. The women were used to receiving and talking to local and visiting 
researchers. 
2.  The tomato retailers were aware that we obtained prior formal 
authorization from the local market leaders before we embarked on the 
interviews. 
3. We familiarized ourselves with the women by several initial visits 
before we started the interviews; and the fact that the female assistants 
spoke local dialects to the interviewees was an additional help. 
 
The research teams visited the Sarkin Kasuwa, Ahaji Bale Attension and 
some members of the Executives of the Tomato Traders Association, Farin 
Gada Branch. They were briefed on the purpose of the study and 
subsequently the research team requested for permission to do the study as 
well as their support and cooperation for it. The Sarkin Kasuwa promptly 
granted the request and assured us of maximum cooperation. He also 
undertook to inform and mobilize the leaders of the various registered 
associations of key actors in tomato marketing operating in the market for the 
survey. He added that he would direct the leaders to convey the information to 
their respective members. 
 
 
The Commodity chain 
The tomato marketing chain involves the farmer producer, through an 
assortment of bulk purchasers, wholesalers, middlemen, ‘dillali’, and retailers. 
The latter sell directly to the consumers, (Please see Table 1). A large 
proportion of the tomatoes sold in Farin Gada Market is shipped to the 
southern urban centers in Nigeria, by the bulk purchasers and wholesalers. 
The rest is sold to local consumers by scores of retailers operating in markets 
and roadsides.  
 
Roles of Actors 
(a) The Producer 
The activities of farmers in tomato production have been reported fully in 
existing literature (Adepetu, 1985, Philips-Howard et al, 1990, Abayomi 
(2002), Nyako (2002) and Pasquini et al, 2004). This section therefore 
focuses on the post harvest activities of producers, specifically as they relate 
to getting the tomato to the market. 
 
Producers are responsible for movement of the produce to the farm gate. This 
is normally done by head-porterage usually provided by members of farmers’ 
households and/or farm labourers. From this point the tomato is shipped to 
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Farin Gada market by pickup vans. The supply of the van may be pre-
arranged or could just be the first Jos-bound van to arrive at the assembly 
point. On-loading of the tomato is, however, the responsibility of the driver and 
his ‘conductor’ once the transport cost has been agreed upon. 
 
Sometimes, the tomato or part of it is sold to the assembler (yan wazai) or 
retailer at the farm gate. In such a situation it is the yan wazai or retailer who 
arranges and pays for transporting the tomato to Farin Gada market or any 
other retailing points. However, the farmer still bears the farm – to – market 
transport cost as the price he receives per basket is lower than the Farin-
Gada market price by at least the cost of per basket transport to the market. 
Once the tomato arrives at the market, it is handed over to the dillali who sells 
it on behalf of the farmer. Increasingly farmers are taking produce by lorry to 
southern markets at particular times of the year. 
 
(b) Commissioned Agent (Dillali) 
The commissioned agent (dillali) is the link between the producer and the 
wholsaler/retailer/consumer. He is the only “legally” recognized seller. He 
looks for buyers, negotiates “appropriate” prices, sells the tomato, collects the 
money and hands it over to the farmer. For his services he receives a 
commission, which is a fixed amount, on each basket of tomato sold. 
Currently the commission is N50.00 irrespective of the size of the basket. The 
overall income of a dillali depends on the number of baskets of tomato he 
sells. To ensure that farmers retain him as their dillali, he assists some of 
them with credit during production. Sometimes, when tomato remains unsold, 
he provides over night storage for it. In the present survey, nine dillali were 
interviewed, they comprised five Hausa, three Plateau and one Igbo. They 
operated as dillali for periods ranging from 7 to 38 years. It could be noted 
that the dillali do not require any capital to start their operations. All one 
needs is to get registered as a “commission” agent after successfully 
undergoing the pre-requisite period of apprenticeship. 
 
(c) Assembler (Yan Wazai) 
Another category of key actors in tomato marketing are referred to locally as 
yan wazai (assemblers). They go round the tomato producing areas to buy 
tomato directly from farmers or in local periodic (weekly) markets. The tomato 
is subsequently taken to Jos either in their own or hired or commercial vans. 
At Farin-Gada market, they sell directly to both bulk purchasers and retailers. 
In the present survey, seven yan wazai, three women and four men were 
interviewed. The group was heterogeneous in ethnic composition and no 
single group dominated the activity. They were all members of Association of 
yan wazai which regulates the activities of their members. 
 
(d) The Bulk Purchaser 
The survey captured seven bulk purchasers from four ethnic groups – Hausa, 
Ekif/Ibibio, Plateau and Igbo. The bulk purchasers buy from both the yan 
wazai and dillali for shipment to the southern urban markets.  
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Table 1. Key Actors: Their Roles and Characteristics 
Actors Roles Gender Ethnicity 
Producers Production, Packaging, 
Transportation and 
Marketing (sales locally and 
occasionally taken to 
southern markets 
Predominantly 
male 
Hausa/Fulani 
Indigenous.  
A few others 
Middleman/ 
Commission 
agents (Dillali) 
Help farmers sell tomato; 
provide market information 
to farmers; package and 
store tomato; provide farm-
to-market transport, Provide 
credit to producers and 
retailers 
Predominantly 
male 
Largely 
Fulani/Hausa 
A few others 
Assembler (Yan 
wazai) 
Buy tomato directly from 
farmers on their fields or in 
local markets; assemble and 
transport the tomato to Farin 
Gada market, sell tomato to 
bulk purchasers and 
retailers; also offer credit to 
both wholesalers and 
retailers 
Largely male 
and a small 
number of 
women 
participants 
Hausa/Fulani, 
Indigenes 
and 
Southerners 
Wholesalers/Bulk 
purchasers/Itiner
ant traders 
Bulking; sorting and 
packaging; storage; 
transport tomato to external 
market; sell tomato to 
retailers through agents; 
offer credit to retailers. 
Male and 
Female 
Mixed but 
dominated by 
southerners, 
mostly Igbo, 
Effik/Ibibio 
Wholesalers’ 
Agents (in 
consumer urban 
markets) 
Break of bulking; provide 
market information to 
Wholesalers; transport 
tomato to retail-point; offer 
credit to retailers; remit 
sales money to wholesalers, 
provide storage for tomato. 
Predominantly 
Women 
Southerners 
Retailers Break-of –bulk; transport 
tomato to retail point, 
storage, direct sale to 
consumers hawking. 
Largely female Mixed  
Consumers  Buy tomato; point of 
purchase to home transport. 
Male and 
Female 
Southerners 
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FIG 1: TOMATO MARKETING CHAIN 
 
 
The baskets of tomato of each wholesaler are uniquely labeled for easy 
identification. Every bulk purchaser has an agent at each destination. It is the 
agent who takes delivery of the tomato, sells it to retailers and  remits the 
proceeds to him/her, either directly or (in the case of Port Harcourt traders) 
through other wholesalers returning to Jos. However, the wholesalers who 
ship tomato to Calabar accompany the truck carrying their tomato. They 
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personally handle the sale of the tomato to retailers at the destination. These 
traveling wholesalers offer credit facilities to retailers in the southern markets. 
 
 
(e) Retailers 
The retailers operate throughout the range of the hierarchy of retail centers in 
Jos metropolis, including even street by street hawking of tomatoes and other 
vegetables in residential areas. This means that all categories of consumers, 
including urban poor, can easily find to tomatoes to purchase within walking 
distance of their homes. However, it was observed that in the lower markets, 
there could be slight increases in prices and decline in the variety and quality 
of what is available. This is more likely to be worse during the rainy season 
when there is a seasonal scarcity caused by decline in production, as the 
tomato variety planted does not thrive in very humid condition. This is the time 
of the year when the urban poor experiences slightly reduced access to good 
quality tomatoes, and this applies to most other foodstuffs and vegetables 
during their off season. At such times, the rich are able to afford the higher 
priced exotic supplies or the tinned/processed substitutes, which are beyond 
the reach of the poor. 
 
While the wholesalers are predominantly Hausa/Fulani, the retailers are 
mostly women with male retailers operating in markets located in 
predominantly Moslem areas of Jos. The long term involvement of traders 
suggests that this is a good livelihood compared to other options and it is a 
particularly good opportunity for poor urban women as the initial entry requires 
very little or no capital. Some retailers also operate as wholesalers at times.  
 
 
Market Institutions 
 
Sources of information 
The various key actors in tomato marketing rely on different sources for up-to-
date information on tomato price. The farmers depend on personal interaction 
with fellow farmers, transporters, yan-wazi and dillali (considered as the most 
authentic). Information on where tomato is available for evacuation is easily 
accessed by transport operators either through mobile phones or direct 
contact with other drivers. This enables them to evacuate freshly harvested 
tomato to the market promptly and while still in very good condition.  
 
The yan wazai and dillali also rely on interaction among themselves as well as 
with bulk purchasers. In addition almost all of them possess mobile phones 
through which they could access information on price. The dillali believe very 
strongly that the roles they perform in tomato marketing are crucial and highly 
beneficial to the farmers. They see themselves constituting a powerful group 
who are much better placed than the farmers to bargain with bulk purchasers 
over price. The dillali assert that whatever they do is to ensure that the 
farmers receive fair prices for their produce. 
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Those with the most accurate information are the bulk purchaser who ship 
tomato out of the producing region to urban centres, particularly in southern 
parts of the country. They are better informed than any other group as they 
receive information, by mobile phone, (every bulk purchaser owns a mobile 
phone), from their agents in southern urban centres, on continuous basis on 
price movements. They also reside virtually permanently in the tomato 
producing region and know the tomato supply situation. This gives them 
considerable power and enables them to significantly influence the price of 
tomato in Farin Gada Market to their advantage. 
 
The principal channel of information used by the retailers is personal contact 
with each other, with their partner wholesalers, and with producer farmers in 
that order of importance. No use of telephones was mentioned by the 
retailers, nor were any radio or government sources. They seek information 
on prices, availability, and safety of roads from robbery. They said the 
information they obtain in those ways are often accurate and reliable and so 
most of them prefer to continue to get more information from those sources on 
the same topics. 
 
Credit 
Traders are reliant on informal means of credit from family, friends and other 
traders. There was only one case of a female tomato retailer who obtained a 
loan of N15, 000 from a bank on formal terms and at an interest. She said she 
did not find the conditions attached easy to abide with. The dillali play an 
important role in providing adequate and timely credit. The credit may be in 
cash or kind such as seeds/seedlings fertilizers and irrigation pumps. The 
credit facilities are granted to farmers on the basis of trust only as no 
guarantors or written agreements are needed. The only condition attached is 
that he should remain their dillali. 
 
 
Like the dillali, the yan wazai help farmers with credit during production on 
basis of trust only. However, it is expected that farmers who are given credit 
will sell their produce to their creditors. The yan wazai also offer credit 
facilities to retailers, also on the basis of trust only. Retailers interviewed said 
that the credits have no special conditions or terms attached and no extra 
payment or interest is charged. Ethnicity and religion are not considerations. 
The only condition which applies to retailers in markets other than Farin Gada, 
the main tomato wholesale centre is that if the creditor/wholesaler has to 
make a trip to his retailer debtor operating in the other markets to collect the 
debt, the only extra payment the debtor needs to pay him is the return taxi 
fare and a portion or the whole of the outstanding debt. There is no fixed time 
for repayment and no collateral is required. Often the two are trading partners 
of many years standing, and they interact with trust. Many said that their 
creditors trust that they will sooner or later pay their debts, “because the 
debtors have never failed to pay in the past”; “because of many years of 
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interaction between us without breach of trust”; “because the creditor knows 
the debtor and where to find him or her.”  
 
Trust came up very strongly and many times as a major factor in their trading 
relationship. The tomato retailers expressed their strong preference for the 
informal credit system because of its highly humane and simple features, and 
they spoke gratefully of the assistance which the wholesalers extend to them 
in this way. Bank loans do not appeal to them because “they bring lack of 
peace of mind” until you pay up within the time frame allowed. 
 
The daily cooperative contribution, “adashe” or “esusu” is another informal 
source of credit, though it is primarily a form of saving, but it is also fairly rigid 
in its rules as defaulting is very much discouraged. Most say however that 
defaulters are “left to God”.  
 
Just as the retailers have access to some sources of informal credits and 
loans, most extend some credit in the form of tomatoes and other vegetables 
to some of their poor customers. Most of them said that they do not usually 
insist on their debtors paying within a fixed time limit, and that most often the 
debtors pay up. For example, salaried workers may buy tomatoes and other 
vegetables on credit, especially when salaries are not paid in time, and pay 
up, when they are eventually paid their salaries. 
 
Market associations and access to markets 
There are market associations for the wholesalers, both for the whole of the 
Farin Gada and for particular commodities and types of traders. These 
associations ensure that all buyers go through dillali or yan wazai.  
 
There are no associations for retailers in Farin Gada although there is at the 
Jos Terminus Market). At the Kwararrafa market, a district market, and at 
Farin Gada vegetable market, the responsibility is, officially, that of Jos North 
Local Government Authority. In the latter two markets, however, the tomato 
retailers claim that they are allocated spaces by the local traditional market 
officials, “Sarkin Kasuwa” and his agents, for no fees or rents. Most tomato 
retailers are allocated very small open spaces, only about 1 square meter, on 
which they are allowed to display their vegetables, but they are not allowed to 
erect even temporary sheds. They sell in the sun throughout the day. It was 
found that the tomato retailer does not need to be a member of any market 
association to get an allocation of space in the markets. In this respect, the 
retailers are not disadvantaged. But they are clearly disadvantaged by the rule 
that does not allow them to erect sheds or kiosks, unlike the wholesalers who 
tend to have some form of enclosed rooms to use as stores and shelters in 
the markets.  
 
However, the women said that they only belong to market branches of their 
cultural unions, which are not primarily for regulating or interfering with tomato 
trade. Rather, such unions are for the social cohesion of women of similar 
ethnic/cultural origin. They usually contribute money and material to assist the 
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poor, the sick, and those befallen by misfortune among their members. 
Likewise, they do the same thing to rejoice with each other on occasions such 
as child birth, wedding, and other good fortunes.  
 
Many of the bulk purchasers from the southern markets buying in Farin-Gada 
were found to be organised into two sub-groups, the Port Harcourt axis and 
Calabar axis. Through associations linked to the destination markets, these 
traders can influence the tomato supplies reaching these urban markets as 
every bulk purchaser is allocated a quota which cannot be exceeded. The 
numbers of registered members shipping tomato to the two axes from Farin-
Gada market to the two areas stood at about 30 and 20 respectively. Four big 
trucks, each carrying about 570 big baskets of tomato leave Farin Gada 
market for the Port Harcourt axis every week – one truck each on Tuesday 
and Thursday and two trucks on Sunday. Similarly, three trucks, but of much 
smaller capacity, each carrying less than 200 baskets – leave for the Calabar 
axis – one truck also on each of the days for the Port Harcourt axis. 
 
The loader has a register showing the name and quota allocations of all 
members, and he is under a strict order to adhere to the quota whatever the 
circumstances. By this arrangement, the bulk purchasers are able to regulate 
the supply as well as the price of tomato in some urban centres in the south. 
The extent of this practice is not known but interviewees suggested it was 
particularly common in Port Harcourt. Further research is required to find out 
how such control is maintained and what happens when there are tomato 
supplies from other markets on the Jos Plateau (such as Maraba Foron) or 
elsewhere in Nigeria.  
 
Security in the market place 
Security is a crucial aspect of marketing operations which provides enabling 
environment for access by the rural/urban poor and improves patronage. 
Security is thus the pivot on which efficient market operations rotate. Security 
is the vein of the market without which it will collapse.  
 
Most markets in Jos are relying increasingly on informal policing due to the 
apparent inability of the formal security system without which the market 
cannot function effectively. Our findings are in line with Alemike’s (2003) 
findings that formal policing in urban food markets have been observed as a 
failure resulting in traders engaging informal policing. Market associations and 
individuals are tasked with the additional cost of hiring the service of informal 
security and this has inflationary implications on the prices of produce. 
 
Research in Farin Gada showed that the informal security operators such as 
vigilante group (yan banga) and night watchmen (yan gadi) operate everyday 
while the formal sector only operates on market days. The army, mobile police 
and fire service only come to the market when there is problem such as fire 
outbreak or breach of security, in the market . The informal security are 
predominantly Hausa and Fulani, with Quaranic education only. They have 
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limited training on security issues and are only armed with bows and arrows 
and torches.  
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Figure 2 Security chain of Farin Gada tomato market 
The roles of the different security agents are described below. The police are 
involved when the informal security and association cannot solve a problem. 
The cases the police have recorded are primarily disagreement or conflicts 
among actors of the market such as those arising between members of 
market associations or within associations, as well as cheating, theft and (in 
2004) three cases of fighting. 
 
Table 2. Roles of security 
Security group Roles/ functions 
Vigilante group (yan 
banga) 
Surveillance, patrol, settling disputes, collection 
of market dues, arrest. 
Night watchmen (yan gadi) Take custody of produce, crime prevention, 
arrest of criminals in the market. 
Police(regular) Maintenance of law and order, crime 
prevention, arrest, prosecution, settlement of 
disputes, safety of market actors  
Mobile police Controlling riots, handling demonstrations, 
preventing looting. 
CID Crime investigation, arrest, gathering security 
information. 
SIB Crime investigation, surveillance, arrest 
Fire service Containing fire outbreaks 
The army General defense, forestall threats to market, 
NIGHT 
WATCHMEN
SECURITY
FORMAL INFORMAL 
ARMY POLICE CIVIL 
DEFENCE 
VIGILANTE 
GROUP (YAN 
BANGA) 
C.I.D. 
S.I.B. NIGER GUARDS 
FIRE SERVICE 
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crime prevention. 
Source: researcher’s findings, 2005.  
While the traders perceive the informal security to be more effective there are 
some reservations. One trader complained of theft despite having security:  
. “ … thieves have opened my bags of onions and carted quantities without 
detection . … if you have your produce here in the market you leave it in the 
hand of God … we pay on daily basis all forms of dues for security and 
protection of our goods but we no de see am” 
 
The research also noted that the market authority and the retailers sometimes 
have different opinions on the security operations in the market. For instance 
while the market authority claims that there are few cases of breach of 
security, the small scale traders-retailers impress that security problems are 
high. These conflicting claims, and as earlier mentioned in this work do not 
give a clear picture of the security environment. Some traders complained that 
the informal security were as biased as the formal security particularly against 
smaller traders and women retailers: 
“… they can help you to investigate, help you to detect bad people in this 
market and not for small to small traders like us”. 
“You cannot risk leaving produce in open space of the market till the next day 
as any loss to unknown persons will usually receive unfair remedy ,… we 
usually endure because of the slim chances of recovery and sometimes we 
do not even report because the cost is not worth it.” 
 
 
Standards of quality and measures 
Tomatoes are highly perishable and they have very short shelf life. This poses 
the greatest risk to the tomato retailers in a country where there are no central 
refrigerated warehouses and delivery vans; and where electricity supply is not 
reliable. Traders and producers have developed a range of systems to 
minimize damages and losses.  
 
The tomatoes are usually harvested on the farms when they are just 
beginning to ripen, only a day or two before the market day. Furthermore, the 
traders, particularly the retailers, and those who have to transport tomatoes to 
distant places prefer the “dan UTC,” a variety which has many unique 
qualities such as its firmness, thick flesh, long shelf life, and good taste.  
 
Traders in tomatoes as well those in other vegetables and fruits rely on 
traditional packaging methods that only succeed in preserving the 
commodities for a short time by ensuring that they are naturally cooled by air, 
with minimum exposure to heat and to the sun before they are sold off. Thus, 
tomatoes are packed in baskets made of split bamboos lined with straws or 
leaves. Packaging is done by boys, numbering about 200, but operating in 
groups of 10-15. Immediately a wholesaler completes buying, the baskets are 
assembled at a point. Here the boys carefully sort the tomato, removing the 
broken and crushed ones. The good ones are subsequently transferred from 
the medium -sized baskets to the much larger ones, whose bottoms have 
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been lined with dry grass. When the baskets are filled to the desired level, 
they are covered with brown cement paper and carefully  and loosely fastened 
together with strings. Loaders arrange the baskets of tomato very carefully 
and orderly in the truck. Such a task requires considerable experience. 
 
Amongst retailers there is a grading system to separate the damaged 
tomatoes. The poor often go for these cheaper types, known as “baje.” Low 
class restaurateurs also use a lot of “baje” tomatoes. Some “baje” tomatoes 
are not safe as they may be rotten and infested with fungi and maggots. 
Sanitary inspectors are supposed to ensure that “baje” tomatoes are 
destroyed and not sold or used for human consumption, but they do not 
enforce the regulation. A trader remembered seeing a sanitary inspector in 
the market only once in the last twelve months. This neglect allows the traders 
to continue to sell “baje” tomatoes to the poor, but the buyers ensure that they 
purchase only smashed but not rotten tomatoes to minimize their health risks. 
There is no consumer association to champion their cause. 
 
Government officials such as sanitary inspectors, Ministry of Health officials, 
Environmental Protection Agency staff, National Agency for Food and Drug 
Administration and Control (NAFDAC) officials, and Local Government 
Administration staff, have formal and legal roles to play in the markets. The 
traders said that with the exception of Jos Metropolitan Development Board 
(JMDB) staff that periodically go round the markets to collect rents from shop 
owners and other traders and to carry out space control, the activities of the 
government officials in the markets are not known to them and are certainly 
not helpful to them. Many of them said, “Government is not helping us at all”. 
Some lament the poor and unhygienic environmental condition of their 
markets, especially during the wet season. In contrast, their perception and 
opinion of the roles of the informal traditional market administrators are very 
familiar and positive. 
 
Tomatoes are not retailed by weights (requiring scales for measuring), but 
rather in traditional inaccurate measures, such as in baskets and bowls which 
are often falsified by denting or padding the bottom of the container with 
leaves, grass or earth, designed to cheat the customer. Another form of 
measure in which tomatoes are retailed in Jos is in heaps. In all cases the 
consumer is not allowed his/her choice because the fruits are not sorted. 
Thus, in a heap, bowl or basket, often there may be a mixture of species of 
tomatoes in various stages of ripening; a mixture of sizes, and in various 
stages of deterioration or damage. The trader does this to pass on his/her 
losses to the consumer, and so the consumer is worse off for it. 
 
There are laws about the use of weights and measures in Nigeria, stipulating 
that the metric units are the legal and official system. However, only some 
butchers selling meat and those selling frozen fish use scales. Vegetable 
retailers and other retailers in Nigeria seem to have a dislike for the scale but 
the consumers interviewed wanted scales to be introduced into vegetable 
retailing. However, the Standard Organization of Nigeria (SON) that should 
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enforce the use of scales in the markets appears to concentrate, for now, on 
trying to enforce compliance by formal organizations such as industries. 
 
 
 
 
Transport 
While some tomatoes are sold from the farm gate, most are brought to 
markets before being sold onto bulk purchasers. Ordinarily pick-up van 
operators, owners and drivers ply the tomato producing areas and assist 
farmers with timely farm-to-market movement of tomato. Very often drivers 
bring the produce to the market on credit and get paid only after the farmers  
have sold the produce. Over the years, a high level of trust has developed 
between farmers and pick-up van operators. Hence farmers regularly send 
their produce unaccompanied , thus saving valuable time which is deployed to 
other critical farming operations. Where the farmer does not accompany his 
tomato, he usually instructs the transporter to deliver the tomato to his 
“regular” dillali who pays the cost of off-loading by yandoko and later recovers 
the cost from the sales price of the tomato. 
 
Pick –up van operators also make their vans available to farmers and yan 
wazai on a hire basis. When this is done they always ensure that the weight of 
the produce carried is within the vehicle’s specified capacity which is 45 and 
80 baskets of tomato for 4-wheel and 6- wheel vans respectively. The Farin 
Gada Tomato Market Pick-up Vans Owners Association, according to Ibrahim 
Abubakar, its leader, has 25 members drawn from virtually all the major ethnic 
groups in Nigeria.  
 
Taxi operators convey tomato retailers (with their tomato) to various retailing 
points on the Jos Plateau, and particularly Bukuru, Kuru, Tree Centre (Jos 
South Local Government Area). They even go as far as Gwantu, and Fada 
Karshi (Kaduna State) and Akwanga and Wamba (Nasarawa State). Each taxi 
carries 7-8 baskets of tomato and the current fees charged range from N50.00 
to N70.00 per basket to Bukuru and Tree Centre respectively. Higher charges 
are made for more distant locations. The operators, whose number range 
from 25-30 and drawn from all the major ethnic groups in Nigeria are 
members of the Farin Gada Tomato Market Drivers Association. Very often 
they assist traders by carrying them on credit and they pay up promptly when 
they sell their goods  
 
Long distance truck operators play very crucial role in the tomato trade and 
particularly in the trader-producer and consumer-trader interactions. The 
Ejikeme Transport Company provides all the trucks for evacuating the tomato 
of the wholesalers operating in the Port Harcourt axis. Each truck carries 540 
to 560 baskets. The manager of the transport company claimed that his 
company provides transport facilities on credit to the traders by allowing them 
to pay for transportation after selling their goods. Responding to the question 
on what his company does when a truck breaks down he said that the 
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breakdown is reported promptly to his office as the driver and the two traders 
accompanying the truck have mobile phones. If the fault is minor, the 
company branch (his company has branches in nearly all the state capitals on 
the Jos-Port Harcourt route ) closest to the point of breakdown is directed to 
rush a mechanic and appropriate spare-parts to the scene to repair the fault. 
However, if the fault is a major one requiring considerable time to correct , 
another truck will be sent  also from the branch of his company closest to the 
breakdown point to evacuate the tomato to Port Harcourt. 
 
Bulk purchasers in the Calabar axis have a different transport arrangement. 
Generally a group of 8 – 10 bulk purchasers hire a truck (trucks are always 
available for hire at Farin Gada market). If after on-loading all their baskets of 
tomato, there is still space left in the truck, they may accommodate other 
traders who agree to abide by their terms. If the truck has a major breakdown 
the hirers arrange and pay for another truck “locally” to evacuate the tomato to 
Calabar. They are able to do so because only 50 percent of the cost of hire is 
paid in Jos while the balance is paid in Calabar. 
 
The problems which transport operators reported they encounter are similar. 
First on the list is the issue of multiple charges on their operations. For 
example, one interviewee claimed that the Jos North Local Government 
Council collects N500 on each truck that loads at Farin Gada Tomato market. 
In addition the truck pays N1, 000.00 at every customs check point located at 
every inter-state boundary. There are eight such points along the Jos-Port 
Harcourt road. Thus altogether the truck pays N8,500.00 to government. This 
amounts to over N15.00 per basket of tomato, and ultimately higher costs of 
tomato to the consumer. Similarly every pick-up van that brings tomato to 
Farin Gada market also pays a fee of N50.00 which is always passed on to 
the producer.  
 
All the motor vehicle operators complained bitterly about increasing 
harassment and extortion by police (at the numerous road blocks), Vehicle 
Inspection Officers (VIO’s) and Road Safety Corps (FRSC). They claimed that 
these unwholesome activities result in delays and higher transport cost. 
Another problem universally encountered is frequent incident of armed 
robbery. An interviewee recounted and incident along Jos –Akwanga Road in 
December 2004. The truck conveying tomato to Port Harcourt ran into a road 
block mounted by armed –robbers. The driver lost control of the truck and it 
eventually fell on one of the robbers. To conceal his identity his colleagues 
instantly set the truck ablaze resulting in the loss of both the truck and the 
tomato. Furthermore they expressed dissatisfaction with the very high cost of 
petrol and petroleum products, spare-parts, and vehicle maintenance, all of 
which have resulted in very high cost of providing transport services.  
 
Transport operators are also unhappy about the very bad conditions of the 
roads. Although the Jos Plateau has a relatively high density of road network 
(which was developed to serve the needs of the tin mining industry), most of 
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the roads have laterite surfaces and are always in a state of disrepair. 
Consequently, vehicles plying the roads suffer considerable tears and wears. 
 
The motor vehicle operators also held common views on who bear the losses 
resulting from accidents. They said the losses are borne jointly-the traders 
bear the loss of their goods, while the transport operators bear the cost of 
repairs on their vehicles or their replacement. Furthermore, all the categories 
of traders have no insurance covers for their goods. However, sometimes 
they receive assistance from friends and relations and from their associations. 
 
 
Effects of 2001-2005 Crisis 
It is anticipated that the series of ethno- religious crisis on the Jos Plateau 
would have serious consequences not only for tomato production but also its 
marketing. The views of the actors interviewed were sought for and obtained. 
 
Virtually all the actors interviewed reported that the crisis seriously disrupted 
operation at Farin Gada market, although only temporarily. Traders had to flee 
the market and abandon their tomato on September 7, 2001 and when they 
returned several days later, the tomato had completely gone bad. There were 
also corroborated reports of several traders who got stranded at Tilden Fulani, 
some 10 km away from Jos, with tomato they were bringing back from Gombe 
also on September 7, 2001. Two days later the pick-up van carrying the 
tomato had to be diverted to Kano, but before it arrived there the quality of the 
tomato had deteriorated so considerably that it had to be sold at a give-away 
price, resulting in substantial losses.  
 
Similarly, tomato farmers along the Dilimi Valley at the University of Jos 
Permanent Site claimed that neither their farming operations nor the peaceful 
relationships among them as well as between them and the traders had 
suffered as a result of the crisis. However, the situation is somewhat different 
in the Jos-South Local Government Area where the crisis has resulted in a 
small decline in the population of migrant dry season farmers and farm 
labourers of Hausa/Fulani origin. Nevertheless this had not led to a reduction 
in the total land area under dry season vegetable production as an increasing 
number of the local population have become dry season farmers. 
 
Retailers reported that the current lingering impact of the conflict on the 
women is the loss of some of their Hausa customers and the lingering fear of 
venturing into remote rural areas to buy tomatoes 
 
However, they all maintained that the crisis had not adversely affected 
operations at the market and intra-and inter-association relationships. It is 
significant to note that over 50% of the women retailers interviewed said that, 
these impacts are not seriously affecting them or their tomato retailing, as 
most of such incidents occurred on the streets. They also stated that the 
market leaders have done much to restore peace in the markets after the 
conflicts. 
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Concerning their relationship with other ethnic groups, most of the retailers 
described it as “good”, “fine” and “smooth”; but one indigenous Plateau female 
tomato retailer said, “our relationship with other ethnic groups is fine, except 
the Hausa who find it difficult to forgive”. Hers was, perhaps, a minority 
opinion, for we equally heard more favorable comments from others on their 
trading relationship with the predominantly Hausa/Fulani wholesalers whom 
they describe as “humane creditors”. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
Power and stake holders in urban food market have been the central theme of 
in this paper. The findings of the study in this regard have largely shown that 
the traditional informal institutions and their associated power relations appear 
to be more effective and acceptable to the actors in their interactions with 
each other in the market than the formal institutions. This situation has left the 
actors the responsibility of creating informal institutions that will regulate their 
activities. Today, the activities of eight of the actor types are highly organized. 
Each of them has an association whose membership is compulsory for all its 
members. The traditional trading institutions and regulatory environments in 
the markets visited in Jos have their roots in Hausa customs and practices 
which traders have got used to for nearly 100 years.  
 
The producers as well as consumers, do not have any regulatory body. The 
two groups are thus left very vulnerable to exploitation by other actors. 
Unfortunately, all efforts to organize them into viable producer and consumer 
cooperative associations by both government agencies and NGO’s have 
proved unsuccessful. 
 
Presently, the three most influential actor-types in tomato marketing in Farin 
Gada market are the yan wazai and dillali (who interact directly with farmers) 
and the bulk purchasers (whose interaction with the farmers is indirect). As 
already indicated the yan wazai’s roles in tomato marketing are invaluable. 
They facilitate farm-to-market evacuation of tomato and pay farmers 
“appropriate” price based on the information supplied by both the dillali and 
bulk purchaser. The dillali’s roles in tomato marketing are also important. 
They represent the link between the farmer and the bulk purchaser/retailer. 
They also provide farmers price information and decide for them what price to 
sell their tomato. This decision is also based on the price information supplied 
by the bulk purchaser. However, the practice of charging a fixed commission 
per basket of tomato sold irrespective of size and price appears unfair to the 
farmer. The practice does not provide the dillali sufficient motivation to strive 
for higher price or to resist a fall in price as they neither suffer nor benefit from 
price fluctuations. A better alternative system is a fixed rate on the sales price 
of a basket of tomato. Under such a system price fluctuations will result in 
corresponding benefits and losses to both farmers and dillali. 
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However, the farmers are sharply divided in their assessment of the dillali’s 
roles. According to Alhaji Hamidu, the chairman of Fadama Farmers 
Association, Yelwa Branch, only the poor farmers are happy with the dillali 
because of the credit facilities they receive from them. They realize that until 
governments come to their aid, the dillali will remain indispensable. On the 
other hand, the relatively wealthy farmers regard the dillali as parasites who 
make “profits” without making any investments. Furthermore, this study found 
tht some harboured resentment against dillali that were not indigens. 
 
The effectiveness of the traditional home grown system of power relations at 
the food retail level of the market chain was confirmed by the actors 
themselves Viewed from western value perspectives, inequalities and 
constraints imposed by sex, ethnicity and religion abound, but the actors do 
not seem to perceive them as such. Instead, the informal and humane 
qualities of the institutions are hailed by them – especially those pertaining to 
market entry and provision of credit and savings. 
 
However, nobody really understands the mechanism for fixing the price of 
tomato. Several basic questions remain unanswered. The questions include: 
Who or what determines the ‘appropriate’ price?  How is price information 
obtained by the various actors? 
 
Another practice of the bulk purchasers that has the most far-reaching 
implications for both the producer and consumer is the quota system reported 
to be operating in some southern markets. The justification given for this 
practice is to prevent the urban centers from becoming dumping ground for 
cheap tomato, without any indication that it is unwholesome. By this practice 
select groups of traders not only effectively control the supply of tomato to 
urban centers but they also dictate the price consumers pay. 
 
Generally transport providers, especially, operators of pick-up vans and taxis 
offer adequate and satisfactory transport service to tomato farmers. The only 
complaint of the farmers is that the transport cost is on the high side. 
 
This study confirmed these advantages and popularity of informal credit 
systems. They have good potentials for improving the small trader’s access to 
credit; increase his/her working capital, and improve marketing systems, 
credit from suppliers, money lenders, and rotating credit/savings schemes can 
be important if ways of reducing their interest and other costs are found. The 
informal credit and savings systems need to be improved. The USAID (2001) 
suggested that the credit unions could become more efficient and profitable 
than they are currently if they could be strengthened through consolidation 
and economic integration; updated accounting systems, stronger controls and 
procedures. These actions will amount to modernization of the systems, but 
such should be gradual and systematic to avoid sudden and damaging shock. 
 
Modern institutions and regulatory environments are normally introduced by 
banks, and the various government agencies and officials. But they do not 
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appear to be making positive impacts on tomato traders in Jos, perhaps 
because their practices are alien, formal, legalistic, and rigid – even punitive. 
It has been reported that a trader saw bank loan as a source of worry. The 
perception, which the traders have of government officials and their roles, 
clearly portrays the modern and government sectors as discouraging if not 
oppressive. 
The implications of the above, for urban and rural poor include the following: 
a) Government programmes may not be taken seriously by the small 
traders, as government officials are usually assumed to be “not 
serious”. 
b) Programmes that target the poor may get better reception among them 
if some elements of local /traditional institutions and regulations are 
built into them. 
 
Furthermore, there is evidence of discrimination against smaller traders and 
retailers. The following recommendations made by the retailers themselves 
will improve the marketing of tomatoes: 
a. Allocation of more and larger spaces to the retailers and allowing 
the retailers to erect sheds. 
b. Improvement of the physical environment and more regular 
inspection of the markets by environmental sanitation officials. 
c. Improved security in the markets especially for small scale traders 
and retailers. 
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6. TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND INFORMATION UPTAKE IN THE 
CONDUCT OF CASSAVA FUFU MARKET 
 
K. Adebayo University of Agriculture, Abeokuta 
 
Introduction 
This study aims to examine the traditional institutions that shape market 
access for those selling and buying fufu. Specifically it aims to examine how 
the markets are operating, how information flows within the commodity chain, 
the role of traditional institutions and trader associations in managing 
marketing, and finally to explore security issues in the conduct of the cassava 
fufu market. 
  
A previous DFID funded study (A0898) has examined the cassava fufu market 
in southwest Nigeria. The study focused on understanding the market network 
and channel, transport, weight and measures, (Dipeolu, et. al. 2001); credit 
provision, gender and ethnicity, (White et. al. (2002); food safety, agro 
processing and value addition (Sanni, 2003); role of government agencies 
and other external actors (Adebayo, et. al. 2003). The main gaps noted in 
these studies are the issues of alternatives to traditional market institutions, 
market information and market security. It is opined that this project provides 
an opportunity to fill these gaps and build on existing knowledge of the 
marketing system for cassava fufu. 
 
 Contributions of this study to understanding market access and food 
supply for the poor 
Cassava fufu is widely consumed in rural and urban areas in Nigeria, 
especially among poor households.  It is a cheap and ready source of vital 
energy among these categories. But processing is important for cassava 
because of the short shelf life of the roots after harvesting (typically less than 
two days). Even more important is the need to target cassava fufu marketing 
such that the product reaches the final consumer with minimum delay (the 
shelf life of the wet paste is about 7 days). An understanding of the issues 
identified in this study will provide policy makers a better view for ensuring 
that adequate and safe foods are available to urban and rural consumers. 
 
Methods of data collection and analysis 
A checklist of key information required to shed light on the key issues being 
investigated in this study was drawn up mainly from personal experience in 
fufu market research, the literature and peer comments from the first Nigerian 
Food Market Network’s meeting held in December, 2004 in Abuja. Primary 
data was collected using the checklist as a guide in leading discussions with 
key informants representing the range of stakeholders in the market (Market 
Administration, Transporters, Fufu Processors, Traders, Cart pushers, 
Cassava Farmers and sellers, Stall owners, Open space fufu sellers, Local 
Government Officials and their contractors and members of the Odua 
Peoples’ Congress operating in the market). This was complemented with 
observations over a period 3 market days and focus group discussions 
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disaggregated by activities in the market. Data analysis was mainly qualitative 
seeking trends and patterns emerging from the data. Additional data was 
collected after comments were received from Project Coordinators on the 
initial draft report. These additional data were used to explore in greater 
details the emerging patters and trends from the data. A draft version of this 
report was presented at the second meeting of the Nigerian Food Market 
Network and Stakeholders’ Forum held February/March, 2005 at Abuja. This 
final version has been revised to incorporate the important comments from the 
meetings. 
 
My entry into the Fufu Market is purely as a researcher whose main interest is 
seeking an understanding of the fufu marketing system such that economic or 
technical interventions in the marketing chain would not negatively impact on 
local processors and cassava farmers. My years of service as a field level 
extension officer in Ogun state and thereafter as a rural development 
researcher has given me a bias towards these groups (local processors and 
farmers) in studying and discussing development issues. I am local to the 
region but not from Ifo.  
 
 
Location 
Ifo fufu market is located in Ifo Town along the Lagos-Abeokuta highway in Ifo 
Local Government area (LGA) of Ogun State. It is a major assembly market 
for wet paste fufu. It serves the marketing needs of fufu from processors who 
come from towns and villages within an estimated 40km radius of the town. 
Most of the fufu assembled in this market is targeted to various locations in 
Lagos metropolis.  
 
 
Layout of Ifo Fufu market 
There are 9 concrete sheds in the market, each of which is split into 24 half-
wall stalls. Nine of the stalls were allotted to lafun and starch sellers while the 
remaining is occupied by wet paste fufu sellers. Cassava roots are sold in the 
open space adjacent to the larger shed (Figure 1) 
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Figure 1. A sketch drawing of the layout of Ifo Fufu Market 
Keys 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
The location of the market along the Lagos-Abeokuta highway makes it very 
easy for market actors from both Ogun and Lagos States to patronize the 
market. Most of the buyers found in the market come from various locations in 
Lagos such as Apapa, Ajegunle, Agege and Mushin. Sellers are mainly from 
Ilaro, Arigbajo, Pakoto, Ifo and other surrounding villages. 
 
The market becomes fully operational as early as 7am. By this time, cassava 
processors begin to arrive from villages within 40 km radius of the market and 
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able-bodied young men (ages range between 14 and 40 years old) are 
engaged in off-loading, re-packaging and re-loading of cassava roots and fufu 
wet paste in the market. 
 
 
General characteristics of cassava fufu marketing chain in Ifo Market 
 
Market participants 
Table 1 summarises the key actors and their roles in the fufu market. This 
study focussed mainly on the wholesalers, retailers, itinerant sellers, 
packaging/baggage handlers, stall owners, market association and Local 
government operating in the Fufu Market at Ifo, Ogun State, Nigeria. 
 
Gender Roles 
The specific roles of the different groups found in the fufu market 
disaggregated by gender are presented in Table 2. It is important to note that 
ownership of a vehicle is considered a major sign of wealth by the various 
groups in the markets. The vehicle owners in the fufu market are the key 
officials of the various associations in the market. This suggests either that the 
relatively wealthy actors in the market get elected to the Associations’ Offices 
or that becoming an officer of an association accords privileges that makes a 
market actor a vehicle owner in the market. When these positions were posed 
to different groups in the market, they declared the former with an 
understanding smile. 
 
Furthermore, even though it is observed and confirmed that driving is clearly a 
male only activity in the market, many of the female officials of the market 
associations also own vehicles which are driven by men.
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Table 1. Key actors, their composition and their specific roles in the cassava 
fufu market 
Actor Local 
term 
Role Gender Ethnic 
group 
Relative 
wealth/pover
ty 
Cassava 
farmer 
agbe Cultivates and 
sells cassava 
roots either 
directly to 
processors or 
through 
intermediaries 
Men and 
women 
Mainly 
Ohori, 
Yoruba 
All 
categories 
Transporters 
Head 
portage, 
Bicycle riders, 
Motorcyclists 
Vehicles 
(usually vans 
and trucks) 
Oloka
da or 
onim
oto 
 
Transfer cassava 
roots from point 
of harvest to 
point of 
processing 
Mainly men 
for 
motorised 
transport but 
all 
categories 
for head 
portage 
Yoruba, 
Ohori, 
Igede 
Poor for non-
motorised, 
increasing 
order of 
wealth with 
level of 
motorised 
transport 
Processors onifuf
u 
Convert cassava 
roots to wet fufu 
paste 
Mainly 
women 
engaging 
children and 
other 
women as 
paid or 
unpaid 
labour 
Yoruba, 
Ibo 
All 
categories 
Transporters 
– Mostly 
motorised 
onim
oto 
Transfer fufu wet 
paste from point 
of processing to 
points of sale 
Men Mostly 
Yoruba, 
Hausa 
Not poor 
Wholesaler alaro
bo 
Buys larger 
quantities usually 
for many 
processors or 
other forms of 
arrangements 
Women Yoruba, 
Ibo 
Not poor 
Retailers onifuf
u 
Buys small 
quantities - 
sometimes in a 
deferred 
payment 
arrangement 
with a wholesaler 
or processor. 
May cook before 
Women Yoruba, 
Ibo 
Poor 
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sale 
Itinerant 
sellers 
onifuf
u 
Mostly cooks a 
small  quantity 
and use head 
portage directly 
or use children to 
hawk the ready-
to-eat fufu 
Women 
sometimes 
engaging 
the services 
of children 
Yoruba, 
Ibo 
Poor 
Restaurant/bu
kateria 
owners 
olounj
e 
Either buys wet 
paste and cook 
for sale to 
customers or 
buys ready-to-
eat fufu for 
resale 
Women All 
groups 
All 
categories 
Packaging/ba
ggage 
handlers 
alaru Found mainly in  
assembly market 
for packaging 
and repackaging 
wet paste fufu 
Young men Yoruba, 
Hausa, 
Ibo 
Poor 
Market 
Associations* 
Fufu 
Processors 
Fufu Sellers 
Fufu 
Transporters 
Cassava 
sellers 
Market 
Administratio
n 
Egbe 
onifuf
u, 
Egbe 
onim
oto, 
Parak
oyi 
Dictate and 
negotiate prices 
and rates, 
represents their 
respective 
groups. Settle 
conflicts. 
Sometimes 
responsible for 
security 
All 
categories 
All 
categori
es 
All 
categories 
Local 
Government 
Ijoba 
Ibile 
Charge rates, 
sometimes build 
and maintain 
market locations. 
Sometimes 
responsible for 
security. Settle 
conflicts 
All 
categories 
Mainly men 
Yoruba Relatively 
wealthy or 
simply seen 
as more 
powerful 
Others 
Food sellers 
Water sellers 
Any other? 
Olonj
e, 
olomi 
Meets some 
basic needs of 
all market 
operators 
All 
categories 
All 
categori
es 
Mainly poor 
* These are associations of the various groups in the rows above. Market 
Administration however has representatives of all the associations in it. 
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Table 2. Specific roles of different gender in the Fufu Market 
 
Gender Age range Role 
Men 20 – 70 years 1. Selling cassava roots 
2. Cart pushing 
3. Packaging cassava products 
4. Transporting cassava products 
 
Women 20 – 70 years 1. Buying, selling and reselling of fufu and raw 
cassava 
Children (both 
sexes 
14 – 18 years 1. Cart pushing 
2. Hawking of other food products (usually for 
their mothers) 
Boys 12 – 18 years Loading and off-loading Lorries 
Key Officials of 
all 
associations 
(both sexes) 
20 – 60 years Owners of the vehicles operating in the market
 
 
Roles of ethnicity and ethno-domination in the market 
Overall, the Ifo fufu market is run by the Yoruba people (Table 3). This is 
simply because Ifo is a Yoruba town, subject to Yoruba traditional authorities 
headed by the Oba (Olu of Ifo). In terms of visibility (estimate of population) 
market is dominated by Yoruba people followed by Igbo people. In terms of 
activity, the fufu wet paste section is dominated by Igbo and Yoruba peoples; 
cassava roots is dominated by Ohori, Yoruba, Igede and Igbo peoples, lafun 
processing and selling, starch processing and selling and tapioca selling are 
dominated by Yoruba and tapioca processing is done be a Beninese woman. 
 
Table 3. Roles of main ethnic groups found in the fufu market 
 
Ethnic 
Group 
Roles 
Yoruba Transportation, wholesale, stall owners, retail cart pushing, 
security 
Igbo Selling and buying of cassava roots and fufu wet paste 
Ohori Selling of cassava roots 
Igede Selling of fufu wet paste 
Hausa Cart pushing, driving 
 
There is an active cross-border trade in tapioca along the West African Coast 
from Lagos to Accra. It was found that there is no particular are of the market 
assigned to tapioca sellers. The tapioca sellers are dispersed throughout the 
market. There are no associations or groups of tapioca sellers. It was 
revealed by the Otun Iya Oja (a Chieftain of the Market Women Group) that 
tapioca processed in Togo is smuggled into the Nigeria through Agbalata 
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Market in Badagry (a Nigeria-Benin border town in Nigeria) via Cotonou in the 
Republic of Benin. She said that tapioca is smuggled into Nigeria because 
they understand that there is a ban on the importation of cassava products by 
the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) (This claim is not true. It is possible 
that traders mistook harassment by Customs Officials for a ban on importation 
of cassava products by the FGN). The black market is very active in the 
border towns for changing the naira in to CFA and vice-versa. 
 
The Beninese woman processing Tapioca in Ifo market is only taking 
advantage of the demand for tapioca in Nigeria to process and sell to traders 
from Lagos thereby reducing the inherent risks of smuggling. 
 
 
Control of Market Space 
Market space is controlled by the Baba ‘Loja (or Iya ‘Loja, if the position is 
occupied by a woman). The Baba ‘Loja is the titled Chief superintending the 
market and representing the traditional authorities vested by the Oba (Olu of 
Ifo). He is recognized as the highest authority in the market by all actors in the 
market, including Local Government Officials. In the absence of this High 
Chief, his or her role can be performed by the Deputy (Balogun Oja/Seriki 
Gbogbo gbo or the Otun Iya ‘Loja) (Figure 2). 
 
An applicant desirous of a market space would liaise with the Head of Section 
(Olori/Alaga), who will make a case, for the applicant, before the Baba ‘Loja or 
his deputy who then allocates a space (this can be a shed or an open space). 
The leaders of the market decide where the applicant would stay based o 
existing vacancies. The allocation of spaces in the market attracts a fee 
payable to the Contractors appointed by the Local Government (LG) to collect 
such revenue in the market. The contractor is responsible for maintenance of 
stalls and other facilities and remittance of an agreed sum to the LG. There 
were no complaints from any of the interviewees about this process. However, 
the ability to control the amount of fufu coming into the market suggests that 
there is a control on who can be a trader and a likelihood that there are others 
who might want to trade but cannot. Interviews with those not having access 
to the market was not possible within this small project.  
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Figure 2. Organisation of the Ifo Fufu Market 
 
 
Market Turnover 
During three consecutive visits to the market, it was established that 
operations at the fufu market usually ends at about 4.30 p.m. At this time, an 
estimated 150 bags (25kg each of fufu) is left over. On the other hand, 
cassava roots are never left over. Sellers somehow find a way of disposing all 
the cassava roots brought to the market in any particular day. It seems that a 
deferred payment arrangement is usually struck towards the end of the 
market period where the buyer stands at great advantage at dictating the 
lowest price of the day for cassava roots. 
 
In the case of leftover wet fufu paste, various methods are adopted by market 
operators to preserve it till the next market day. The most common method is 
by pressing to reduce the moisture level such that the paste becomes a cake 
which has a longer shelf life. Another method is by packaging in water and 
airtight polythene bags. Some of these are however sold before the next 
market day. Where sellers are unable to sell the fufu paste or cake for up to 8 
days, the product becomes inedible. The colour would have changed from 
white to yellow. In this case, the paste or cake is discarded as waste. This is 
not a common occurrence in the market. Leftover fufu pastes usually attract 
cheaper prices. 
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Fufu processors explained that there is a law guiding the quantity of bags of 
wet fufu paste that could be brought to the market on any specific market day. 
This law is a collective decision of fufu processors to allow the association 
better able to manage the price negotiations between them and the fufu 
sellers. 
 
The law is binding on all fufu processors brining fufu wet paste to the market 
irrespective of their tribe or position in the market hierarchy. The first level of 
monitoring is at the village level where the Heads of the Fufu Processors at 
this level ensures that all processors under her care comply. Failure to comply 
is reported ahead of the offered. At the market, it becomes the responsibility 
of the Section Head to monitor and ensure compliance. Sanctions range from 
payment of fines (monetary) to being banned from attending the market for a 
specified number of market days. There is no problem with compliance as this 
is enforced mainly by peer pressure. There was no case of this nature 
involving the police or OPC (informal security). 
 
The sellers of cassava roots do not have a similar law determining the 
quantity of cassava root that can be brought to the market. However, there 
are laws specifying the fees and taxes paid in the market. Two of these are by 
all categories of sellers of cassava and cassava products in the market.  
 
These are: 
 
1. Parakoyi (currently N40) payable every market day to the office of the 
Baba’Loja. Part of this money is used for sweeping the market and 
removal of wastes at the end of each market day. 
 
2. LGA tax (usually N10/bag of cassava product) collected by the 
Contractors appointed by the LG. This is different from rent payable by 
market participants for allocation of space. 
 
3. The Head of the Cassava Roots section collects a fee from 
transporters (Lorries). He charges between N60 and N100 on each full 
lorry load of cassava root. 
 
4. The Head of the Cassava Roots section also collects 10% of total fee 
charged from other sub-section heads in the transportation section of 
the market. 
 
5. In addition, most market actors pay Association Due. The association 
due for the transporters has not been collected for sometime now 
because new officers are yet to be elected. 
 
 
 
 
Market chain and market information system for cassava fufu 
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Figure 3 depicts the marketing channels for cassava fufu. The short shelf life 
of the products makes it imperative that the product should reach the final 
consumer as soon as possible. The fufu market is operated such that this is 
achieved with minimum level of waste. Fufu processors and transporters 
remain the key that ensures that this marketing arrangement functions with 
minimum friction. First, processors ensure that the final stage in the 
processing of wet fufu tallies with the day preceding the market day. From this 
period, the transporters come in as the main instrument to facilitate delivery at 
the market and from the market onward to secondary markets and the final 
consumers in various parts of Lagos. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The cassava fufu marketing chain in Ifo Fufu Market 
 
This cycle requires that information is available to all the key market actors as 
required. For instance, stall owners need to have a good idea of the quantity 
of wet paste fufu to expect on each market day, the traders from various 
locations in Lagos need to prepare ahead for any modifications in price at 
each market day and the transporter need to be aware of when to pick up and 
make deliveries. 
 
The market associations are the main source and manager of information in 
this marketing arrangement. As such, each group of market actor has its own 
association all of which meets under the umbrella of an overall head of the 
market (Baba ‘Loja). When important information is intended for the entire 
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market, the Baba’Loja summons a meeting of all Unit Secretaries through 
whose offices the information is shared. 
 
 
Market information 
The main information that different category of actors in the market seek is the 
price of their products and services. They are usually interested in knowing 
when it is increasing or decreasing. Market actors also seek information on 
other market outlets where their products can either be bought or sold. 
 
The most important channels that market actors look out to for information are 
the transporters, the general office (Baba ‘Loja’s Office) and their colleagues. 
Usually individual actors’ personal network becomes a major asset here. 
Where there is a change in market price of any product or service in the 
market, those closer to the Baba ‘Loja often have the advantage of early 
knowers in the information system. 
 
Overall, because of the nature of the job of transporters, they are usually in 
touch with at least two ends of a link in the marketing chain. They therefore 
stand out as the main group that provide early warning system on return from 
a trip to either end of the marketing chain. 
 
All the market actors interviewed agree that mobile phones are good in 
spreading market information, while land lines are not used at all. Most of the 
poorer actors lament their inability to afford phones and those who can buy 
the hardware complain of the high cost of maintaining it. These people can 
rent phones or use phone kiosks.  However, phones are only useful if traders 
know other traders or transporters who have useful information that they are 
willing to share. 
 
 
Degree of transparency of market operation 
The fufu market operation appears to be very transparent. Leadership crises 
could be observed from the repressed tones and knowing glances exchanged 
when issues bordering on transition from one set officers to another are 
mentioned throughout the period of the study. 
 
The information in Table 4 was sought particularly to affirm the degree of 
transparency in the market. Almost every other market actor could provide 
information on the prices of goods or services provided by other actors in the 
market chain.  
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Table 4. Prices charged for different services and products at various levels in 
the fufu market 
 
Product/Service Price attainable 
Buying 25kg bag of wet fufu paste N 500 
Re-Selling 25kg of wet fufu paste N 700 
25kg cassava roots N 580 – N 650 
Cart pushing (25kg load) N 40 
Packaging and loading (25kg load) N 50 
Head portage (25kg load) N 20 
Transport to Agege, Lagos N 300 
Transport to Mushin, Lagos N 350 
Transporters Association ticket N 100 
Commission to Head, Cassava roots Section N 80 – 100 
 
Note: Even though these prices are agreed upon by members of respective 
association or product/service groups, in practice, individual members may 
bargain for a higher or lower fee for favoured customers. 
 
When compared with information obtained in the study by Dipeolu and Ayinde 
(2003), the share of the various actors from the primary wholesalers’ price 
and the secondary wholesalers’ price have changed (Table 5). The primary 
wholesalers seem to have become better off while the secondary wholesaler 
has become worse off. But while the processors’ share of the primary 
wholesalers’ price have fallen from 81% in 2003 to 60% in 2005, it has 
increased when compared to the secondary wholesalers’ price from 36% in 
2003 to 37.5% in 2005. From a rural development perspective, this implies 
that between 2003 and 2005, the changes in the economy of the marketing 
system had been favourable to the grassroots. 
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Table 5. Market margins of fufu wet paste traced from Ilaro through Ifo Fufu 
market to Pen Cinema market, Agege, Lagos 
 
 
Price of 60kg bag of Wet paste fufu Market chain 
Dipeolu and 
Ayinde (2003)
Adjusted 
2003 values 
(Factor= 
1.15) 
Current 
Study (2005)
1. Point-of-processing price 
2. Transport cost 
3. Point-of-wholesaling purchasing price 
4. Primary Wholesaler selling price 
5. Primary Wholesaler margin (%)  (4) – (3) / 4 
6. Processor share (%)    (1) / (4) 
7. Transportation cost 
8. Point-of-secondary wholesaling purchasing price 
9. Secondary wholesaler selling price 
10. Secondary wholesaler margin (%)  (9) – (8) / 9 
11 Processor share (%)    (1)/(9) 
N284 
N 24 
N 308 
N 350 
12% 
81% 
N 62 
N 412 
N 800 
49% 
36% 
326.6 
27.6 
354.2 
402.5 
12% 
81% 
71.3 
473.8 
920 
49% 
36% 
N 1,200 
N 100 
N 1,680 
N 2,000 
16% 
60% 
N 250 
N 2,400 
N 3,200 
25% 
37.5% 
Source: Updated from Dipeolu and Ayinde (2003) 
 
It is important to note that seasonal variations in the prices of cassava and 
cassava products are common. Prices are usually lower in the wet season 
when harvesting is less tasking and therefore attracts lesser cost. Dipeolu and 
Ayinde (2003) data were obtained in November, 2002 while the data for the 
current study were obtained in January, 2005. Both studies were therefore 
conducted within the dry season when the prices of cassava root and cassava 
products are more likely to be at their highest in the year. Since the data for 
the Dipeolu and Ayinde (2003) study were obtained early in the dry season 
compared to the mid dry season for the current study, slight variations in the 
prices are to be expected. 
 
Another variation is the prices of cassava roots and cassava products are the 
biennial cyclical movement in prices as a result of farmers’ reaction to price 
changes in the cassava market. If the prices of cassava and cassava products 
are high in a year, farmers’ increases the land area cultivated in that year. 
This increase in land area cultivated results in a higher quantity supplied of 
the cassava roots in the next year, thereby forcing prices down. Some farmers 
often refuse to sell their cassava root sin that year and also refuse to cultivate 
new land, hence keeping prices low until the second year. The situation 
changes in the third year when the quantity supplied falls below quantity 
demanded and prices rise again. This cyclic movement seems to have been 
at comparable stages when the data for the Dipeolu and Ayinde (2003) and 
the current studies were collected. 
 
For these reasons therefore, an attempt was made to express the 2003 prices 
in terms of 2005 prices using the ration of price of rice in Ifo (a common staple 
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in Nigeria) in November, 2002 (N64.25/kg) and January 2005 (N73.81/kg) as 
the factor. Even with this adjustment, there has been an increase in the real 
price of fufu wet paste. 
 
 
Traditional institutions in the management of cassava fufu market 
The market is segmented into six different product units. These are fufu wet 
paste (dominated by Igbo and Yoruba peoples), cassava roots (dominated by 
Ohori, Yoruba, Igede and Igbo people), lafun (Yoruba), starch (Yoruba), 
tapioca sellers (Yoruba) and tapioca processors (Beninese). Each unit of the 
market has its operational head (Olori or Alaga). At the time of the visits, the 
transport section is in transition, so only a caretaker was in charge of the 
Transportation Office. The reason for this is that the term of the immediate 
past Officers of the Fufu Transporters Association have just ended, so a 
Caretaker is appointed until fresh elections are conducted. 
 
The traditional institutions in the management of cassava fufu market are: 
 
1. The Parakoyi – This is the Baba ‘Loja-in-Council. It is made up of 
constituted by old people who could be retirees from government 
parastatals, old soldiers and lorry owners under the headship of the 
Baba ‘Loja. The Parakoyi settles disputes, quarrels among market 
actors and refer cases that gets out-of-hand to appropriate quarters 
(usually the Police). Parakoyi is also a term used to describe a form of 
tax payable on goods brought to the market. The market is a scheduled 
5-day market, but skeletal services are available on other days. Arrival 
for each schedule market day begins the night preceding it. 
 
2. The Oduaa Peoples’ Congress (OPC) is another traditional institution 
in the market. The Congress is being employed by the market 
contractors (commissioned by the Local Government) to serve as day 
and night guards. 
 
3. It is only the Baba ‘Loja or his representative who have the authority to 
change things in the market. 
 
 
Security issues in the conduct of the cassava fufu market  
The OPC is dominant ethnic militia group throughout Yoruba land. The group 
was invited by the Contractors to provide security for the market. This was 
due mainly to perceived inefficiencies in the operations of the Police and the 
experiences of unresolved security breaches on the part of the Police by 
some market actors. The main concern of the OPC is to prevent theft in the 
market. Security issues do not influence food supply to the poor. Neither does 
it result in the exclusion of any group. Some market actors praise the 
efficiency of the OPC even in cases where the Police have been helpless. 
Usually, the OPC traces and find the culprit and executes extra-judicial 
punishments. The mere presence of the OPC in the market place was 
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reported by many market actors to be enough deterrent for anti-social 
behaviours. 
 
 
Positioning of current work in the literature  
Marketing is the sum total of all of all business activities involved in the 
movement of commodities from production point to the point of final 
consumption. The need for marketing arises with the production of a surplus 
(Olayemi, 1972; Adekanye, 1988). It is widely reported in the literature that the 
marketing of agricultural products is done in mostly unorganized markets in 
Nigeria. This study appears to challenge this position given that clear lines of 
organization can be discerned in the marketing of cassava fufu. 
 
Furthermore, marketing has been viewed as the crux of the whole food and 
agricultural problem in Nigeria (Adegeye and Dittoh, 1985; Okunmadewa, 
1995). They posit therefore that it would be useless to increase the output of 
agricultural commodities and equally futile to set up optimum standards of 
nutrition unless means could be found to move agricultural commodities from 
the producer and at the prices affordable by the consumers. The ability of a 
marketing system to effectively and efficiently perform its developmental 
functions depends on the ease with which price changes and responses are 
transmitted spatially and temporally between contiguous market pairs for a 
homogenous commodity. This in turn depends on the availability and 
effectiveness of marketing infrastructures like storage and transportation 
facilities, communication networks, and access roads (Mafimisebi, 2001; 
Mafimisebi, 2002). To a great extent this study has demonstrated how the 
marketing of a traditional product could meet this challenge. The cassava fufu 
market is transferring a product with very short shelf life to meet urban food 
demand with a commendable level of efficiency. 
 
 
Power relations within the food markets 
This study has confirmed the findings of Wan (2001) that the food market is 
not having any impact on gender relations and women’s subordination. The 
overall head of the market could be male or female and all the market 
functions are dominated by women except transport. Even in the case of 
transport, some women own vehicles which are driven by male employees. 
 
Information is scanty in the literature on the role of ethnic domination in food 
markets. In this study, the domination of the Yoruba ethnic group is evident in 
the fufu market at Ifo. Even though there are no laws excluding other ethnic 
groups from operating in the market, all the traditional institutions and the 
market associations are dominated by Yoruba people. 
 
 
 
Access to information on prices and supplies 
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The findings of this study confirm the conclusion of Shepherd (1997) that 
producers and traders require a range of different types of marketing 
information. In addition to prices and supplies, information is required on 
alternative channels, quality, means of payment and financing. The study also 
re-affirms the importance of traders’ personal network and social capital in 
obtaining market information (Lyon, 2001). The closer a trader is to the Baba 
‘Loja or the transport office, the more access that trader is likely to have to 
important market information. The studies of Smith and Lutrel (1994) and 
Lyon (2003) have demonstrated this assertion. 
 
This study reaffirmed the findings of earlier studies that the power to control 
prices and supplies depends on the ability of market associations to act as 
cartels (Smith and Lutrel, 1994). The various market associations in Ifo Fufu 
Market are very strong in dictating prices of various products and services in 
the market. They even limit the quantity of products that can be brought to the 
market on any given market day to retain their control of the prices of such 
products. 
 
 
Self-regulation: the role of trader associations 
The reasons for forming associations in agricultural markets have been 
outlined in earlier studies (Whetham, 1972; Smith and Lutrel, 1994). These 
reasons were re-echoed in this study. A key finding that emerged from this 
study however is that associations are not necessarily a cohesive whole. 
There are issues of conflict within market associations that may hinder their 
effectiveness in meeting the expectations of their members. Such conflicts 
were felt in the various discussion sessions in this study. 
 
The domineering influence of market associations emphasized by Adubi 
(1996) is also evident in this study. Non-compliance to association rules 
attracts heavy penalties that often results in exclusion of such erring parties 
from the market. This study did not however perceive the roles of market 
associations in the negative sense evident in the work of Adubi (1996). Market 
associations are essentially filling a void that could hinder the smooth 
operation of the market. These roles ensure the regular flow of products 
through the marketing chain by retaining a pragmatic market price even in the 
presence of potential great fluctuations in the supply, protecting the rights of 
their members to fair dealings in the market and ensuring that the threats of 
conflict are nipped in the bud. 
 
 
Market security:  youth vigilante groups 
The presence of the Odua Peoples’ Congress (OPC) in Ifo Fufu Market 
affirms the position of Alemika, (2003); Gore and Pratten (2002) and Aboderin 
(2003) on the role of youth vigilante groups as important features of the 
Nigerian nation state. As some market actors put it: “the mere presence of the 
OPC in the market place is enough deterrent for any anti-social behaviour”. 
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Good practice emerging from the study 
Traditional market institutions are essential components of marketing 
systems. The search for alternatives to these should be done with great care. 
This study has shown that traditional market institutions can maintain effective 
marketing systems when interference from external forces do not erode their 
strength in maintaining balance and keeping order in the market system 
 
The central role of market information as the driving force of a transparent 
marketing system is clearly observable in this study. Modern communication 
gadgets such as the mobile phone were recognized by all categories of 
market actors as desirous in making market information wide available. It was 
deduced that such gadgets aid in increasing the disparities in access to 
market information between the rich and the poor actors. It is important 
therefore that policies seeking to make such gadgets accessible to market 
actors should also create avenues such as public pay phones that the 
relatively poorer market actors can use. 
 
The failure of the Police to provide adequate security in the market was 
mentioned by several respondents in this study. As far as the market actors 
are concerned, the youth vigilante group or ethnic militia is welcome relief in 
improving the security situation in the market. Their presence gives several 
market actors a feeling of security which is important for efficient market 
operations. 
 
The need to target cassava fufu marketing such that the product reaches the 
final consumer with minimum delay (the shelf life of the wet paste is about 7 
days) is the evident guiding principle informing the structure, conduct and 
performance of the fufu market. As such policies to influence this marketing 
arrangement with a view to ensuring that adequate and safe foods are 
available to urban and rural consumers must learn from this. 
 
 
Specific Recommendations for the Fufu Marketing system 
There is a need to improve market linkages in the cassava fufu market. 
Currently, the market is not taking full advantage of the very good road 
network in the area to explore supply of wet paste fufu to other parts of 
southwest Nigeria. The role of markets associations in negotiating prices for 
goods and services in the market could be expended to searching for other 
outlets for the cassava fufu. This way, the system of controlling output to suit 
market demand can be replaced with one of optimum production to meet the 
needs of a diverse market. 
 
The promotion of functional market associations is useful. They provide an 
organised entry points for discussing improvements to the fufu processing and 
marketing system and new market opportunities. Most fufu marketers rely 
heavily on trusted market relationships, the associations therefore provide a 
forum for creating such assurances before their members embark on any new 
initiatives or take major risks. 
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The incidence of leftovers in the fufu market, though not widespread because 
of the control mechanisms put in place by the market associations makes the 
search for shelf-life enhancing technologies important. Currently, some 
processors use a double packaging method to extend the shelf life of wet fufu 
paste. This method and others emerging from careful research could be 
promoted in processing and marketing locations. Another technology that 
could aid an increase in shelf life of fufu wet paste is the production of fufu 
powder.  
 
The introduction of new technologies (particularly larger scale capital 
intensive) may increase the disparities between the poor and the rich. They 
may also create new power blocs in the marketing system which may give 
rise to conflicts that were not there before. It is important therefore that the 
introduction of new technologies should be carefully studied and its potential 
effects clearly understood before their active promotion is encouraged in the 
system. 
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7. MARKETING OF GARI IN BENIN CITY AND ENUGU, NIGERIA 
 
C. Ezedinma, R. Okechukwu and L. Sanni 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, Ibadan 
 
Introduction 
Gari - a fermented and roasted granular product from cassava - was hitherto 
considered a poor man’s crop until recently. It is now elevated to an urban 
convenience food.  It is a cheap and ready source of vital energy. Gari is 
produced following harvesting of cassava, peeling, grating, dewatering, 
fermentation (optional), sieving, frying and bagging. This process will give 
white or creamy white gari while addition of palm oil prior to dewatering; will 
add yellow color to gari. Yellow gari is preferred and can cost twice as much, 
making it less available to poorer households. Gari is commonly consumed 
either as a paste made with hot water and eaten with vegetable sauce or by 
soaking in cold water with sugar, coconut, roasted peanut, fish, boiled cowpea 
as complements. A report by Phillip et. al. (2004) reflects that cassava (gari) is 
truly a national food with an urban market presence. Cassava gari appears to 
be a ‘food of choice’ even in the face of alternative food options in urban 
areas (Maziya-Dixon et al, 2004). It is mainly produced for domestic markets 
but presently; some of the dry processed food products from cassava (such 
as gari and fufu flour) are known to be finding their ways to emigrant Nigerian 
communities in United States and Europe (Dipeolu et. al., 2001). It is also an 
important commodity in cross border trade (Ezedinma, 2005).  
 
The goal of this report is to examine some critical marketing institutions with a 
view to assess whether the urban and rural poor are excluded since gari has 
gained prominence in all the urban centres of Nigeria. An understanding of 
the issues identified in this study will provide policy makers a better view for 
improving market access for the rural and urban poor to safeguard their food 
security and their livelihoods. The objective of this report is to explore issues 
pertaining to the gari commodity chain and its relationship to urban market 
institutions, transport infrastructure, security and associations.  
 
Study location 
This study was conducted in two urban markets in Enugu and Benin City. The 
urban markets are major consumer markets for gari in South East and South-
south of Nigeria relying heavily on supplies from the assembly or interior rural 
markets within and beyond the State. Enugu is in the southeast geopolitical 
zone dominated by the Igbo ethnic group. Benin City is in the South-south 
zone with a mixture of many ethnic groups but most influenced by the Binis 
and so Pidgin English is the common mode of communication. In terms of 
agroecology, Benin City is located in the rainforest belt of Nigeria while Enugu 
is located in the derived savannah belt. In Enugu there are three major urban 
markets namely, the new market, the old Ogbete market and the Awkunanaw 
suburban market. Similarly, in Benin City there are also three markets namely 
the Oba market, the New Benin market and the Ikpoba hill market. In Enugu, 
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the new market is the major urban market for gari while in Benin the new 
Benin market is the major market for gari. 
 
 
 
Methodology 
A purposive rapid rural appraisal (RRA) was used to generate information in 
Oba market, Oredo Local Government and Ekiuwa market (major village 
market) in Benin City and New Market (gari market) in December 2004 and 
January 2005. The markets were also revisited at later dates. Some of the 
supply markets were visited in both Edo and Enugu states to observe the 
nature and ways in which the wholesale traders conduct their business. There 
was purposeful sampling of informant traders. Snowballing approach was 
employed during interview with interviewees recommending other people to 
interview. This was supported with rapid observations and social interactions 
within and outside the market premises targeting marketing women, hawkers, 
drivers, local authorities, inspectors and passers by. Some of the government 
regulators were interviewed at the local government level.  
 
Information was captured from answers that were received from respondents 
to a designed checklist of questions. The research used both individual and 
group interviews. In many cases, while a respondent answered, colleagues 
sitting around concurred when they agree and gave different observations 
when they did not fully agree. The research drew on local researchers and 
interpreters who had knowledge of the markets and well as the necessary 
languages. Data analysis was mainly qualitative seeking trends and patterns 
emerging from the data. Responses are summarised in the report.  
 
The Commodity Chain 
Figure 1 gives a generalized over view of the gari commodity chain. Gari is 
produced from cassava. The farmer in rural based communities produces 
cassava. Women mainly produce cassava in the two study areas. The farmer 
may process the cassava into gari or sell cassava tubers to the rural 
processor who converts it to gari and transports the product to the rural 
market for sale on market days. For the purposes of this study we begin our 
analysis from the village assembly market level. Within the village assembly 
market the processor sells to the wholesale trader who bulks gari in such 
markets for the urban market, 90% of the gari is taken to urban markets. The 
processor at this point is also a retail trader in the rural assembly/village 
market.  
 
Rural processors are too atomized and the quantity of gari produced per 
household or processor at the rural market is too small to warrant travelling to 
urban markets. They cannot make any reasonable income if they have to 
travel long distances to sell small quantities of gari in urban markets. Their 
function is to add value by processing cassava into gari at the rural level and 
make a little income above the fresh root price. The farmers and processors 
who bring their gari to the urban markets are those who live close to the 
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market and may have engaged in urban farming in the periphery of the cities. 
They have no other market but the daily urban market to sell their gari. 
 
There are also urban processors who buy cassava fresh tuber from the 
farmers at the village market or even from the farm in the village, transport to 
the city and processes it into gari for sale in the urban market. It is often 
argued that this process is more expensive as cassava tubers contain 70% 
water. But observations indicate that distances traveled by such processors 
are not too far from the city. However, majority of the gari that is sold in Enugu 
and Benin City is moved from the rural assembly markets to the urban market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Commodity chain of Gari in Enugu and Benin City markets 
WS = wholesale trader, TR = retail trader, PO = Processor, ASSN = market associations, REGU = 
market regulators 
 
The price received by farmers varies through the year. Gari is cheapest in the 
months of July to September. Gari is most expensive as from December to 
April. This is because the prices of roots are also expensive at this time. As 
the dry season advances from November to March, the soil is caked and so it 
becomes very difficult and arduous to harvest cassava roots. This cost is also 
transferred all the way down to the consumer. Prices also vary from year to 
year as shown in the table (1) below. In Nigeria gari prices exhibit cyclical 
peaks and troughs due mainly to the inability of markets to absorb supplies. 
As a result in the years when cassava is scarce the price goes up and farmers 
are encouraged to plant; production goes up in subsequent years and the 
price comes down prompting farmers to plant less until the price goes up 
again in a cycle of approximately two to three years. Such cyclical changes 
cause price instability, and significantly increase the income risk to producers. 
Producers
Assembly/Bulking 
market (WS, TR, PO, 
ASSN, Regu)
Urban market (WS, 
TR, PO, ASSN, 
Regu)
Consumer
Farmer
Fresh Tuber/Gari
Village assembly market
Urban market
Wholesale Retail
Restaurants Households
Urban processors
Fresh tubers
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However, in real terms (taking into consideration inflation) the price received 
by farmers has reduced considerably. The decline in real prices for gari 
suggests the diversification into other commodities for which cassava can 
produce efficiently. These products include starch, ethanol, flour and pellets, 
which are primary products for industrial and feed sub sector. 
 
Table 1: Gari nominal and adjusted Prices, 1993 - 2000 
Year 
Nominal Price 
(Naira) * 
Inflation 
rate % ** Index
Real price adjusted 
for inflation using 
1993 as a base year 
1993 14.41 67.20 1.00 14.41 
1994 10.19 57.00 1.67 6.09 
1995 16.05 72.90 2.63 6.11 
1996 24.05 29.30 4.54 5.30 
1997 29.54 8.50 5.87 5.03 
1998 25.28 10.00 6.37 3.97 
1999 19.25 6.60 7.00 2.75 
2000 20.67 6.90 7.47 2.77 
Source:  * = Projects Coordinating Unit, Abuja 
** = Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report and Statement of Account (Different Editions) 
 
 
Wholesale traders 
There are two types of wholesale traders. The first involves those who travel 
to the various rural/assembly markets, bulk gari in bags of 40-120kg from the 
farmers or processors, and transport the bags to the urban market. This group 
of traders may sometimes be referred to as itinerant traders or wholesale 
assemblers. Assembly/source markets in Ebonyi State account for 70% of the 
gari that is supplied to the New Market in Enugu State. However, if traders at 
Enugu are running out of stock they go to a nearby supply market at Ugwugo 
Nike and/or Oye Emene in Enugu State. All source markets for gari to the 
Oba market in Benin come from within the (Edo) State. While the Enugu gari 
market is 5-day market, the major day of sale of gari at Benin is on Tuesdays. 
This is because the wholesale buyers travel to the assembly markets in rural 
areas on Monday, and then arrive the new Benin market on Tuesday. 
 
The second group of wholesalers involves those who depend on the traveling 
wholesalers. They purchase in bulk from the itinerant wholesale traders and 
eventually sell to the consumers sometimes in another market. For instance it 
was observed that wholesale traders in Oba market also buy gari from traders 
in the New Benin market. This category of wholesalers do not travel far 
distances but await the arrival of the first-line wholesalers. 
 
Both male and female gender sell gari at both the New Market Enugu and 
Oba market Benin City at the wholesale and retail levels. At Enugu it was 
mostly the Igbo ethnic group and a few traders from the Yoruba ethnic group 
that dominate gari trade. At Benin, a lot of ethnic groups from southern 
Nigeria were involved in the trade. The Hausa ethnic group is not involved in 
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gari trade in either market. The relative poverty of wholesale traders can be 
manifested in their inability to absorb disasters during setbacks in their 
activities. Otherwise they are relatively richer than most other key actors in the 
chain especially the porters, drivers, retailers, security personnel and 
processors. 
 
Retailers 
Retailers can be divided into those that own the stall or have long leases from 
local authorities and other traders who rent from the stall owners/tenants. Stall 
owners are relatively rich since they have the ability and influence to obtain 
market stalls in the first instance, while the other traders may be poorer or 
operating on a smaller scale. Retailers buy from wholesalers and sell to urban 
consumers. There are also retailers operating in rural areas. 
 
Market information 
Traders require information concerning the price of gari in different rural 
areas, and the price in the urban areas.  Prices are determined by level of 
demand, availability (scarcity) of gari, and type of gari. There is no deliberate 
action to control volumes in the rural markets. The volume that comes into the 
market determines prices.  
 
Retail and wholesale traders obtain information about market prices from 
other markets through informal meeting points or from one colleague/friend in 
the market to another or from transporters/drivers. Sometimes, a spy visit is 
undertaken for this purpose. 
 
Channels of information are personal communication, now frequently using 
mobile phones, either owned by traders or through patronizing kiosks. With 
the coming of the democratic governance, there have been improvements in 
telephone communications as the mobile telephony was introduced. But most 
traders in the rural/assembly market where there is no network for GSM 
neither operate nor patronize kiosks. For those who make use of mobile 
phones, they ring their business colleagues, friends, relations and neighbours. 
But respondents were of the view that the cost of operating a mobile phone is 
very high. The conclusion is that it facilitates marketing at both rural and urban 
markets but, exclusively available to the rich only.  Drivers are another 
important source of information. Many of them have mobile phones and use 
these to talk about market price situation to trader friends and driver 
colleagues.  
 
Prices are broadcast on radios and there is a farmer radio program on Radio 
Nigeria Enugu that has been running over the past 20 years. Traders and 
farmers have been listening to this program. This program (Ndi olu ubi ndewo 
nu) provided by the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria is broadcast in the 
local language. However, the lack of standardization of weights and measures 
limits this information.  
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Information is also required on the location of areas of good quality. The issue 
of certain locations being known for the quality of their gari is very interesting. 
This is a form of ‘branding’ whereby processors and others can add more 
value to their products and therefore it can have an effect on poverty. 
Historically, gari was of low quality characterized by high moisture content, 
high fibre content resulting from poor sieving and large coarse texture. This 
was before the advent of the grater in the 1970’s when gari processing was 
done for domestic consumption. But with civilization and diversification in 
traditional menus, marketing of gari for cash, gave rise to competition just as it 
was equally elevated to a full occupation for some people. Each processor 
therefore strives to improve the quality of her gari (most processors are 
female) in order to have more buyers, attract more money, and sustain her 
business. Competition gave rise to the production of high quality gari and 
some areas or processors were noted for this. Hence the perception was 
promoted through competition.  
 
Credit provision 
The informal credit market is the only form of credit system that is accessible 
to the poor and little educated trader and other actors in the gari food chain in 
the study area. The study did not find any informal credit and no dedicated 
customer relationship at the wholesale-processor level or wholesale-farmer 
level. This is because the processors are mainly subsistence and transient 
farmers who rely on the money realized from the sales of the cassava product 
to solve family problems. They are not regular in the market with gari but 
appear with the commodity subject to the availability of raw materials and/or 
financial need. 
 
There are several types of informal credit systems in addition to lending 
between individuals. The akawo is a daily contribution especially by retail 
traders. At the end of the month, the contributor is paid their total contributions 
and they can start the next month contributions. The akawo operator moves 
from person to person, collecting individual contributions, which is recorded in 
a small book. The akawo keeps very good records and there is very little 
administration as he records the amount contributed immediately in the 
presence of the contributor and moves on to his next client. How does he get 
paid? Usually, the first amount contributed in the first day of the month by the 
trader belongs to the akawo operator. This suggests that the more clients, the 
more income he earns even though the amounts contributed per individual is 
relatively small. The amount contributed per individual is an individual 
decision but it could range from as low as N10 to N100 per day. Monies 
collected are kept in a safe or in a bank depending on the level of literacy of 
the akawo operator. 
 
The second type of informal credit system is the isusu. The isusu is a thrift 
society usually based on town/village union or groups, associations or 
cooperatives. Each thrift society (ndi meeting) is unique and so several rules 
and norms may guide contributions, interest rates, borrowing and pay back 
periods. In each group there are executive officials comprising of the 
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president, vice president, financial secretary, secretary and treasurer. Each 
member of the society makes monthly contributions. Amounts contributed 
may be optional or may be fixed by the society but are usually large. In cases 
were the amount is fixed it could sometimes be used as a form of savings in 
which the proceeds are shared in turns on a rotational basis. For instance a 
group of 30 women may decide to contribute money and all the monies 
contributed go to one member in month A. In month B another round of fixed 
amount contributions goes to another member and so on until each woman in 
the group has taken his or her turn and another process may begin this time 
with perhaps a higher amount of contributions per person or some persons 
may drop out of the next round of contribution or new members may join. In 
this type of isusu savings group no member is allowed to leave the group until 
all have benefited from the contributions. There are however several 
difficulties in trying to maintain such groupings.  
 
The members of an isusu can ask for loans from their contributions at an 
interest. Non-members are also allowed to take loans but at a higher interest 
rate. For some thrift societies members may pay a monthly interest on loan of 
N40 for every N1000 borrowed with a pay back period of one year. Other 
types of thrift societies operate a shorter time period of six months with a 
cheaper interest rate of N18 for every N1000 borrowed or as low as N9 
interest for every N1000 borrowed. Members are entitled to borrow as much 
as two or three times above their contributions as loan from the isusu society. 
Repayments are made on a monthly basis but sometimes the society accepts 
repayments of both principal and interest or the interest only may be paid on a 
monthly basis and the principal is repaid at the end of the negotiated period.  
 
There are hundreds of such informal credit institutions and groups in both the 
Benin and Enugu markets. These credit societies provide the engine that oils 
the informal trade in gari and other commodities. There is usually no collateral 
attached but guarantors of high social standing serve as ‘shortees’. For 
defaulters, the guarantors are held responsible. The guarantors either repay 
the loan or facilitate in its recovery.  
 
For retail traders, credit in kind is sometimes provided by the wholesale 
traders especially in the Enugu market but is subject to payment immediately 
sales are over. This is a credit facility usually advanced by the wholesaler to 
his regular and credible retailer. There are also credit facilities involving the 
retailer to customers who regularly buy from the retailer but have no cash at a 
particular market day to pay for the transaction. According to one respondent, 
‘we sell on credit usually to regular customers but not always. About one part 
out of 10 customers do ask for credit’. They cut across civil servants, 
neighbours, friends and well wishers whose background (village, place of 
work, etc) is well known to the retailer. The customers normally give time for 
the repayment. For civil servants, it could be at the end of that month. For 
friends, neighbours and relations, it is normally after sales of particular goods 
or receipt of certain amount of money details of which must be brought to the 
knowledge of the seller. Incidentally, the credit beneficiaries do not pay any 
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extra money as a condition for this mode of transaction. Rather, the gari 
traders regard it as a good will and good customer relations’ strategy.  
 
There have been occasional defaulters but the traders stopped selling to the 
particular defaulters on credit. Traders complained of the difficulties they face 
when their civil servant customers are not paid their salaries: 
 
“No salary. No market. 2003 Xmas was good. 2004 Xmas was bad. Why? 
Because government no pay salary. If you pay salary, Market women go get 
money and children will go to school”.  
“In those days, women do not pay school fees but men. Today, women pay 
school fees because there is no money from their husband. We women do not 
want our children to suffer. We have to source for other means of getting 
money to pay school fees. We may have to sleep with men to get money. We 
are not happy. Please help us”. 
 
For vehicle owners and drivers, it was reported that there is a hire purchase 
system for vehicle purchase, which some drivers patronise. This helps them 
to acquire a vehicle and pay back the cost of the vehicle after one year of use 
to dealers. It was also reported that there are state government schemes that 
provides vehicles on loan to drivers and they to repay the full cost of the 
vehicle to the state government, although details of who has access to this 
was not available. 
 
The conclusion here is that the informal credit institutions have been able to 
respond to the needs of key actors in the market based on trust – a very 
important aspect of social capital. One interesting fact came out during 
observations in these markets. This borders on the issue of how actors in the 
market build trust. It begins with how traders identify themselves in the 
market. Unlike in the western world, were an individual is identified by name 
and a fixed address, market traders identify themselves on the basis of their 
villages, towns and ethnic group (in the case of Benin City) of origin. For 
instance on a return trip we had to identify one of the respondents, a woman, 
on the basis of her complexion and village of origin (nwanyi ocha nke onye 
Abagana literarily translates to the light skinned woman from Abagana town). 
The village of origin (family ties, ethnic ties), and apprenticeship formed the 
basis for trust and reciprocity. This is further fortified if the individual actor 
identifies with his/her town or village union/group in the city. These bonding 
mechanisms provides the platform and the basis for trader-to-trader credit 
both in kind and in cash as well as trader to customer credit both at the 
wholesale and retail level. There is also inter-ethnic bridging, which is often 
facilitated through interethnic marriages. In cases were there is inter-ethnic 
access to credit it is also tied to inter ethnic marriage between families. 
Friendship is also another very important aspect of social capital that can 
bridge inter ethnic access to credit. 
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Because informal credit institutions are hinged on social capital, provision of 
credit by formal institutions may have a lot to learn. One advantage of the 
informal system is the reduced paper work and responsiveness of the informal 
system to the needs of the poor trader. Formal credit systems may have one 
or two lessons to learn from this. 
 
Transport institutions 
Various types of transport vehicles are used to transport gari from the rural 
assembly market to the urban market. These include lorries (508 model, 911 
model), pickup vans or Austin diesel engine trucks or trailers. Motorbike 
transport (okada/ina-aga) is normally used for intra city distribution and 
wheelbarrows are used within the market or from market to nearby homes 
(family/small restaurant use). In the assembly market, wheelbarrows are used 
to assemble the bulk before loading them onto the lorries for evacuation. 
 
In Enugu, transporters come to the new market and pick buyers to the rural 
market and convey them back after their purchases. Both goods and 
passenger are conveyed together to and fro and this is not usually a smooth, 
pleasant and comfortable ride. There has been some effort to improve 
intercity road infrastructure especially in Enugu and Edo States were both 
cities are located in Nigeria. However, rural dirt roads are still repaired only 
seasonally (sometimes by communal effort. The maximum distance traveled 
from the rural market to the Oba Market Benin is 90km (table 1).  
 
Table 2: Distance of gari supply markets to Oba Market, Benin City 
Name Source Mkt LGA Source Mkt Dist Rural Mkt (km) 
Abudu Orhionwan 90 
Ebue Uhumwode 55 
Ehor Uhumwode 60 
Ologbo Ikpoba Okha 14 
Ugbogiobo Ovia North-East 62 
Urhonigbe Orhionwan 50 
 
Transport fares change between destinations. It is a little high when going to 
the rural market because few vehicles travel that route. The fare charges are 
influenced by distance, type of vehicle, and fuel price. Transport fare for the 
goods is determined by bargaining with the driver since transport fare for the 
passenger is usually fixed. Also availability of lorry/truck can also influence 
fares. The fare for gari that is transported without an accompanying 
passenger is lower than when someone accompanies the goods. The 
weather/climate can also influence the fare. During rainy season one makes 
extra effort to protect the gari from getting wet. If the road is poor/muddy, a 
higher fare is usually charged. The number of days a driver will be away from 
home also influences fare price. On the average, the cost of conveying gari 
from the source markets to the Enugu new market is about N3/kg.  
 
Routes with a lot of police and local government check points attract more 
fare. Unfortunately there is no route without unofficial tolls. It was actually 
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observed that the number of police and local government check points 
increases on each market day in each of the routes described above. The 
drivers settle the police and local council posts whenever they are 
encountered. Some of the traders interviewed maintained that these extra 
expenses are not built into the selling price. Rather the forces of supply and 
demand determine prices. While many others were of the opinion that the 
extra costs are included in the transport cost but finally borne by the ultimate 
consumer. Because the transport owner is familiar with the route, he has fore 
knowledge of the extra costs ahead of plying his vehicle on the road. 
Following from that fore knowledge of the extra costs he offers his transport 
charge to the gari trader who passes it on to the retailers. 
 
The price is also affected by fuel prices and petrol and diesel prices have 
tripled in nominal terms since 1999. The government, through the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the Petroleum Products Marketing 
Company and the independent petroleum marketers association, regulates 
access to fuel. Some times petrol station dealers collude to deliberately hoard 
fuel in order to push up prices of fuel. This is no longer common but happens 
towards festival periods. Once there is scarcity, prices of fuel increases and 
this is reflected on the cost of transportation. Once government policy affects 
factors of transport such as increases in fuel prices, the transporters do not 
consult each other rather they individually bargain with the gari traders. Lorry 
owners/transport owners initiate the fare change and pass it on.  
 
The research has identified the important role that transport unions play. The 
National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) see to the welfare of the 
transporters, they ensure that vehicles are in good condition, they maintain 
the park, render security services at the motor park in conjunction with market 
leaders and local government authority, they also mediate on behalf of drivers 
in civil matters. The NURTW also settles cases between drivers and police. 
They fight illegal extortions from the local council. The union’s welfare 
services include issues of visitation for drivers involved in accidents, death, 
and marriages.  
 
Everyone has access to the vehicle park provided the person is not a criminal. 
To become a member of the transport union a potential driver has to register 
with up to N5000 excluding the drinks and kola nuts that is required for the 
union leaders.  The candidate will also bring two guarantors who are of high 
standing and may have some relationship with the Union. The candidate has 
to sign an undertaken to be of good behaviour.  
 
The drivers also pay levy of N20 before each trip out of the market at Enugu 
and Benin City to the local branch of the national union of road transport 
workers (NURTW). The leadership of the local branch of the NURTW collects 
the levies. Taxes for the NURTW are not fixed but in most cases 10% of 
income is remitted as tax to the local council.  
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The routes plied by drivers are familiar routes to them but they have to 
register with the transport workers union every morning they arrive at the 
motor park and choose the route of their choice.  However, someone can hire 
(charter) your vehicle to a different destination. The Union can also plead with 
drivers to re direct their route to destinations were there are more passengers 
or seek their consent to return back if the timing is late to pick remaining 
passengers to specific destinations. The availability of gari, type/nature of 
road, weather/climate, and presence of police/toll collectors are factors 
considered by the driver before choosing a route. Where communities are 
hostile to certain tribes, communal clashes can affect transporters, so one 
plies routes that are familiar and safe. This is however not common in the 
study area but is found in the Niger Delta region. 
 
Suspension is punishment for members who violate the driving rules or 
loading rules such as jumping the queue at the motor parks but members are 
expelled for such offences as robbery or murder. Expelled/suspended 
members are not allowed to enter the motor park to off-load. There have been 
many drivers that have been suspended at both markets by local Union 
officials. 
When there is a vehicle break down another vehicle is called upon to 
complete the journey. In that case, the gari is transloaded at cost to the gari 
owner. But the transport cost is borne by the transporter whose vehicle broke 
down. This is a standing understanding by members of the drivers Union and 
they also go out of their way to help each other out in such instances. This 
support is important in the absence of any formal types of insurance. 
The drivers at Enugu and Benin City said that they insure their vehicles 
because the police will not permit them to use their vehicles otherwise. They 
do not believe the insurance firms will pay claims in the case of damages to 
their vehicle. They only do this because it is a requirement by the police. Most 
have third party insurance or act insurance. The comprehensive insurance 
scheme requires more money to acquire and many drivers do not use this 
type of scheme. The third party insurance scheme is cheaper.   
 
Drivers also use mobile phones to reduce the risks associated with travel. 
Recently there was a robbery incident along Enugu—Abakaliki route. The 
Police were called by mobile phone and they responded quickly and caught 
the robbers. The drivers also use the mobile phone to warn colleagues about 
presence of police and road safety personnel on the road. They also talk 
about weather and market price situation with mobile phone to trader friends 
and driver colleagues  
 
 
 
Control of market space 
Stalls in the Benin City and New market Enugu, are organised into sections by 
category of wares and goods that are sold. This is often referred to in the local 
market parlance as ‘lines’. Thus there is the textile line, the baby ware line, 
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the grains (beans and rice) line and so on. The size of stalls at the Enugu 
market is about 14” x 10”. But stall sizes also vary depending on your physical 
location in the market. The traders within the food commodity wing (or ‘line’) 
have full walled out stalls but those who are in other wings like baby ware 
have smaller stalls. The type of goods you sell therefore affects the stall size.  
 
At Benin, there are also stalls but the gari traders do not get them. Gari 
traders sell in open spaces,  along the road where stalls are allocated to other 
foodstuff sellers, or pay for a section of another person’s shop. Unlike grain 
traders in rice and beans who dominate the food market section because of 
an organised market association, the gari traders sell their goods along the 
market thoroughfare and parks. In Benin, traders reported that  they are fed 
up of so many taxes and rent charges. They paid heavily to secure a small 
space or pair with a shop owner who may be selling other commodities like 
rice, beans, yam etc. Apart from paying to shop owners, they also pay local 
tariff and taxes to local government authority [Oredo Local Government 
Council, Edo State, Hawker’s and Squatter’s permit-Ayo Igiebor & Idiaghe G, 
N50; Oredo Local Government Council, Benin City, Edo State, 
Squatters/Hawkers Revenue Collection Receipt, N20, 000; Oredo Local 
Government Council Authorised Contractor Oba Market Environmental 
Sanitation, N20 per day].  
 
The daily toll and market levy is a major source of revenue for the local 
government where the markets are located. But it does not seem as if the 
returns from the toll and levies are used to the benefit of the general public 
good. For instance aside from the urban markets, there is no public toilet in 
any of rural supply markets. Even in the urban markets that were visited, the 
distant public toilets were not maintained and parking space is a very big 
problem. 
 
Stalls are rented from stall owners. Most stall owners are not traders. At 
Enugu some traders had successfully purchased their stalls off the original 
owners, but a lot of the traders are tenants. Similarly the same holds at the 
Benin market. The original owners of the stalls were indigenes that purchased 
the stalls at approved rates from the local government council at Oredo. The 
local council determines the allocation of stalls. In principle these stalls are to 
be allocated to any Nigerian citizen irrespective of his origin. This hardly ever 
happens. It is obvious that the first lines of people who are informed of the 
construction (not sale since it is at the construction stage that the stalls are 
allocated) of new market stalls are the indigenes of the local council or State. 
Invariably these also fall within the local ethnic group. It is usually the 
wealthier indigenes in the council and the civil servants of the council or State 
that purchase these stalls at first. They may then resell to others at a more 
exorbitant price. These secondary owners may be non-indigenes who actually 
need the stalls. It is also known that some non-indigenes may collaborate with 
their friends who are indigenes. This friend may front for his non-indigene 
friend to bid for the stalls at approved rates in the local council. Obviously 
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poorer traders especially at the retail level are inadvertently excluded. This 
explains why many gari retail traders sell in the open.  
 
A trader at Enugu said some of them applied to the local government council 
with a processing fee of N250, few months after they were allocated market 
space on which they built their stalls. Applicants for stalls paid a non-
refundable fee of N250 for the application form when they applied for stalls at 
Enugu. There was also an unofficial agent fee of N5000-N10000. The original 
owners either sell their stalls to traders or rent it. Some others partition the 
standard stall into two, use one and rent the other. There is no age limit for 
those who wish to obtain stalls. What matters is the ability to pay the rents 
and obey market rules. Every adult from 18 years and above can own a stall 
but traders of a lower age can sell within the market. These are usually 
hawkers many of who are less than 18 years. For the gari traders that sell 
along the road, they pay for space to the council. They pay a fee of N20/day 
and obtain a ticket from the council officials to permit them to display their 
wares in the market.  
 
However, a gari trader in Enugu said she heard an announcement of stall 
sales on the state radio before she applied and got it. The call for application 
for stall allocation by the local council had closed long ago because there are 
no free stalls or spaces ready for allocation. Hence as more people enter the 
market to sell their wares they have to do so in the open spaces. This 
indicates that the demand for stalls is still there but the supply by the local 
council is restricted. The council is no longer building new stalls because of 
lack of space for expansion in both markets. However, new entrants may 
have to go through agents to find a landlord that would rent or share or 
intends to evict an incumbent tenant. 
 
Annual rent for stalls is about N12000-N18000 paid to the landlord, but the 
stall owners (land lords) at Enugu pay only N50/annum to the local council. It 
is the responsibility of the tenant to also pay for market premises fee of about 
N350/annum to the local government. A landlord/trader said he pays 
N50/annum to the local government and about N350/annum to the 
management of the market. A tenant said some people pay N1000-N1500 per 
month to stall owners. At Benin, tenants pay a rent of N10000-N12000 to 
landlords and N200/shop for security.  
 
One may loose his stall if one does not pay rent, mandatory local government 
dues/levies or uses the stall for criminal purposes. One can also loose his stall 
if found to deal in ritual practices. These laws are enforced by the market 
association leaders either at the apex level or at the zonal level depending on 
the magnitude of the offense. If one loses his stall legally, the local council 
reclaims it and the council re allocates the stall to another person after 
exhaustive handling of the case that led to the stall loss. In some instances it 
must be determined whether the stall has to be re acquired from the landlord 
by the local council or the tenant has to be evicted by the landlord and the 
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stall re allocated by the landlord or the local council. But this does not happen 
often. In case of death of stall owner the stall is transferred to next of kin. 
 
Roles and organisation of trader associations 
There is a difference in the composition and functionality of market 
associations in Enugu and Benin_City. However, it was confirmed (through 
triangulation) that the Gari traders association exists only at the wholesalers 
level in both Benin and Enugu markets. There is a Gari traders association – 
New Market Gari Traders Association - in the Enugu New Market. The 
association in Enugu new market strives to ensure the security of its 
members, takes care of their social welfare (burials, etc), provides financial 
assistance, and acts as a pressure group against undue treatment from other 
bodies/government agencies. They do not exclude anybody from selling gari 
in the market. Both members and non-members are allowed to sell. 
Membership is voluntary.   
 
The wholesalers appear to have some control over the prices in urban 
markets if they decide to sell limited quantities to shore up prices especially 
during the rainy season when the prices of gari begin to drop. Wholesale 
trader groups through informal meetings attempt to set prices but the extent to 
which they are able to do this is not known. There is also some evidence that 
suggests that associations can use their influence over supplies to help 
traders involved in accidents. Associations often impose embargo on off-
loading new supplies for one or two days to allow for exhaustive sale of the 
consignment involved in an accident. But, this is only where some quantities 
were recovered. It is usually an open secret that once a truck of gari is 
involved in a fatal accident others will automatically avoid going to the 
assembly markets for bulking and delivery as a mark of solidarity to the 
victims. This is a form of insurance and for traders involved in an accident, 
there is no other provision to recover any lost money (or property). There is no 
form of insurance except perhaps to fall back on the support of the extended 
family, friends and colleagues. 
 
In Benin no trader associations were observed for gari in the Oba Ekenwa 
market, but there is a Gari Market Association in the new Benin market. It is 
observed that the itinerant wholesale traders first re assemble gari from 
various sources in the New Benin market and then the intercity market 
wholesalers purchase from them and move to other markets in Benin City. 
These markets include the Oba Ekenwa market and the Sakpoba market also 
in Benin City. This is perhaps why there is no gari traders association in the 
Oba market in Benin City. 
 
In Benin the gari traders are not organised especially at the retail level 
because many retail gari traders are transient and so may not enjoy the 
privileges that the grain traders have. Grain (rice and beans) trade is a long-
distance trade and may involve a relatively heavier capital outlay at the 
wholesale level than gari. Grain traders are therefore relatively wealthier than 
gari traders. It was possible to see a rice or beans major seller, selling some 
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gari but not a major gari seller selling rice. However, gari traders have 
localised arrangements on the allocation of space for selling of gari as 
explained above.  
 
There is a global market traders association that often liaises with the local 
council. This traders association is for all traders in the Enugu and Benin 
markets. Each market has an association with an apex chairman, secretary, 
financial secretary, provost, treasurer, and public relations officer (PRO). 
There are also associations within each market along trade lines. Along the 
trade lines such office functions are replicated in each of the markets. At 
Enugu, the market is divided into 12 zones each has full functionaries. This 
private (informal) sector market management are in charge of assigning trade 
lines in the market. Each trade line has a representation in the zone 
association and each zone has a representation in the apex market 
association for each market.  
 
The market management send reports to the local council. In some instances 
it has been known that a major trade line or a zone (e.g. the Timber Traders 
Association or the Spare parts Traders Association) within the market may 
wish to break away from the market and find new land and better space for 
their trade. In some cases they may purchase an expanse of land from the 
local council, build stalls and allocate to their members. In other cases the 
local council may build the stores and take full responsibility of allocating 
stalls. The association facilitates the local council in bringing the information 
closer to the traders, assembling the applications and undertaking a pre-
processing scrutiny. The important point is that the local government council 
assigns the land or the stalls at a cost to the trader associations. The apex 
market association also has committees, one for security, another for cleaning 
of the market and sanitation and so on.  
 
In Benin it is believed that the Oba of Benin has some influence over the 
selection of the chairman of the market association for Oba Ekenwa market. 
In Enugu, the chairman is often appointed following a voting process but it is 
usually won by men of means that are very well known in the market. The 
differences lie in the history, location and ethnic mix. Benin City has a lot of 
history predating the colonial times in Nigeria. It used to be the capital of the 
old Benin Kingdom. Vestiges of this kingdom still exist with the hereditary 
kingship of the Oba of Benin. The Oba still has some influence on the socio 
economic life of the city. There are however several ethnic groups in Benin 
City. The city is located in the central and southern region of Nigeria. Enugu is 
a city that grew out of coal mining in the colonial times. It was a coal miner’s 
town but later became the headquarters of the Eastern region immediately 
after independence. The predominant ethnic group in Enugu is the Igbo. 
 
 
 
Security 
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Crime within markets, increases the costs of traders and can affect the poorer 
participants as they are less able to absorb disasters. There is private security 
provided in both Benin and Enugu markets. At Enugu zonal leaders of the 
market association as described above provide security in each section of the 
market. These informal vigilante group supported financially by the traders are 
partitioned into zones of the market. Different zones are in charge of patrol 
according to a roaster. At Benin the traders within the market hired a security 
outfit to ensure security in the market. The outfit is called Gadsak International 
security.  
 
The market leaders in both markets collect levies from traders to pay the 
security outfits. At both markets, the market leadership committee make 
payments to the security groups through their group leaders. Monthly 
payment at Enugu is based on the revenue realised by the apex association 
office. In some cases a percentage of revenue accruing from the zonal 
associations to the leadership is paid to the security outfit, usually 10% and 
this is preferred by the security outfit or vigilante group. Generally they are 
paid N2000/month/person at Enugu. At Benin, each shop pays N200 for 
security per month. Traders who operate from houses near the market hire 
their own personal security guards in Benin. They usually pay their respective 
landlords for security provision. 
 
Both male and female sexes are accepted into the security outfit because 
there are certain cases that will require a woman to do the investigation. Such 
offences involving women would require that women should investigate it. No 
ethnic group is excluded in the security outfits but the individual must speak 
the local language. There is also no religious bias in recruitment. 
 
The functions of the security outfit are: dismissal of suspected thieves, 
guarantee payment of losses in the market (the security outfit is made to sign 
an undertaken that they will pay for any losses/stolen property of any trader in 
the market after business hours), ensure that individuals adhere strictly to 
close of business time. The market closes by 6 pm and defaulters are 
penalized if they default. Security contractors provide security to buyers and 
sellers during the day and at night for the stored products. They encourage 
concerned traders in the form of moral support, securing positions in the 
market, management of conflicts between members and among colleagues. 
There is security assurance and guarantee against losses of 
goods/commodities. The market stakeholders develop confidence in the 
market and do not panic for loss of goods. 
 
The security organisations report to the trader associations.  Defaulters who 
fail to comply with punishment by the security outfit or zonal security 
committee are taken to the market leadership committee of the apex 
association on security matters who are the final decision takers of all civil 
matters. Usually force is applied to ensure that people/marketers comply with 
rules. The security contractors at Benin have regular meetings –(monthly) with 
the traders’ security committee to discuss and share experiences as well as 
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talk about the need to obey security institutions. The non-compliance costs to 
disobedience of vigilante law could be dismissal from the market or financial 
penalty depending on the offence.  
 
For criminal matters the case is taken to the police. However, traders 
complained about the ineffectiveness of the police even though the monthly 
entitlement of security personnel is small and demoralizes security 
employees. Marketers have more confidence in the vigilante group than 
police. They complained of double standard in dealing with policemen. The 
market has experienced theft on many occasions but not theft of gari. 
Because theft is a criminal matter, culprits are handed over to the police. But 
this is only when the suspect is caught red-handed. There was an instance 
when robbers were caught at night. They were held till morning and handed 
over to market management who handed them over to the police. One of the 
respondents said:  
 
“We are usually disappointed by cases referred to the police …for instance a 
case of stealing of iron rods/pillars used in building shops was handed over to 
the police for more than one year, the case was not charged to court”.  
 
The police may also require that vigilante groups should be registered with 
them. This is a rent-seeking device by the police, which may force security 
fees paid by traders upwards.  
 
Urban vigilante youth groups otherwise called area boys or “agbero” do exist 
in the market but do not serve as security outfit for the market because they 
are considered to be of questionable character. They are usually at the 
periphery of the market and are not allowed access inside the market by the 
day security men on duty. 
 
There has been a fire outbreak at both the Enugu and Benin markets. At 
Enugu, the fire started at night at various sections of the market. Only few 
portions of the market were left unburnt. The traders, vigilante group, fire 
department, and men of civil defence society worked to put the fire out. At 
Benin, in year 2000 there was a fire outbreak. Most shops were burnt. In both 
markets there was no insurance, people had to source for their own funds to 
rebuild. Unlike in many countries fire hydrants are usually provided in public 
places such as markets. Both the Enugu and Benin City markets do not have 
fire hydrants.  The fire services Department at Enugu are usually available 
when they are contacted for fire outbreak but lateness and insufficient 
materials for fighting fire characterize the department. Civil defence group 
members do also help in such cases at Enugu. 
 
Consumption and food safety 
Safety of gari in public places is questionable given the widespread 
inadequacy of current regulation and institutional and physical infrastructure 
(notably street vendor’s access to water).  Most restaurants owners reused 
(dirty) water to wash plates and the washing bay looks dirty. Based on various 
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forms of gari in the market, the issue of packaging, storage can bring serious 
dangers for urban consumers especially the less privilege ones. 
 
On safety consumption of gari, most of the Benin consumers informed that 
Benin is the home of gari since centuries and there has been no case(s) of 
health complaints after taking gari. They are of the opinion that addition of 
palm oil might have contributed to maintaining a safe consumption of gari.  
 
Enugu consumers informed that yellow gari is less acceptable than white gari. 
Because of addition of palm oil and the hygroscopic nature of the commodity, 
storage of yellow gari is susceptible to microbial attack and this informed the 
little preference for yellow gari. 
 
According to government regulators, most of the regulations exist to guide 
free and fair marketing of gari and other food commodities at local, state and 
federal level. These regulations seek to provide wholesome, safe and 
affordable food products to the urban and rural poor. Most of the time the 
regulations are flouted by the producers and traders. There is a public health 
law of 1963 volume 6 Chapter 103 which deals on effluent control and 
channeling of processing activities like cassava processing to gari. 
 
The law states that processors like gari processors 
should channel the effluent of gari which is highly toxic 
and constitutes environmental nuisance to a closed 
catchments chamber or pit which must be emptied at full 
capacity. 
 
However, enforcing such regulations are difficult as much of the processing is 
carried out in homes. There is also a Consumer Protection law of the federal 
government of Nigeria and State Byelaw dealing on food generally in the 
market (including gari) that empowers local authority and health inspectors to 
inspect food, condemn food and prosecute defaulters of unwholesome foods. 
This regulation is part of the Public health law, section 34, 1976.  
 
The Federal standards for gari are applicable to any trademark pre-packed 
gari factory while byelaws are used for lower processors and handlers of gari. 
Local government health inspectors and other regulatory agencies reported 
that they visited markets daily and carry out monthly assessment of foodstuffs 
in the market including gari. They also stated that there is some level of 
monitoring going on in the hospitals to detect any case (s) of food poisoning. 
There is also some evidence of traders self-regulating through trader 
associations. The market women informed that they are well organised so that 
no trader can sell inferior gari to customers. On further probing of what 
happens if a trader sells low quality; they responded that they would eject 
such a trader from the market or hand him/her over to the law enforcement 
agent. 
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There is some evidence that suggests that the environmental inspectors are a 
form of rent seeking with minimal impact on the trading system. Interviewed 
traders reported that “some of the inspectors will first taste gari, check for 
dryness, toilets, washing bays, cleaning towel and eating place for restaurants 
and the next thing will be, madam pay your environmental sanitation fee”. 
Market traders observed that even though these occasional visits, pushed 
them to keep the market clean, they maintained that there is extortion of the 
little profit they were making from sales of gari especially in the light of the fact 
that the market is not receiving any other form of assistance by this group of 
government workers.  
 
In response to this, in Enugu market, most restaurants owners selling to 
various actors in the market informed that they belong to an umbrella 
association, which serves as protection against harassment by the agents of 
government especially local government officials. One of the restaurant 
owners informed that before they had an effective association, some 
government officials usually ate food without paying and this had resulted in 
series of conflicts in the past. Since the establishment of an umbrella 
association, no government officials are allowed to eat free food. A 
chairperson, secretary, treasurer and publicity secretary govern the 
Association. They meet monthly and all restaurants have an automatic seat at 
meetings. The association also provides assistance in time of difficulty such 
as robbery and fire outbreak. The association is like a pressure group and a 
welfare group. It is also a medium for effective communication. Since food 
safety is an important issue, the association ensures that all restaurants are in 
good clean environment with simple hygienic practices. In Benin market, there 
is no such association. 
 
Weights and measures 
A wide variety of weights and measures were used in the different markets. 
These include bags (ranging from 25- 100 kg), basins (large and small), paint 
containers (painters) and cups. It should be noted that the wholesale traders 
do not usually carry a weighing scale and it is not likely that a full 100kg bag 
will weigh 100kg. Visual methods and hand lifting based on experience are 
used to asses weights and volumes. This may limit the opportunities for those 
without the experience or knowledge of assessing different measures.   
 
Measures used for gari sales are very important at the retail level because it is 
the tool of transaction at which the many retailers use to come in contact with 
consumers. Each has its price tag and each is used to service a particular 
type of consumer/buyer. Therefore the market has been able to break down 
volumes to suit consumer pockets. In Enugu, cigarette cups, milk cups, bowls, 
and bags are used as measures compared to Benin City, where they use 
bags, plastic bowls and basins as measures. At point of sale gari is measured 
in cups, four liter paint buckets and basins. There is no imposition of any 
measure/weight by the government. Customer relations are usually 
maintained with the principle of jara, which is the additional amount of gari 
that the retail trader is willing to discount before the customer pays. For 
 
INVESTIGATIONS ON BUILDING A FOOD MARKETING POLICY 
EVIDENCE BASE IN NIGERIA: November 2005 
 
 
140
instance the retail traders believe that if they give an additional one to two 
cups without payment the customer might seek them out the next time she 
comes to the market. Some retail traders give one or two handfuls as jara 
instead of one or two cups (or other types of measure) 
 
The issue of different types of measure brings to the fore the issue of 
standardization of measures which is a major hindrance in the provision of 
market information service. Because there are so many types of measures 
information has to be standardized on a unit basis. There are those who 
believe that the existing measures are standard enough while others 
especially in government circles believe that government should introduce 
standard measures. But one point with respect to market information is that 
broadcasts in local language must include the local measures for a better 
appreciation of the market prices in each locality. 
 
Even though there is no official weights and measures, the majority of the 
traders and consumers agree that they are happy with the present market 
measures. However, some silent few (poor consumers and market actors) 
informed that there is always a combination of concealment and display with 
weights and measurement of gari especially during dry season when gari is 
relatively expensive.  One of the traders adduced to the fact that at the 
earliest development of marketing, there has been some few cases of 
malpractices and such defaulters were suspended from trading in the market 
for three months. They were absorbed back due to intervention of local 
government authority and since then, there has been very good compliance to 
the standard weights and measures in the market. 
 
In Benin market, there has been a rift in the market between gari traders and 
other traders or traders versus consumers when it comes to full measurement 
of gari using basin (2.7kg). This case was settled by the local government 
authority and at times law enforcement officers who normally act through the 
market association. They make use of amicable settlement in the first 
instance and if it fails, apply force by taking them to their station for further 
interrogation. On further discussion, it was observed that most traders were 
scared of this procedure because they eventually paid some token money to 
the respective law enforcement officer as gratis. For this reason, they tend to 
comply with providing satisfactory measures.  
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion we maintain that wholesale and retail traders are key actors that 
need to be supported within the framework of traditional market institutions. 
This is because they are relatively poor and in the gari trade are of the female 
gender. This observation has obvious implications for family welfare and 
livelihood in the urban centers. Support for the female gari trader means 
improved family livelihood and welfare in the urban cities.  
 
The marketing actors operate primarily within well organized but informal 
market institutions even though formal government (State and local 
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government) institutions are imposed to govern and administer these markets. 
The formal systems such as credit institutions have failed to cater for the 
needs of the urban trader and key market actors, who are predominantly poor 
and non-influential citizens of the State. However, the traditional market 
institutions have shown that they can maintain effective marketing systems 
because they are trust based. But rent-seeking activities by official agents 
reduces the benefits of traditional marketing systems especially to the poor. It 
is no wonder that market actors have very little respect and trust for local 
government and other types of officials in the urban markets. It is therefore 
recommended that the government (including federal, state and local 
government) should build on the strengths of the traditional institutions in 
maintaining balance and keeping order in the urban and rural marketing 
system in Nigeria. An appropriate entry point may be through building on the 
successes of the informal credit system, which is built on social capital in 
order to service the voiceless majority, namely the relatively poor women gari 
traders in both Benin and Enugu markets. 
 
The study has shown, that most gari traders have to sell in open spaces, as 
they cannot get access to stalls. This is due to the policies of selling 
subsidized stalls to richer well-connected people. There is also an absolute 
lack of trust for government operated security agencies. Government should 
therefore learn from the informal security services in other to improve the 
State Police activities. 
 
The wide range of weights and measures also adversely affects the poor. 
Introduction of standard weights and measures by the central and local 
government will do well if there is a stringent action to compel introduction and 
implementation of common standard weights and measures to the Nigerian 
markets. Formation and strengthening of commodity Associations is 
necessary bearing in mind that commodity association will serve as a good 
forum to reach out to the grassroots, regulate pricing, ensure quality of gari 
and maintain the market in terms of good hygiene. The forum is also a good 
therapeutic and welfare medium to distressed members. 
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8. MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR COWPEA IN MAIDUGURI AND 
ABEOKUTA 
 
A. O. Adejobi and I. A. Ayinde 
 
(Respectively Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, and 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Farm Management, 
University of Agriculture, PMB 2240, Abeokuta, Ogun State) 
 
Introduction  
Cowpeas provide the cheapest protein supplement to the urban and rural 
poor in Nigeria, and is especially important given the general rising poverty 
levels of both the urban and rural poor (Ayinde et. al., 2002). The increasing 
inflation rate in Nigeria (from 6.9% in 2000 to 18.9% in 2002) has decreased 
the marginal propensity to consume animal protein. This has affected the 
protein intake of most Nigerians. This has probably contributed to the rising 
production level of cowpeas relative to other staples from 4.7% in 1997 – 98 
and 8.11% in 1999 – 2000 vis-à-vis 2.78% and 3.25% for other staples in the 
same range (computed from CBN, 2001). 
 
The eating habits of many poor people revolve round cowpea consumption in 
different forms; either through direct cooking of cowpeas, processing into 
akara (cowpeas cake), moin-moin, etc. or as component of other meals, as in 
cowpea soup, rice and cowpeas, etc. The versatility of cowpeas in this 
respect makes it a component of the food consumed at least thrice in a week 
by most households in the southern Nigerian study area.   
 
Cowpea is very important for the federal government’s strategic grain reserve 
programme and food aid programme.  Better understanding of the cowpea 
commodity chain will enable policy makers to know the best points of 
intervention in food security programmes. 
 
Study locations  
This report  focuses on two locations, each chosen because of its strategic 
position in cowpea production.  Maiduguri, in the dry savanna region of north-
eastern Nigeria, is a major production centre where the marketing chain 
starts. (The main cowpea producing states in Nigeria are Kano, Katsina, 
Kaduna, Bauchi, Borno and Gongola).  Abeokuta, in western Nigeria’s Ogun 
state, is one of the major destination market centres for cowpea in southern 
Nigeria (commonly reached via Bodija market in Ibadan, Oyo State, which is a 
major assembly market for cowpeas in the southwest).  Abeokuta, the capital 
of the state, is predominantly an urban settlement where cowpeas produced 
in other parts of the country are consumed as an important supplement for 
animal protein particularly among the poor. Little cowpea is produced locally.  
Kuto market, the focus of the study, is one of Abeokuta’s three main urban 
markets and a major centre of cowpea sales.  It has is a daily market, 
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attracting an estimated 2,000 buyers and a 5-day market, attracting an 
estimated 5,000 buyers.  
 
The cowpea market was examined in Maiduguri, Borno State, with a particular 
emphasis on understanding the producer/trader interface (including trans-
border trade) and local trader interactions, with reference to gender and ethnic 
composition of traders, credit and the role of various formal and informal 
institutions regulating trade in the market.  Similar themes were pursued in 
Abeokuta, Ogun State; a region of rain forest and derived savannah 
vegetation. Here, issues surrounding weights and measures in Kuto market 
were given particular attention.  
 
Methods 
The data used in both market studies were mainly from primary sources 
collected from the principal actors identified in the marketing chain. Little data 
could be collected from secondary sources due to the unavailability or 
inaccessibility of materials on cowpea marketing within the study areas. The 
emphasis was on qualitative data: i.e. a small number of in-depth interviews 
with different trader types, and personal observation.  Focus group 
discussions were also held with the different trader groups in the Maiduguri 
markets.  Here most of the respondents were met in Manu market, the largest 
and dominant wholesale cowpea market in the study area, some in the 
Monday market and small-scale trans-border farmer/traders at Mallari, a 
“bush market” outside the city.  Traders from each from the six different types 
of cowpea traders identified were interviewed.   In Abeokuta interviews were 
similarly undertaken with wholesalers, retailers, and other market participants 
such as buyers, relevant government personnel, loaders, etc.  Emphasis was 
put on collection of data at different market operating periods: i.e. market days 
and days preceding the market day (when preparation is in top gear for the 
market).  
 
In Abeokuta data collection was hampered by the reluctance of traders to be 
available for group meetings; respondents preferred being interviewed in their 
shops or sheds while carrying out their marketing functions since meetings 
away from their place of business may translate into revenue loss. All efforts 
to interview the chairperson of the cowpea marketers association in Kuto 
market failed.  It was necessary to allay the suspicions of traders that 
information collected was not for business or tax collection purposes.  
 
The researcher who conducted the Maiduguri study is based in Ibadan, but 
was able to draw on the research network of PROSAB (Promoting 
Sustainable Agriculture in Borno State) based in Maiduguri to which he 
belongs. The Maiduguri interview team was multilingual (essential in this 
centre) and consisted of both men and women (again, essential in this largely 
Moslem centre). The team was unable to interview the larger-scale trans-
border traders responsible for movement of large quantities of cowpea. In 
Abeokuta the researcher is from the local region and was thus able to conduct 
many of the interviews directly himself.  
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The commodity chain  
1. The commodity chain in the Maiduguri region 
Figure 1: Marketing Chain for Cowpea in Maiduguri Area, Borno State 
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Table1. General Characteristics of the Selected Commodity Chain 
Key actors Local terms 
for actors 
Brief indication of 
roles 
Gender and ethnic 
pattern 
Relative 
wealth/p
overty 
Farmer/produce
r 
Kamkuloma Production of cowpea Both male and female. 
Mainly local Kanuri and 
Hausa/Fulani within 
Nigeria and the 
neighboring countries. 
Usually 
poor 
Transborder 
farmers 
Sawurma 
Ngaloye 
Production of cowpea Both male and female. But 
mostly males and are 
made up of mainly  Kanuri 
and few Hausa /Fulani 
Usually 
poor 
Rural 
retailer/bulkers 
Ngaloma 
Karaye 
Buy in trickles and 
bulk. Sells to 
Wholesalers and 
sometimes rural 
consumers 
Both male and female. 
Mainly the indigenous 
Kanuri ethnic group 
dominates. 
Relatively 
poor 
Commission 
agents 
Dillali (Hausa) 
Komoshomma 
(Kanuri) 
Buy on behalf of urban 
traders (brokerage) 
Mostly male. Dominated 
by  the Hausa/Fulani and 
few Kanuri 
Averagel
y rich 
Urban 
wholesaler/bulk
ers 
Ngaloma/Fato
ma 
Buy in trickles and bulk 
through commission 
agents. He sells mostly 
to intra country traders 
Both male and female. But 
there are more males than 
females. Dominated by 
both the Hausa/Fulani and 
Kanuri. 
Usually 
very rich 
Urban retailers Ngaloma Sells to urban 
consumers 
Both male and female. But 
there are more males than 
females. Dominated by  
Averagel
y rich 
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the Kanuri and few 
Hausa/Fulani 
Intra-country 
traders 
Sawurma 
Ngaloye 
Buys from 
wholesalers/bulkers 
and commission 
agents in Maiduguri 
and transport to other 
parts of the country 
Both male and female. But 
there are more males than 
females.  Mainly Yorubas 
and few Ibos. 
Usually 
very rich 
Consumers Luwayamai Consumption Both male and female. All 
ethnic groups 
Mostly 
poor 
Source: Field survey, 2005 – sample size was 36 (6 each for the trader groups except for the Farmer/producer/trans-border farmers 
group that had 12 i.e.-6 for farmer/producer and 6 for trans-border farmers) 
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The Kanuri, who are the indigenous traders, together with the Hausa/Fulani, 
dominate most categories of the trader groups. The traders are predominantly 
male and mostly younger middle aged (32 - 42 years on average), with not 
less than 10 years experience in cowpea marketing.  There is a harmonious 
relationship between the Hausa/Fulani and the indigenous Kanuri ethnic 
group because of a long history of trading relationships. They see themselves 
as one because of religious and traditional affiliations. 
 
The first actors in the cowpea chain are local producers, including farmers 
who bring their produce from other countries, and trans-border traders 
(especially important in periods of short supply). Most local and trans-border 
farmers are small producers, who are usually poor. They bring their produce 
in small bags to the village markets where they sell directly either to trans-
border retailers or rural bulking agents. Several cowpea of the same variety 
from different producers are bulked together.  At times, the farmers and trans-
border retailers sell to urban wholesalers or urban retailers through 
commission agents.  These farmers are the starting link in the cowpea market 
and usually sell their products in small quantities (mudu or small bags). 
Interestingly, rural farmers hardly sell to rural consumers; this is said be due 
to the fact that the farmers earn more by selling to rural retailers than rural 
consumers.  The regulatory or institutional environment has little impact on 
this group of traders in the study area, although some of them operate in the 
local border markets. It should be noted that much of cowpea consumed in 
Nigeria is from the trans-border trade.    
 
The market intermediaries in the Maiduguri region consist mainly of dillalis 
whose job it is to assist marketers either in buying or selling their goods.  They 
charge a specific amount for that assistance (usually between N30and N50 
per small bag commission).  The dillalis are usually locally based: urban 
dwellers in Maiduguri, rural dwellers in the bush market.  They are disliked by 
some other market operators who say they mislead or cheat potential buyers:  
 “There are a lot of commission agents (dillalis) in this market who bring 
customers to the wholesalers and they are paid N30 - N50 per bag. But at 
times they inflate the prices, which they will come back to collect after the 
customer might have gone. They may wrongly influence the decision of a 
trader who they perceive not to have a good knowledge of the market”. 
-Alhaji Sule (cowpea merchant in Manu market) 
 
This view suggests bad practice, which will have a negative impact on urban 
consumers. Inevitably, commission agents take a different view: 
 
 “The major problem we face in the cowpea market, particularly in the ‘bush 
market’ where we operate is high level of competition. The wholesalers want 
to buy directly from the rural farmer and you know if they don’t buy from us we 
will not be able to charge our commission, which is our principal source of 
income. The solution to this problem is that the wholesalers or merchants 
should be discouraged from coming to struggle with us in the ‘bush market’”. 
-Babagana Mustapha (Commission agent). 
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Urban wholesalers/bulkers/merchants are perhaps the most sedentary of the 
different operators found along the marketing chain of cowpea in the study 
area: they have permanent brick stalls in Manu garage market as well as 
space for loading and offloading. They are the largest provider of credit in the 
cowpea trade, in various forms.  The most prominent form of credit offered is 
the one given to the producers or rural assemblers directly or through their 
agents with a view to getting the largest share of the producers’ output during 
harvesting. They often prefer to go through commission agents because of 
the tedious nature of cowpea sourcing from numerous small producers, 
particularly in the ‘bush markets’, which are the most reliable cowpea source.  
They also offer the largest warehousing and storage services along the local 
marketing chain, usually for upward of three months. They participate in trans-
border trade through their agents who purchase in the ‘bush markets’.  
 
 Many of the urban wholesalers have labourers working for them who are sent 
to the bush market at Mallari to buy directly from the farmers or through 
commission agents who charge between N30 to N50 per 100 Kg bag: this 
represents between 1 to 5 percent of the total cost. There are few cases of 
labourers cheating but it is not a common occurrence since most of the 
labourers are local people who are well known. In the case of cheating, the 
labourer is reported to his clan head for arbitration.  The urban wholesalers do 
not sell directly to consumers, since consumers buy in smaller quantities than 
they are willing to sell.  
 
Most of the wholesalers sell to intra-country traders who come from southern 
cities such as Ibadan, Lagos and Onitsha. The itinerant traders buy as much 
as a trailer-load for transportation to various destinations.  These wholesalers 
are about the richest in the chain and control a lot of grain. The commission 
agents are also rich and have a lot of market power as they link potential 
buyers to the grain source. In this case, market power refers to the control in 
terms of the quantity of grains the commission agents control and their ability 
to determine prices of cowpea in the market. At times, they inflate the price for 
an unwary buyer.  
 
Urban retailers sell in stalls or have hawkers that move about the market to 
sell their wares. They sell (in smaller quantities than the urban 
wholesalers/bulkers/merchants) directly to the urban consumers. This group 
of traders does little warehousing and storage. Some of them participate in 
trans-border trade through their agents who purchase in the ‘bush markets’.  
 
Intra-country traders are the most itinerant of the different operators found 
along the marketing chain of cowpea in the study area. They usually don’t 
have stalls in the main markets. The itinerant traders may lodge in hotels and 
pay for their accommodation, but some of the brokers and speculators provide 
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accommodation for their clients. This group of traders relies on the 
merchants/wholesalers for warehousing and storage services usually for very 
short periods. They are aware but do not participate in trade in the ‘bush 
markets’. Although most are southern Nigerians and some are women, they 
do not face any exclusion from the market.  
 
 
2. The commodity chain in the Abeokuta region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Note:    = Minor Chain ;              = Major Chain
     
WHOLESALERS 
Including wholesalers and wholesaler-
retailers inside the Kuto market 
RETAILERS 
Either retailer in or outside the Kuto 
market 
INTERMEDIARIES: The 
wholesalers and the retailers
CONSUMERS 
Figure 1: Commodity Chain for Cowpeas in Abeokuta 
Bodija market in Ibadan, Oyo State 
Northern Part of Nigeria 
Operators of 
bukateria 
both in and 
outside the 
market
Itinerant sellers 
of cooked
cowpeas both in 
and outside the 
market
Consumed 
as street 
food  
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Table 2: General characteristics of cowpea marketing chain in Kuto market, 
Abeokuta, Ogun State 
Key Actors Local Term Role Gender Ethnic 
Group 
Relative 
Wealth/Poverty 
Wholesalers Alajapa,Onisowo 
lapolapo 
Buy in bulk and 
sell to retailers 
and other 
intermediate 
purchasers 
Women; 
married and 
spinsters. 
Men; 
married - 
bachelors 
Yoruba, 
Binis, 
Igbos and 
Hausas 
Relatively rich.  
Drivers Awako/Onimoto Transport 
cowpea from 
purchase 
location to the 
market. 
Men; 
married - 
bachelors 
Yoruba  Rich-Poor. Some 
own the vehicle 
while some drive 
for other owners.  
Loaders Alaaru/Alabaru Head-loading of 
cowpeas in bags 
from vehicles to 
designated 
shops of sellers 
and to 
customers cars 
or taxis 
Men, 
youths. 
Yoruba, 
Hausas  
Poor. Live on 
daily wages or 
charges from 
load carried. 
Retail Traders Alarobo, Elewa Break bulk. Sell 
to consumers, 
restaurant 
owners.   
Women, 
Few men:  
Married 
Yoruba, 
Igbos, 
Hausas 
Relatively Poor 
Consumers  Onibara Buy cowpeas for 
household 
needs 
Women, 
Men, 
Youths: 
married and 
single 
Yoruba, 
Hausa, 
Igbo, Binis, 
etc. 
Poor – Rich 
Restaurant/Bu
kateria 
Owners 
Onibara, Elewa Sell cowpeas in 
cooked form 
Women; 
married -  
spinsters 
Yoruba Relatively Poor 
Trader 
Associations 
Egbe Elewa Dictates prices, 
Legislation. 
Women Yoruba Poor – Rich 
Local 
Government/ 
State 
Agencies 
Ijoba ibile / ijoba 
ipinle  
Revenue 
collection, 
Control, 
Measures and 
standards 
Men Yoruba Rich  
Security outfit Olopa, Olode Maintains law 
and order, 
Guard shops  
Men Yoruba, 
Hausa 
Poor  
Source: Field survey, 2005 
 
Most of the cowpeas sold in Kuto market were grown in northern Nigeria’s 
Sudan savannah belt.  Figure 1 shows the marketing chain for cowpeas in 
Kuto Market. The principal market traders are wholesalers and retailers (both 
located both in and outside the market. All the cowpeas sold in Kuto market 
are sourced through Bodija market; an assembly market for cowpeas in 
Ibadan, Oyo State.  
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By contrast with the situation in Maiduguri markets, no commission agent is 
involved in cowpea marketing between the wholesaler–retailer–consumer 
chain in Kuto market.  The cowpeas are purchased by wholesalers in 
standard bags of cowpea at the rate of N7, 000 to N9, 000 (including N300.00 
per bag transport fare from the assembly market in Ibadan to Abeokuta) 
depending on availability of cowpea. Cowpeas are usually purchased a day 
after the market day, and purchase may be on a group or individual basis, 
depending on the operating capital and convenience of the individual. Group 
purchase is common but it is not a dominant feature and it is based on 
personal arrangement and agreement between individuals where some are 
constrained to undertake the journey. The group members defray part of the 
transport cost (of the member who agrees to undertake the journey on their 
behalf) but pay the full haulage fees for their goods.  This arrangement does 
not encourage cheating since it is based on mutual trust and the fact that 
marketers have knowledge of market prices prevalent in the assembly market. 
Vehicles are boarded at dawn in Abeokuta city. Usually the quantity of 
cowpeas purchased per trip is dependent mainly on the prevailing demand 
pattern and funds available to the market operators. Generally, more cowpeas 
are purchased during the harvest period (between June and September), 
because they are cheaper then. They are then stored by the wholesalers in 
their shops for a maximum of two months and sold when prices increase.  
Wholesalers provide added value mainly in the form of winnowing to remove 
excess cowpea pod husks.  
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The wholesalers sell mainly to retailers who may be market-based or based 
outside the market.  This includes operators of restaurants/bukateria and 
itinerant sellers of cooked cowpeas (ewa kolobe). One interesting finding is 
that the majority (about 75%) of the wholesalers of cowpeas in this market 
also double as retailers in the same market.  However, retailers from outside 
the market are the bulk purchasers of cowpea (about 85%). The retailers 
outside the market sell in various parts of the city either in shops or in front of 
their residence. Both market-based and non-market based retailers sell 
directly to consumers or to operators of restaurants/bukateria and itinerant 
sellers of cooked cowpeas (ewa kolobe) who add value to cowpea through 
cooking and make it available in ready-to-eat form. Consumers who do not 
have time to prepare cowpea at home patronise these street food vendors; 
this has implication for food safety and the health of consumers in general.  
 
Cart pushers also operate as cowpea retailers in the market. They are mainly 
Hausas and Igbos and sell mainly on market days, moving round the market 
until they finish selling their wares at rates (usually N10.00) lower than the 
prevailing market price. They operate independently of both the wholesalers 
and market-based retailers and are exempted from paying any market fee 
except the local government levy because they are seen as temporary 
marketers from other markets within the town. Nobody disturbs their activity 
(despite selling a little below the market price) since they sell only a small 
quantity of cowpeas and only on market days.  
 
Credit provision 
Credit arrangements permeate the marketing system for cowpea in both study 
centres. Usually credit is informal, coming from other traders in the market or 
from family sources. In Maiduguri those who provide credit mostly say they do 
not charge interest (which would be against Islamic codes of conduct), but 
those that charge interest take between 10 and 15 percent of the amount 
borrowed. Formal credit sources such as banks do not generally provide 
credit to any category of traders in this market. Banks were mostly found to 
perform only one financial service to the market operators i.e. funds transfer. 
Only a few of the operators in the cowpea market save their money at the 
bank. An average cowpea marketer in Maiduguri does not do so because he 
believes he might need money urgently to transact business: the delays 
usually associated with bank operations could frustrate this. Most of the 
traders keep large volumes of cash in their stalls and this exposes them to a 
lot of dangers (theft/burglary and there was a case in Manu market when 
there was a fire incident and several millions of cash were lost to the inferno).  
 
Many farmers receive in-kind credit, usually in the form of agricultural inputs 
from rural retailers/bulkers/ commission agents during the planting season, on 
condition that the farmer will sell to the dealer after harvesting with no interest 
charged. The dealers do not provide credit to trans-border farmers, however, 
because of lack of trust. 
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 Urban wholesalers/bulkers are the largest provider of credit in various forms 
within Maiduguri market but do not take credit from anybody.  Sales credit is 
given to customer retailers, reportedly with no price differences between those 
goods sold on credit and those on cash in this situation, because there are 
longstanding relationships of trust between the urban retailers and the 
wholesalers/bulkers/merchants. In the case of default, the case is usually 
reported to the Kachalla (market head) who takes various steps (there are no 
definite procedures, the steps taken depend on the nature of the case) to 
ensure that the money is repaid. In an extreme case the defaulter may be 
banned from selling in the market for breach of trust. 
 
The most prominent form of credit offered by wholesalers is to the producers 
or rural assemblers directly or through their agents, with a view to getting the 
largest share of the producers’ output during harvesting. They often prefer to 
go through these commission agents because of the tedious nature of 
cowpea sourcing from the producers, particularly in the ‘bush market’, which 
is the most reliable cowpea source. (Inter-country traders, however, do not 
take credit within the market. The credit taken by this group is usually from 
their home market from various sources.)   
 
The urban retailers in Maiduguri also provide and take credit in various forms 
within the market. The most prominent form of credit offered is to consumers 
who pay back usually within a period of two or three weeks. These retailers 
request no form of collateral; their transactions are based on trust.  Urban 
retailers on average may sell about 30 percent of their produce on credit to 
their customers.  The most prominent people that enjoy this kind of credit 
facility are salary earners, who work for public or private organizations; the 
urban retailers are sure that such people will pay and they monitor the period 
when salaries are paid, so that they can arrange the recovery of their loans. 
Great trust exists between urban traders and their customers and in the case 
of default, a trader may have to go to the place of work of such customer to 
retrieve his loan; this however was pointed out to be a rare occurrence. There 
is a price differential between those that pay cash and those that buy on 
credit. Those that purchase on credit usually pay higher prices per unit. 
 
The intra country traders were found to neither receive nor give credit in any 
form in the market. They are perhaps the most excluded in terms of credit 
offered in the market. There are only very rare cases among this group of 
traders who enjoy some credit facility from the 
wholesalers/bulkers/merchants.  These are people who have a long-standing 
relationship with the wholesalers/bulkers/merchants and this credit facility is 
usually small, not more than what the provider of such can bear in case of 
default. 
 
An interesting practice in the market is lack of requests for collateral before a 
loan is offered; everything is done on trust and there have reportedly been 
very few cases of default. Of the very few cases of default recorded in the 
past, only a few were taken to the police or court if the market association 
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could not resolve it. The common practice is to report first to the association, 
which then takes various steps to ensure the debt is recovered (inviting the 
defaulter for discussion and agreement on how to pay back; if the defaulter 
goes against the decision, he is subsequently sanctioned by either outright 
ban from the market or locking up of his stall for a specified period).  
 
Traditional rotating saving schemes were not found to be prominent in the 
market (contrasting with Abeokuta below) except among a few small traders.  
The large traders believe that they transact business in sums too large for an 
operator of a local savings scheme to handle.   
 
In Kuto market, Abeokuta, wholesalers may obtain credit from the trade 
association (discussed in more detail below).  The majority of sales from 
wholesalers to retailers are strictly on a cash and carry basis.  Only a limited 
number of retailers benefit from credit and these are usually people known to 
the wholesaler such that they are traceable (to their homes) in case of any 
default. The retailers will try to pay up on time to prevent the wholesaler from 
visiting their homes to request for the money, as they may be embarrassed in 
the presence of their neighbours if this happens. Payment of last purchase 
entitles retailers to another batch of purchase on credit; the range of time 
between purchases is between 1 or 2 market days and one month usually at 
the discretion of the wholesaler. Payment of extra cash (either in terms of 
interest or transaction cost) on credit purchases is not a feature of this sales 
arrangement.  
 
Credit arrangements between market-based retailers and consumers are the 
same as those operating with the wholesalers. The credit opportunity is not 
ethnic or gender biased; rather it is an inter-personal arrangement based on 
the level of acquaintanceship existing between the two parties and it is usually 
based on trust.  
 
One avenue for fund mobilisation for both wholesalers and retailers is the 
market association. The association operates like a cooperative outfit 
whereby members contribute a given amount of money on a monthly basis, 
depending on convenience. Such monies may be collected to meet personal 
financial needs or used to collect a loan under a cooperative arrangement. 
The limit of funds obtained is usually twice the amount a member has in her 
savings account within the association, usually at the rate of 2.5% interest 
rate.  This is one the main institutional sources of credit to most marketers 
(wholesalers and retailers) but relatively few of them utilise this opportunity 
because of member’s low level of savings and the problem of payment default 
by beneficiaries which makes little money available for subsequent loan 
applications. When the latter happens, only those favoured by the leadership 
of the association can access the loan portfolio. 
 
The other avenue for accessing funds in Abeokuta is the contributory credit 
scheme; this is more widely patronised. The contributory credit scheme is an 
arrangement wherein marketers (wholesalers and retailers), who are close 
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acquaintances come together as a smaller group to contribute equal amount 
of money at an agreed interval (mostly weekly) and each member then take 
turn (based on balloting) to collect all the monies contributed until the last on 
the list collects; the whole process will then start all over again. This 
arrangement is based on trust; also there is no problem of entry and exit into 
the scheme but this must be at the beginning of a fresh arrangement. 
 
Market information 
Information in cowpea marketing is passed through both direct face-to-face 
contact and through telephones.  Most producers in Maiduguri do not have 
access to market information to fix the unit price of their goods but say they 
rely on their memories to estimate the cost of production before the prices are 
fixed.  In southern Nigeria prices are fixed in relation to information about 
prices at the assembly market on a daily basis; this is further communicated 
to other marketers via phone calls and physical interaction. Recent 
developments in the use of mobile communication (GSM) services has made 
communication between markets easier as marketers who do not have mobile 
phones can use public call boxes to make calls at affordable rates.   
 
The formal institutional and regulatory environment: local and state 
governments 
In neither study areas are local or state governments perceived as supporting 
the cowpea trade. 
The role of the local government in Maiduguri markets was found to include 
revenue collection, provision of market infrastructure such as access roads, 
stalls, etc. The brick stalls and the market spaces in Maiduguri Mano market 
are provided by the local government for a fee, which depends on the size of 
the stall (between N100 and N500 per month). The trader applies for a stall 
from the local government (LGA) through the association and a stall is 
allocated if there are vacancies, otherwise arrangements are usually made to 
share stalls with other traders who had already secured stalls.  In most cases, 
influential people get the stalls from the LGA and sublet to less influential 
traders, usually at a rate higher than the official fees.  In the opinion of most of 
the market operators, the local government just exists for revenue collection. 
The local government was not seen to be performing any useful regulatory 
roles.  
 
In Kuto market local government is mainly responsible for the maintenance of 
the market environment (refuse collection, drainage maintenance and other 
support services). The LGA charges a token fee (a flat rate of N 10.00) to 
those who do not have shops but display their wares beside the road; cart 
pushers and transporters (drivers of vehicles, motorcycles and cart pushers); 
this has to be paid on market and non-market days. This money serves as 
one of the sources of revenue for funding LGA activities. Cowpeas marketers 
view the payment of levies to the LGA as exploitation of their meagre trading 
resources and are usually unwilling to pay this levy, because they say the 
local government authority is negligent of their responsibilities until their 
attention is called to them by the market association.  
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The roles of the State government are perceived as similar to those of the 
local government. In the legal or constitutional sense, the State government 
has no direct function in the maintenance of most markets in Nigeria. The 
market operators believe that the State government has only come to the 
market for revenue collection purposes, which they charge separately from 
those of the local government. No known regulatory roles were performed by 
the State government in Maiduguri markets.  The Ogun State government is 
responsible for the provision and maintenance of market infrastructure, such 
as road network, buildings, electricity supply as well as provision of other 
support facilities such as banks, etc. The state government charge rent on 
shops (N250.00 for a shed and N500.00 per month for a shop) occupied by 
marketers and also makes rules and regulations governing the conduct of 
marketers in the market. 
 
Roles and organisation of trader associations 
Trader associations play an important role in the cowpea trade in both 
Maiduguri and Abeokuta, influencing or determining access to market space, 
providing welfare, mediating disputes among members and mediating with 
other institutions where necessary.  Their power in shaping trading patterns is 
consequently very considerable. 
 
The Borno State Grain traders’ Association is the main informal association 
affecting Maiduguri cowpea marketers. The association is run by nominated 
leaders who are also traders and are predominantly men. The ethnic 
composition of the association is such that it is dominated by the Kanuri and 
the Hausa/Fulani: a Kanuri man is usually made the chairman. There is 
reportedly no law or norm excluding women from being nominated to the 
leadership of the association. The dominant Cowpea market (Manu market) in 
Maiduguri was established in 1971 and the association was formed in 1985. It 
is made up of about 2000 traders, with a Chairman, Vice Chairman, 
Secretary, Treasurer, PRO and a legal adviser as leaders. Only one female is 
a registered member of the association.  There is a linkage between the 
traditional institutions (i.e. the Borno emirate) and the cowpea marketers’ 
association. The association’s chairman is an automatic title holder in the 
Borno Emirate. (A title called - Kachalla). When a chairman is nominated by 
the marketers, he is always turbaned as a ‘Kachalla’ by the Shehu of Borno. 
 
The association performs a variety of functions ranging from financial to 
regulatory. Most of the market operators interviewed mentioned financial 
intermediation as one of the principal functions performed by the association, 
particularly in times of distress. The association also performs the role of 
arbiter during crises and serves as a protective cover for its members, 
particularly when they run into problems with the various government 
agencies operating in the market. For example a trader that defaults in the 
payment of his dues to the government revenue collectors risks his stall shut, 
but the association intervenes by ensuring that his stall is not shut until he 
pays.  The regulatory role performed by the association is in terms of 
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determining market access to a new entrant into the market, particularly if the 
operator requires a stall and space. The association, in conjunction with the 
local government officials, arranges for these facilities and assesses the level 
of trustworthiness of such trader before he is finally accepted. He is also 
expected to join the market association at a fee (currently put at N500). The 
association even includes traders who come to sell in small quantities in the 
market.  It thus has very firm control over market access: 
 
“Association membership is compulsory for all of us selling within the market. 
But there are traders who bring their good to the market and liaise with 
association members to sell for them and they pay commission on the 
quantity that is sold on their behalf. So it is sometimes not necessary to 
belong to an association before you can operate in the market.” 
-Mallam Aminu Uba (wholesaler in Manu market)”. 
 
The role of traditional marketing institutions in Kuto market is also significant, 
as can be seen in the control of market access for key actors in cowpea 
marketing and provision of social security for members. Cowpea marketers 
are organised into Cowpea Marketers’ Associations. Membership of the 
cowpea marketers’ associations is compulsory to all cowpea marketers 
regardless of the marketer’s ethnic group. This means no cowpea marketer 
can operate in Kuto market without belonging to their cowpea association. 
The monitoring team of this association look out for new entrants into the 
market every day; such entrants are made to pay a given fine in addition to 
the association entrance levy if they are not duly registered. Merchandise of 
defaulters is seized by the association based in the market until they satisfy 
these entry requirements. A new entrant is initiated into the membership of 
the Cowpea Marketers Association by paying a registration fee of between N 
3, 000.00 and N5, 000.00, a bottle of gin, kola, bitter kola, biscuits, etc. The 
money goes to the association’s account while the other materials are used 
for traditional prayers to initiate the new member into the market. Membership 
(mainly females) is dominated by the Yorubas who also occupy key positions 
of authority (such as chairperson, financial secretary, etc.) in the association. 
Other ethnic groups (so long as they are cowpea marketers) are also 
members.   Cart pushers who sell cowpeas are however exempted from this 
treatment as they belong to cowpea marketing associations of other markets 
in the city. Despite the fact that they sell a bit below (N10.00 less) the market 
price, they are not seen as threats to the operation of resident cowpea 
marketers because they sell only on market days and they sell little quantity of 
cowpeas per market day. As a result of this, nobody disturbs their operation in 
the market. 
 
The association’s meeting is every nine days at the Kuto market. Meetings 
usually deliberate on the current trend in cowpeas marketing, security issues 
and members welfare. The Kuto marketers association, like other cowpea 
marketing associations in the city, is affiliated to a central association which 
meets at the palace of the king (the Alake of Egbaland) once a month. This 
bigger association selects representatives for the apex Market Association 
“Association membership is compulsory for all of us selling within the market. But 
there are traders who bring their good to the market and liaise with association 
members to sell for them and they pay commission on the quantity that is sold on 
their behalf. So it is sometimes not necessary to belong to an association before 
you can operate in the market. 
-Mallam Aminu Uba (wholesaler in Manu market)”. 
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comprising marketers of various products under the leadership of Iyalode of 
Egbaland (who is a female and key chief in the palace of the Alake of 
Egbaland). 
 
The association also assists its members to fix market prices. This is mainly 
done with reference to the existing (or procurement) price of cowpea at the 
assembly market. Where there is a fall in market price, members are 
expected to adhere to this because it will usually bring down the market price 
on market days. Anybody who sells at a higher price would not make any sale 
at the market because buyers would go for the same product at a cheaper 
price. In the case of upward review in market prices, members would 
necessarily adhere because when they sell their stock they would buy at the 
assembly market at a higher price. Price communication is usually through the 
use of telephone messages and physical interaction between members. 
 
The association also settles dispute among members, though most disputes 
seldom get to the hearing of the association, as most disputes recorded (e.g. 
exchange of hot words, abusive language, etc.) are settled informally. 
 
Security 
Security issues were not considered in detail in the Maiduguri study, but were 
highlighted in Abeokuta, where arrangements are both the responsibility of the 
State government and the marketers. Kuto market has a police post which 
helps to maintain law and order in the market and, to a large extent, curbs 
theft. Private arrangements for the use of informal policing are also made by 
traders. They secure the service of night guards for their shops: two guards 
are usually hired per row/street. The range of monthly salary earned by the 
night guards is between N 3,500.00 and N4, 000.00; which is contributed by 
all the shops occupants. The night guards are usually equipped with locally 
made guns and other powers (such as black magic) which are used to protect 
themselves and also deal with night marauders when necessary. The 
preferred sets of people hired for this security job are members of the local 
hunters group and members of the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) (a non-
governmental, informal law enforcement group).  
 
The local hunter group is an organised body of hunters who derive their 
livelihood partly from hunting games and also from this kind of market 
arrangement. They have been at the apex of security affairs since the 
establishment of the market, while the use of OPC is a recent occurrence. 
The OPC is a socio-political organisation established to maintain law and 
order and also to protect the political interest of the Yorubas and Yoruba 
states. They provide security to prominent Yoruba politicians, markets, and 
also assist in unravelling criminal activities; if their assistance is sought in this 
respect. The OPC, according to the marketers, are noted for their fierceness 
and capacity to stem criminal acts, and do not discriminate against marketers 
belonging to other ethnic groups in the discharge of their duties in the Kuto 
market.   
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Weights and measures 
This section is based on studies in Abeokuta, though the comments about 
variation in volume measures are pertinent to Maiduguri too. The cowpea 
trade depends on volume measures.  Unfortunately, volume measures 
supposedly the same may vary considerably. Variations in weight were 
recorded in Abeokuta, with reductions of about 0.91% to 2.31% of the normal 
volume measure for the most popular volume measure (Kongo) for cowpea. 
Further variation also abounds in the way foodstuffs are measured using 
these volume measurements. Some women are better than others in 
measurement, and usually cowpea marketers are not predisposed to allow 
customers to measure cowpeas themselves. 
 
Various types of volume measurement in cowpeas marketing at Kuto markets 
are used: sack, tin, Kongo and half kongo.  According to the respondents, 
government regulations on the adherence to standard weights and 
measurement are mainly in the use of the Kongo and half Kongo measures, 
the most widely used standard of measurement used in most markets in Ogun 
and Oyo states. Moreover, all the marketers have complied with the regulation 
on the use of these measures, despite the initial reluctance of some 
marketers to adopt it when it was introduced.  
 
 Type of volume measurement for cowpeas prevalent in Kuto market in 
Abeokuta 
Type of Measurement Range of Weight (Kg) Average Weight (Kg) 
Sack 72 – 100  84 
Tin 7.2 – 13  12 
Kongo 1.1 – 1.3  1.2 
Half Kongo  0.54 – 0.67 0.6 
Source: Field Survey, 2004 
 
Generally, the type of transaction (in terms of volume of sales) and preference 
of consumers determines the volume measurement used by the cowpea 
marketers. Sacks and tins are predominantly used by the wholesalers, while 
the use of Kongo and half Kongo is predominant among the retailers.  
Measurement requires dexterity on the part of both buyers and sellers. If the 
buyer is not wary, the cowpeas due to her will be reduced. For instance, the 
seller ordinarily should fill the measuring bowl to the brim until it forms a 
perfect inverted cone before pouring it into a container for the buyer; but if the 
buyer is oblivious of this during the measuring process, the marketer 
(especially the retailer) may gain some cowpea grains off the consumer. This 
phenomenon is usually common with lower measurements like the tin, Kongo 
and half Kongo. 
 
Another recent form of sharp practice adopted by cowpea marketers in Kuto is 
to boil the measuring bowl (which is made of plastic) in order to “shrink” it so 
that the weight equivalent of the cowpeas measured is reduced. With this 
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approach, it is difficult for the buyer to detect visually whether the volume 
measure has been tampered with or otherwise. The marketers’ association is 
aware of this issue but it has not curbed members from this act.  Our survey 
showed that when retailers buy from wholesalers, they use volume measures 
which have not been tampered with, but they sell to consumers using the 
boiled volume measures.  Some of the consumers interviewed are aware of 
this latest sharp practice but feel there is nothing they can do to stop it, since 
it is difficult to prove. On the other hand, some customers have tried to 
circumvent this practice by insisting they do the measurement themselves, but 
this is seldom allowed. This sharp practice cuts across most of the cowpea 
marketers.  
 
A consumer’s view illustrates this problem well: 
“The situation of weight and measure in this market is a hopeless situation. 
There seems to be nothing anybody can do about it. I normally want to bring 
my own volume measure and when I do, I was made to pay more (amount 
undisclosed), so I stopped it. Now I know they cheat me, I have to assume it 
is not happening. The implication is that I have to buy a bit more, but I get by”.  
 
Marketers themselves recognize this:  
“I am aware that they do magomago in measuring cowpea for the customers. 
But me o, I cannot do it because my conscience will not allow it. Instead I will 
sell using the approved Kongo. Nobody has come to me with a personal 
Kongo for measurement; I would have obliged the customer. My brother, the 
funny thing is that the difference in the original measurement is not much, na 
thief-thief dey do them”. 
 
Usually, the State government which is responsible for the enforcement of 
regulations affecting weight and measures,  ignores the issue because no 
formal complaint has been made. These findings suggest that the view that 
traders’ associations “could in principle be used to guarantee good quality and 
conduct ….” as reported by Fafchamps (2001), is unrealistic.  
 
Transport institutions 
The cowpea studies did not focus in any detail on transport arrangements.  In 
the Maiduguri region farmer-traders generally bring their goods to market by 
human and animal porterage.  Dillalai rely mainly on vehicles (usually trucks) 
to transport their wares from the bush market to the urban markets and on 
head porters within the market.  Most of the Maiduguri wholesalers or 
merchants have trucks of their own. If not, they liaise with the road transport 
employers/National Union of Road Transport Workers to arrange for transport 
for their customers, particularly those that have come from a distance (the 
intra country traders).  Most of the urban retailers do not get involved in motor 
transport. Those that use motor transport rely on their agents to arrange it.  
Some of the intra country traders have trucks of their own. Otherwise they 
liaise with the road transport employers/NURTW to arrange transport.  They 
are the group of cowpea traders most exposed to armed robbery and motor 
accidents with no formal insurance cover.  They rely on their home market 
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associations for assistance in case of loss arising from these incidents. The 
traders said that there was no police or custom officers’ interference, in terms 
of bribes or other illegal collections, but there could sometimes be tipping by 
vehicle drivers/owners at various police/custom check points. However, there 
are tax/revenue inspectors’ check points, but once revenues/taxes are paid 
correctly, there is usually no problem. 
 
Conclusion 
Although various problems were identified by traders involved in cowpea 
marketing in the two study areas (access to credit, infrastructure problems 
etc.), many traders appear to cope extremely well and thus enable the 
cowpea trade to function relatively efficiently and cheaply, accessing produce 
not only within Nigeria but from surrounding countries.  This means that 
cowpea can continue as a source of protein for poor consumers, even when 
the consumer is located at a great distance from the main regions of supply.   
 
Notable features of the cowpea trade include the ability of traders to raise 
trading funds among themselves in the absence of formal/institutional 
financial support. There are considerable levels of trust evident between 
traders, which allow the market to function well, particularly in the area of 
credit provisioning.  In terms of quality, most of the operators in the market 
carry out sorting, which enhances food safety practices.   
 
The role of the cowpea trader associations is more debatable. In both 
locations the associations are dominated by specific ethnic groups and are 
firmly in charge of market access: they may thus exclude some potential 
traders.  Nonetheless, they provide important regulation within the market 
place: in particular, they have evolved an effective alternative dispute 
resolution approach, which helps to forestall potential conflicts (including 
ethnic conflict).  Furthermore, although the intermediaries may sometimes 
inflate costs, they provide a vital link between various categories of market 
operators and in some cases an important source of credit. They are a vital 
source of information regarding prices, availability of products, etc within the 
market system. 
  
The cowpea marketing process provides a source of income to diverse group 
of people (farmers, commission agents, wholesalers, retailers, porters, 
transporters, restaurant owners, itinerant sellers of cooked cowpeas etc.), 
who derive their livelihoods at different points along the marketing chain. 
There are areas where improvements in trading practice are clearly needed:  
in particular, sharp measurement practices by cowpea retailers selling to poor 
urban consumers in Abeokuta was observed.   There is the need to enforce 
and monitor the approved measures in cowpea marketing. The operation of 
the market association should be closely monitored especially in the area of 
failure to guarantee good market conduct regarding fair measures for 
consumers. This implies that the existing Consumer Protection Council in the 
country should also focus at the activities of marketers at the foodstuff market 
level rather than the marketing of manufactured or finished goods which tops 
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its priority presently. Developing tamper proof measures must be a major 
priority.  It can be argued that the State and LGA should also see this as a 
priority area, among their diverse responsibilities towards the smooth 
operation of the market. However, their emphasis on revenue collection alone, 
and lack of support to traders, notably in terms of infrastructure and services, 
means that there is already considerable resentment of their role. Further 
interference could cause serious conflict. 
 
Easing of bottlenecks (such as high transport costs and poor credit 
availability) would go a long way towards improvements in cowpea marketing 
in the study areas. The current intervention of the Federal Government in 
prohibiting policemen from mounting road blocks indiscriminately (for the 
purpose of extortion of marketers) should reduce tolls paid by transporters of 
foodstuff across the country. This will reduce market prices and also decrease 
consumers’ expenditure on cowpea.  
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9. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STIMULATING PRO-POOR GROWTH IN 
THE SEVEN COMMODITIES STUDIED 
 
Our observations and recommendations regarding potential ways of 
stimulating pro-poor growth provided below are mostly limited to the food 
marketing and distribution component, since this is the focus of our case 
studies.  All our studies suggest that so-called ‘traditional’ marketing systems 
in Nigeria are flexible and have changed over time in response to changes in 
the broader context within which they operate.  In many respects they appear 
to offer the most potential for pro-poor growth, in terms of the level and quality 
of internal regulation, informal support and the high levels of trust (including 
inter-ethnic trust) exhibited.  Rather, it is the external linkages to the public 
sector which, in large part, are widely perceived by market participants as 
obstructions to the efficient and cost-effective operation of the food sector.  In 
Nigeria, producers, consumers and micro enterprise traders have a lack of 
trust in the public sector and its associated formal legal systems.  The 
problem of enforcement and its entanglement with rent seeking practices is 
widespread.  Rent seeking permeates interactions between the public sector 
institutions and businesses, as our case studies attest, and are at their most 
pernicious in certain key areas, notably inter-city transport and market space 
allocation.   Not surprisingly then, these issues recur frequently in our seven 
commodity reviews below.   
 
1. Livestock marketing and its impact on pro-poor growth, with 
recommendations on stimulating pro-poor growth in the livestock 
sector 
 
Livestock marketing in Nigeria, as our case studies illustrate, is a massive 
business which currently provides income for the poor principally in their roles 
as producers, or through income obtained in the livestock transport sector.    
Vast numbers of people, both rural and urban dwellers, including many 
women, earn vital cash income from small animal and poultry rearing, in 
particular.  Herding, cart pushing and porterage, meanwhile, provides 
employment for the very poorest (especially poor men in northern Nigeria, but 
as our Ibadan case study shows, also for some women porters in the south).  
From a consumption perspective the industry is less significant for the poor, 
since animal protein is mostly consumed by middle-class and elite groups. 
 
Prospects for stimulating pro-poor growth in the livestock sector lie only 
partially within the marketing element on which our study focuses: at the site 
of production much could probably be done to support small rural and urban 
producers to increase their stock numbers and stock quality through improved 
veterinary services (to improve animal health, breed quality and reduce stock 
losses through disease) and improved credit facilities specifically aimed at 
small producers.  Other suggestions are made in a recent PrOpCom report on 
livestock, notably improved feeding through developing linkages between feed 
millers and organised producer groups (Cook 2005).   
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Within the livestock distribution and marketing element, a number of 
interventions could help induce pro-poor growth by substantially improving the 
returns to small-scale producers for the animals they rear and market: 
• Improved veterinary services in markets and better abattoir sanitation 
facilities would help to reduce cross-infection and subsequent loss of 
animals through disease.  Many animals unfit for transport will not 
survive the long journey to southern Nigerian and other markets and 
need to be weeded out beforehand. Improvements in stock quality 
could substantially improve prices obtained, if the potentially most 
lucrative market – southern Nigerian middle-class consumers – buys 
more local as opposed to imported meat.  Veterinary service and 
abattoir sanitation improvements will require substantial coordination 
between national, state and local governments.  The potential for 
government collaboration with the private sector also needs to be 
investigated.  
• A central government review of current import controls on meat would 
be useful. (In the past the Nigerian government has even subsidised 
the sale of imported meat.)  
• Improved transport facilities are urgently needed: this will require a 
concerted effort from central, state and local governments, together 
with donor support.  Many animals arrive at collecting markets in 
northern Nigeria and in southern Nigerian markets in extremely poor 
health because of the appalling conditions in which they are 
transported.  In northern Nigeria this can be partly attributed to poor 
roads and consequent dependence on herding on the hoof over long 
distances to collecting markets.   The journey to the south further 
reduces animal health since, as our report suggests, livestock may 
receive no food or water and are often packed into unroadworthy 
vehicles for a journey along dangerous roads at as a high speed as the 
driver can manage: serious accidents with major losses of stock are 
common.  (Reliable transport of refrigerated meat southwards, in place 
of live animals, might be advantageous, though this was not 
considered in our studies. A review of any past research on this topic in 
Nigeria and the current potential for refrigerated meat transport could 
merit investigation, possibly under PrOpCom.)   
• Interventions to reduce rent-seeking and associated harassment by 
police and other state agents, especially on the journey to southern 
Nigeria, would substantially improve returns to traders (and thus to 
producers).   The cost in both money and time of illegal checkpoints 
was highlighted by many respondents: this is particularly serious given 
that haulage is of live cargo.  Out of 15 to 20 check points per journey 
only about 5 are usually legal.  NGOs should be encouraged to find 
ways to empower transporters to resist unofficial payments, such as 
through radio phone-in programmes.  More timely payment of salaries 
in the public sector would also assist. 
• Livestock traders are currently dependent on informal 
support/insurance when they send their high-value consignments of 
animals on long journeys.  NGOs and government could work with 
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national insurance companies to explore whether insurance packages 
could be developed for small scale produce traders and transport 
enterprise in the livestock field. 
• NGOs may be able to work with local banks and credit unions to 
experiment towards a fast-track system for small loans for traders and 
livestock rearers. Banks could be encouraged to collaborate in pilot 
schemes offering smaller than usual amounts of money at higher than 
normal bank interest rates with a short time-span on decisions.  
Government should not be involved since many Nigerians do not 
appear to feel an obligation to repay government loans.   
 
The PrOpCom livestock report (Cook 2005) puts considerable emphasis on 
agro-business to resolve current bottlenecks.  This seems to revolve around 
‘a modified Large Enterprise to Farmer Model’ in which ‘producers are treated 
as partners rather than just contract growers’.  However, no details are 
provided as to how this will be achieved.  Ensuring that such interventions are 
pro-poor will be extremely difficult, given the past history of scheme capture 
by Nigeria’s powerful, wealthy elites. 
 
 
2.  Maize marketing and its impact on pro-poor growth, with 
recommendations on stimulating pro-poor growth in the maize sector 
 
Maize plays a crucial role for the poor across most of Nigeria.  It is produced 
over much of the country by poor small farmers and by larger richer farmers 
(who employ substantial numbers of poor people as labourers); green maize 
is cooked and hawked by numerous poor urban women and their children; 
manufacturing industries using maize as a staple produce a wide variety of 
products and employ a large labour force of poor urban dwellers; and maize is 
widely consumed as a staple food among both the urban and rural poor.     
 
Prospects for pro-poor growth in the maize sector have increased 
substantially over the last two decades in Nigeria, due to the ban imposed on 
cereal imports.  This has led to a massive expansion in the demand for maize 
from the industrial sector: brewers, millers, animal feed suppliers, bakeries 
and the confectionary industry have all had to look to maize as a substitute for 
imported grains.   Despite the massive growth in demand for maize, a number 
of serious bottlenecks appear to reduce beneficial impacts on the poor, both 
as maize producers and consumers, as our case studies illustrate.  
 
In terms of the marketing component of the maize industry our case studies 
suggest the following interventions are needed to ensure maximum pro-poor 
growth is achieved: 
 
• Transport sector improvements are essential across the maize 
distribution chain.  This requires a concerted effort from central, state 
and local governments, together with donor support.  Currently poor 
producers suffer substantial losses from: failure to evacuate products 
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from producing areas and get them to the most profitable markets at 
the right time due to poor roads and unreliable transport; diversion of 
goods in transit by corrupt transporters and highway robbers; extortion 
from state officials during transit.  These losses reduce prices for 
producers, reduce profits for  traders and manufacturers and raise 
prices for consumers.  Although informal insurance operates among 
richer traders who support one another when losses occur, poor 
producers do not have the same safety net.   NGOs should be 
encouraged to find ways to empower transporters to resist unofficial 
payments, such as through radio phone-in programmes.  
• Rent-seeking behaviour by state officials is widespread in the maize 
industry (and not only within the transport component), and must be 
reduced if the benefits of increased maize demand are to be translated 
into increased income for poor producers.  This could be assisted by 
more timely payment of salaries in the public sector.  
• Local government control over space/stall allocation in markets often 
leads to rent-seeking behaviour among elites and damages the 
interests of poorer traders, especially women. A national study, 
supported by central government, is needed to examine the potential 
benefits, difficulties and processes of contracting out revenue collection 
and market management to private companies.  This would be best 
conducted by an NGO or research institution. 
• Small farmers’ dependence on dillalai (commission agents) for credit 
(which reduces their flexibility in marketing) could be reduced by credit 
schemes specifically targeted at small producers: these need to 
provide much more timely credit with far less paperwork than 
conventional schemes (which commonly respond far too slowly and 
without consideration for credit needs over the farming year).  Interest 
charges which are higher than conventional bank schemes would be 
needed to cover the costs of such schemes, but could still be lower 
than rates often charged by informal and family credit providers.  
Collaboration between private sector banks and NGOs could probably 
best achieve this.   
• Better regulation to ensure trader’s correct use of standardised 
measures is needed in the maize sector.  Market associations and/or 
independent NGOs would probably be the best group to undertake 
such regulation.  NGOs could offer market-based education to poor 
buyers and sellers who need knowledge and experience of standard 
measures and how to identify potentially adulterated produce.  Much 
time is wasted in maize markets due to arguments over possibly 
cheating: many of these arguments are related to measurement.  
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3. Cowpea marketing and its impact on pro-poor growth, with 
recommendations on stimulating pro-poor growth in the cowpea sector 
 
Cowpea is a critical component of the diet of poor people across Nigeria.  
Cowpea provides the cheapest protein supplement to Nigeria’s urban and 
rural poor and production levels have risen substantially to meet growing 
demand due to the impact of inflation on the price of animal proteins.  
 
Within the cowpea distribution and marketing element, a number of 
interventions could encourage pro-poor growth by substantially improving the 
returns to small-scale farmers, informal processors and traders, and by 
reducing costs to consumers, with a wide variety of knock-on effects on the 
wider economy.  
 
• Credit is a major issue in the cowpea sector.  Much credit (often in 
kind) to small cowpea producers is provided by wholesalers and 
dillalai.  While this is essential to current production, it arguably 
reduces producers’ potential to respond to the best market 
opportunities.  As with maize, credit schemes organised by banks in 
collaboration with NGOs and specifically targeted at small producers 
may be a route to reducing dependence on middlemen.  At present 
bank credit is rarely accessed by small producers, at least in part 
because of the paperwork and the length of time taken to process 
applications.  Schemes need to provide much more timely credit with 
far less paperwork than conventional schemes (which commonly 
respond far too slowly and without consideration for credit needs over 
the farming year).  Interest charges which are higher than conventional 
bank schemes would be needed to cover the costs of such schemes, 
but could still be lower than rates often charged by informal and family 
credit providers.   
• Much time is wasted in cowpea markets due to arguments over 
possibly cheating: many of these arguments are related to 
measurement. Measurement regulation need to be tightened to ensure 
trader’s correct use of standardised measures, as this disadvantages 
poorer buyers with less experience of trading. Public sector officials are 
not able to enforce standards. Market associations and/or independent 
NGOs would probably be the best group to undertake such regulation: 
in the case of Kuto cowpea market, the market association was seen to 
fail in this area and thus NGOs may offer a better route.  NGOs could 
provide market-based education to poor buyers and sellers who need 
knowledge and experience of standard measures and how to identify 
potentially adulterated produce.  NGOs should be encouraged to build 
on their existing experience to develop consumer associations. 
• Local government and state government roles in market affairs need 
attention. Cowpea marketers in the case study markets were 
antagonistic to the role played by both (since they demand taxation but 
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provide no services).  Local government control over space/stall 
allocation in markets often leads to rent-seeking behaviour among. A 
national study, supported by central government, is needed to examine 
the potential benefits, difficulties and processes of contracting out 
revenue collection and market management to private companies.  
This would be best conducted by an NGO or research institution. 
• High transport costs and related transport issues need attention from 
central, state and local government, with support from donors.  The 
case studies of cowpea did not focus specifically on transport, but 
many of the problems associated with maize transport are equally 
relevant to cowpea: failure to evacuate products from producing areas 
and get them to the most profitable markets at the right time due to 
poor roads and unreliable transport; diversion of goods in transit by 
corrupt transporters and highway robbers; extortion from state officials 
during transit.  These losses reduce prices for producers, reduce profits 
for traders and raise prices for consumers.  NGOs should be 
encouraged to find ways to empower transporters to resist unofficial 
payments, such as through radio phone-in programmes. 
 
 
4. Fish marketing and its impact on pro-poor growth, with 
recommendations on stimulating pro-poor growth in the fish sector 
 
Unlike the other six commodities, we were only able to commission one case 
study for fish, and this is based in a rather exceptional context (ethnic crisis in 
Warri). It is thus not possible to make any broad recommendations for the 
commodity from this study.  
 
Key themes which emerged in the specific case of fish marketing in Warri 
were the potential dangers of ethnicity and unionisation in terms of exclusion 
of new market entrants.  Losses in transit and harassment by military/police 
were themes which were repeated for other commodities and locations.  The 
situation is both so complex and so potentially volatile that it would be unwise 
to draw any specific recommendations without further research.   
 
 
5. Vegetable marketing and its impact on pro-poor growth, with 
recommendations on stimulating pro-poor growth in the vegetable 
sector 
 
Over the years dry season market gardening and some wet season 
production has experienced and continues to experience significant 
expansion on the Jos Plateau, both in terms of the number of farmers 
practicing it and the area of land under dry season irrigated vegetable 
production. This growth in production has benefited poor producers and its 
production, handling, transportation, distribution and marketing employ a large 
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number of people. However, competition for land and water for vegetable 
production has been a factor in the ethnic conflict that has limited access to 
production for non-indigene farmers and exacerbated poverty amongst this 
group.  
 
• Traders have been instrumental in encouraging production by creating 
new markets in urban areas and increasing demand for production 
from poor small scale producers as well as wealthier producers. The 
role of traders should be recognized by all policy makers rather than 
considered a hindrance. 
• The conflict in the area has resulted in an increase in poverty for some 
groups and limited travelling to some producer areas. However, traders 
and their associations have put considerable efforts into restoring 
peace in the markets. National, State and local government should 
encourage the existing role of associations in peace activities.   
• Dillali commission agents operate in all markets and support producers 
through negotiating on their behalf as they have better access to 
information, allowing producers to send perishable produce 
unaccompanied, looking after the produce until it is sold and in many 
cases being the only source of credit to farmers. Commission agents 
are paid a fixed commission rather than a proportion of the price which 
may limit their motivation to reach a higher price. Local government 
should encourage associations to develop alternative systems that 
might also attract more sellers to use their markets. 
• Informal finance is vital for supporting poorer vegetable producers as 
there are no other sources of credit available, it is timely and it has an 
element of flexibility if a vegetable crop fails. Poorer retailers were also 
found to prefer trader credit as it was timely and flexible. They in turn 
were offering credit to some consumers. NGOs can collaborate with 
local banks to increase finance to producers. Where banks are still 
unwilling to lend to producers, it may be necessary to encourage banks 
to lend to traders who are willing to lend to producers. In both cases 
rates of interest may have to be higher than for other clients because of 
the costs and risks involved but would be lower than the extra amount 
being paid for informal finance.  
• Poorer producers and traders have less access to information. Action 
can be taken by national and state government to increase the access 
to mobile phones of those living in remoter rural areas. The highly 
perishable nature of tomatoes results in dramatic price changes; NGOs 
rather than the public sector should be encouraged to develop 
marketing information systems that provide up to the minute 
information for poorer producers and traders on prices in distant 
markets 
• While there has been much public sector investment in vegetable 
producer associations, these are not operating at present. Local and 
State government resources are better used in other ways to increase 
producers’ bargaining power. 
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• In Jos, associations play roles in allocating market space although 
members tend to be wholesalers rather than retailers. Poorer retailers 
have less access to space and cannot erect stalls in markets. Local 
government must ensure poorer retailers are represented and their 
voices heard. 
• Associations in some southern cities were found to control the supplies 
of tomatoes through a quota system and thereby increase the costs for 
consumers and reduce the prices given to producers. More research is 
needed on where this occurs and why, as well as considering the 
impact on producers in terms of increasing gluts in supply areas. NGOs 
should identify where these cartels operate and local government 
should ensure limits on competition are removed. 
• Security is an issue in many markets and associations in Jos use 
vigilante groups. However, poorer retailers claimed that they were not 
well served by formal or informal policing. State and local government 
should encourage police to liaise with vigilante groups and ensure the 
poor and less influential are also protected.  
• No consumer associations were found and there are threats to 
consumers health from low quality vegetables that is often sold to 
poorer consumers. Scales are not used in markets which creates 
further disadvantage for poorer buyers with less experience of trading. 
Public sector officials are not able to enforce standards and innovative 
means need to be developed that use traders associations, consumer 
associations and, in particular, the media. NGOs should be 
encouraged to build on their existing experience to develop consumer 
associations. 
• Transporters have to pay high unofficial fees to police and Vehicle 
Inspection Officers and the perishable nature of the produce means 
that they cannot afford delays. These costs are passed on to the 
consumer, hitting the poorest especially. NGOs should be encouraged 
to find ways to empower transporters to resist unofficial payments, 
such as through radio phone-in programmes. 
 
 
6. Cassava fufu marketing and its impact on pro-poor growth, with 
recommendations on stimulating pro-poor growth in the cassava fufu 
sector 
 
Cassava fufu is widely consumed in rural and urban areas in Nigeria, 
especially among poor households.  It is a cheap and ready source of vital 
energy among these categories. But processing is important for cassava 
because of the short shelf life of the roots after harvesting (typically less than 
two days). Even more important is the need to target cassava fufu marketing 
such that the product reaches the final consumer with minimum delay (the 
shelf life of the wet paste is about 7 days). An understanding of the issues 
identified in this study of Abeokuta markets will provide policy makers with a 
better view for ensuring that adequate and safe foods are available to urban 
and rural consumers. 
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• Fufu processing helps poor processors and traders. Technological 
changes may help extent shelf life but may also disturb the 
employment niches of poorer processors and increase disparities. 
Policies to encourage technology development should consider the 
effect on poor processors and traders, and support the search for 
alternative sources of income where this is unavoidable. 
• The experience of contracting out the management of markets in 
Abeokuta can be a way of maximizing income and improving 
conditions compared to competitor markets. Research on the benefits, 
constraints and processes of contracting out management should be 
carried out and disseminated to local authorities.  
• There is some elements of control by market associations in Abeokuta 
over who can sell in markets and the amount of supplies. This may 
protect the livelihoods of poorer processors and traders allowed to sell 
by reducing the losses caused by over supply, although it may also 
restrict market access for other poor processors of fufu. Local 
governments should investigate cases where similar claims are made. 
NGOs and the media should play a role in investigating such cartel 
type situations. 
• Market information on price and demand is vital and comes from 
transporters and personal networks (increasingly contacted through 
mobile phones). Poorer processors and traders have less access to 
information.  Access to mobile phones needs to be improved for those 
in remoter areas.  
• There is also a need to support poorer processors and traders building 
personal networks through exchanges and setting up meetings. This 
would be best carried out by NGOs combined with developing systems 
of trusted suppliers of information that is not public sector led. 
• Security in Abeokuta market is maintained by the OPC ethnic militia 
group. However the extent to which they support the poor and less 
influential needs to be considered. Liaison with police should also be 
encouraged by local government. 
  
 
7. Gari marketing and its impact on pro-poor growth, with 
recommendations on stimulating pro-poor growth in the gari sector 
 
Gari - a fermented and roasted granular product from cassava - was hitherto 
considered a poor man’s crop until recently. It is now elevated to an urban 
convenience food. The goal of this case is to examine some critical marketing 
institutions in Benin City and Enugu that have evolved since gari has gained 
prominence in all the urban centres of Nigeria. An understanding of the issues 
identified in this study will provide policy makers a better view for improving 
market access for the rural and urban poor to safeguard their food security 
and their livelihoods. 
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The gari commodity chain supports propoor growth through increasing 
incomes of cassava growers, processors  and traders, most of whom are 
women. It is also an important part of the diet for poor consumers. 
Improvements in the marketing chain therefore have the potential to help poor 
people in the chain, although technological development may act to exclude 
some processors and traders.  
 
• Information on prices in urban and rural areas is gained through 
transporters and personal connections that may be limited amongst 
poorer groups. Mobile phones or phone kiosks are used by many but 
these are not available in rural areas. NGOs can encourage linkages 
between urban and rural areas and investigate ways of having trusted 
suppliers of information for the poor, that are not linked to the public 
sector. Existing collection of price information without standard weights 
and measures is not a good use of limited resources. 
• Some areas of production and processing have built up reputations as 
suppliers of good quality gari and hence get extra added value 
because of this ‘branding’. Advice to processors should aim to identify 
new niches that specific areas can specialize in.  
• There is a wide range of informal sources of credit with the potential for 
NGOs to work with local banks to encourage lending to the operators 
of saving and credit systems (isusu and akwao), to those traders who 
lend to poorer processors, retailers and consumers, and to vehicle 
sellers offering hire purchase arrangements. These individuals have a 
better chance of reaching the poorest and using trust based relations to 
ensure repayment. NGOs should also work with banks to offer loans 
direct to traders, processors and growers, although the existing 
experience of this has been poor.  
• Rent seeking by officials and police results in higher prices being 
passed on to consumers and therefore affects the poor 
disproportionately. Poor consumers also suffer when petrol station 
owners collude to limit the supply of fuel, although this practice is less 
common now than previous years. NGOs and local government should 
identify ways to empower transporters to resist unofficial payments, 
such as using radio phone-in programmes.  
• The study found owners of stalls in Enugu and Benin City bought them 
at subsidized prices and then rent to traders. Local and state 
government should use their limited resources on other pro-poor 
activities rather than subsidizing the sale of stalls to well connected 
people who are not traders.  
• Associations play a wide range of positive roles but at times may limit 
new suppliers coming into the market. The extent to which this affects 
poor consumers and producers is not known and needs further 
research.  
Gari processing poses health some health and environmental hazards but the 
current regulations on consumer safety and weights and measures are not 
fully enforced. There is a need to encourage trader associations to regulate 
their members and build a good reputation. NGOs can also play an important 
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role in encouraging consumer associations and the media to identify 
malpractice. The case of restaurant owners in Enugu collaborating to refuse 
to give free food to inspectors in an example of good practice in tackling rent 
seeking. 
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10. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMENDATIONS 
 
 
The following conclusions are drawn from our case studies completed in 
seven different commodity chain contexts across Nigeria.  Specific policy 
recommendations for individual groups of policy-makers and other key 
stakeholders are presented in the final section of the report.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 The role of markets and different commodity chains in poverty 
alleviation and pro-poor growth 
The studies of different commodity chains and market institutions demonstrate 
the important role they can play in supporting poor people and pro-poor 
growth, while also identifying those bottlenecks where the institutions may be 
acting to reduce access to markets for the poor. Where market institutions are 
working to support the poor, they can lead to greater private sector investment 
in agriculture and the food trade; increase competition amongst traders that 
can raise producer prices and reduce consumer costs; improve the livelihoods 
of poor producers, processors and traders; build up cross cultural social 
capital and reduce conflict potential. The evidence from this study has shown 
that the precise package of constraints shaping commodity chains differs from 
commodity to commodity, from market place to market place and from season 
to season, but that facilitating factors often exhibit similar characteristics 
(flexibility, informality and trust8 being keynote features). 
 
Because interlinkages are commonly complex, injudicious intervention at one 
point in the chain (e.g. re-siting a market without adequate consultation) can 
cause adverse repercussions for the poor elsewhere. By contrast, judicious 
interventions based on careful analysis of market linkages and relevant 
commodity chains and widespread consultation with public and private sector 
stakeholders can support pro-poor growth by helping to raise incomes (for 
poor producers, poor traders and the poor who operate in related sectors, 
notably transport), and by reducing the cost of food for poor consumers.  This 
will thus reduce the overall vulnerability of the poor. 
 
 1.2 Regional patterns of food marketing 
Our case studies examined food markets in locations across Nigeria.  There 
are strong similarities in very many of the broader aspects of market 
operation, despite considerable variations in ethnicity, culture, local agro-
ecology, population densities etc. e.g.: 
- the importance of intermediaries to effective operation of food 
markets 
                                                 
8 E.g. see Ezedinma et al. re trust based on village of origin, apprenticeship and inter-ethnic 
marriage in the Benin gari case; Adamu et al. re religion, language, apprenticeship and family 
background in trust relations, but also inter-ethnic interaction as a source of trust among 
livestock dealers in Ibadan; Ahmed and Rikko re trust in the development of dillali-seller 
relationships in the maize trade.. 
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- the role of petty trade, security and intra- and inter-market portering 
for the poorest 
- the dominance of informal institutions 
- women commonly occupy the lowest and least profitable rungs of 
food market (and related transport, labour and credit market) 
operations9 
- indigenes usually dominate prime sites and activities in their home 
market, unless they are unable to offer advantages to producers  or 
consumers in term of credit and trade networks that stranger 
traders make available10 
- rent-seeking behaviour at its most widespread and pernicious 
among interactions between formal and informal institutions 
 
 
 
1.3 Recognising the linkages between different (transport, food, credit, 
labour) markets 
 
Formal Informal Cultural Norms 
   
National Government 
Local Government 
Parastatals 
NGOs 
Unions 
Large-scale private 
sector firms 
Co-operatives 
Consumer groups 
Legal systems 
Banks 
 
Traditional authorities 
Trade Associations 
Community groups/CBOs 
Community membership 
Trust based relationships 
Youth vigilante groups 
Customs and trading 
practice 
Reciprocity 
‘Rules of the game’ 
 
The linkages between different markets – transport markets, credit markets, 
labour markets, food markets - and across the formal and informal sectors 
(indicated in the diagram above) are strong and complex.  Our individual case 
studies show how they interconnect in specific places, where local context 
can play a significant role in shaping precise outcomes. However, very strong 
themes are found to dominate across the country:  
                                                 
9 Ikporukpo describes how in Warri market, although the fish sellers are all women, men 
retain control of the market because the market chair has to be male.  
10 In Warri, for example, the chair of the fish market is appointed by the market land owners: 
the chair must be an indigene (i.e. Ijaw).  The (best) waterfront sites are under the control of 
the Ijaw Unions and are thus allocated mostly to Ijaw sellers (Ikpurukpo).  In Jengre maize 
market, Hausa stranger traders use to play a major role as commission agents because of 
their skills, financial resources and connections, but this has reduced since the Jos crisis 
(Ahmed and Rikko).  In Maiduguri cowpea market the Grain Traders’ Association is usually  
chaired by an indigene (Kanuri), which is linked to the traditional authority (i.e. Borno emirate).  
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- The predominance and value of informal linkages across (as well as 
within) markets 
- The pivotal role of (informal) credit markets in food markets 
- Labour markets for the poorest can be found in the food and transport 
markets  
 
Although a large number of formal institutional elements affect the Nigerian 
food sector, the informal associations in the trader sector, the transport sector, 
the credit sector and the employment sector dominate day-to-day 
transactions, and have the most positive impact on the livelihoods of the poor.  
Formal linkages, in large part, are widely perceived as obstructions to the 
efficient and cost-effective operation of the food sector.  Rent seeking 
continues to permeate interactions between the public sector institutions and 
businesses, as our case studies attest.  They are at their most pernicious in 
certain key areas: 
- Inter-city transport 
- Market space allocation 
This increases consumer prices and reduces potential trader and producer 
profits.   
 
Recommendations 
• National, state and local government policies need to be sensitive to 
the variation between market places and commodities and target food 
market interventions carefully to avoid damaging those parts of 
marketing systems that are benefiting the poor.  
• All policy makers need to recognise both the formal and the informal 
sector interconnections which link food, credit, transport and labour 
markets when planning interventions. 
• All policy makers must give attention to reducing the rent-seeking 
which permeates many interactions between businesses and public 
sector institutions in the food and transport markets. A reduction in rent 
seeking would allow reduced food prices for poor consumers and 
improved profits for traders, especially poor retailers.  
 
1.4 How food markets shape access for the poor 
Food markets shape access of the poor in a variety of ways.  They are clearly 
crucial to most poor producers – the small farmers and farmer-traders who 
depend on these markets for cash income.  Trader associations and other 
food market institutions can limit their entry into the market to sell their goods 
by imposing charges, reduce their income by shaping their trading pattern 
within the market (i.e. to whom they can and cannot sell) or even exclude 
them altogether (though exclusion was rarely encountered in our studies).  
However, many poor producers make their sales to traders in rural markets, 
where trader associations are often less common and less powerful than in 
the major urban centres and principal bulking markets.   Also, as many of our 
studies show, strong trader associations can benefit small farmer-traders, 
since they provide an informal regulatory environment within the market place 
which can protect their interests, in the absence of adequate state protection.  
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Our case studies suggest that capital markets and transport markets (see 
below) place much stronger constraints on small producers than food 
markets.  
 
Poor urban consumers  may benefit or suffer from the strength of trader 
associations and other food market institutions, but disadvantages of strong 
market associations, in particular, are likely to be greater for the consumer 
than for the small producer.   Poor consumers may lose out for instance from 
the efforts of trader associations to reduce gluts, when prices would become 
extremely low and they would thus benefit in the short term.  On the other 
hand, associations act as a forum to create insurance for informal credit 
systems and improve infrastructure (see below) and thus give direct or 
indirect benefits to consumers.  Individual trader actions and knowledge 
generally seems to work against poor urban consumers, who are least likely 
to have knowledge of sophisticated cheating practices (such as in measuring) 
and, even if they know, are the least likely to be able to challenge traders, 
especially if they are dependent on trader credit to buy food. 
 
Widespread lack of active producer and consumer associations (see section 3 
below) is a major factor shaping access of the poor.   
 
The spaces through which the poor benefit most in food market are based 
around casual employment (notably as porters), which is generally very poorly 
remunerated but requires few skills.  Potential training areas, such as 
assisting on market stalls, are generally reserved for trader family members or 
(unpaid) apprentices and thus are unavailable to the poorest.  
 
The interventions of state actors in food markets are currently mostly to the 
detriment of the poor producer and consumer, rather than to their advantage, 
since rent seeking is such a strong feature of private-public sector interactions 
in the food trade sector (see 1.3 above).   This raises the cost of produce sold 
to the consumer and reduces prices paid to the producer.  
 
 
1.5 How transport markets shape access of the poor 
Transport markets shape access of the poor (especially the rural poor) to a far 
greater extent than might be anticipated in an oil-rich country.  High transport 
costs and irregular and unreliable transport on poor roads have a major 
impact on the production strategies, selling patterns and profits of poor 
farmers and farmer-traders, particularly those travelling to market from 
remoter off-road areas.  For poor women producers, especially, transport 
costs are often simply too high to allow access to the more lucrative food 
markets.  Instead sales will be made in the local periodic market or to a 
travelling trader at the farm gate.  Given limited knowledge of prices and 
supply in distant markets, this may be to their disadvantage.  (However, richer 
traders who buy at the farm gate or remote rural market also suffer substantial 
risks from market volatility, robbery etc.)  Transport constraints also limit 
remote producers’ access to credit markets. 
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Although fuel deregulation has improved the situation, depredations both by 
state officials in the transport sector (police, local government officers, etc.) 
and by highway robbers are a major hazard for poor travellers, especially 
those travelling with produce.  Even though poor producers will not own the 
vehicle in which they are travelling, passengers with produce are routinely and 
illegally taxed and robbed.   While richer traders are often supported by their 
associates (a form of informal insurance) to restock, poor producers who lose 
their produce are unlikely to receive similar assistance since the members of 
their social networks are equally poverty stricken. 
 
Transport markets have less impact on poor urban consumers, since the retail 
food trade is well developed in Nigerian cities and most urban consumers can 
access food retailers close to their home at limited transport cost.  The 
situation has also been improved by the availability of motorbike taxi services 
in most cities.  Many very poor urban women, in particular, are dependent on 
this urban food retailing sector: they gain their livelihood from the fact that 
poor consumers will not wish to travel far to purchase small quantities of food 
on a daily basis.  
 
Transport markets represent a key employment niche for some of the very 
poorest people  in both urban and rural areas. The significance of human 
porterage of produce to market and within markets as a source of livelihood 
for the very poorest should not be underestimated.  
 
 
2. Building on the roles of trader associations 
All of the studies found that (mostly urban-based) trader associations play a 
key role in facilitating trade through keeping internal order (dispute settlement, 
enforcing their own regulations, hiring security), acting as a forum to create 
assurance for informal credit systems, improving the infrastructure and 
external lobbying. However in a small number of cases11, trader associations 
were also found to be the means by which some people are excluded or 
denied access to some marketing activities. Trader associations can also be 
used to restrict supplies to particular markets and manipulate prices. These 
constraining functions need to be identified and restricted while their positive 
functions should be encouraged and built on.   
 
                                                 
11  See Ikporukpo’s Warri fish marketing study where Ilaje and Urhobo respondents argue that 
the Ijaw fish selling associations have consistently attempted (with some success) to cut off 
their fish supplies so they can establish themselves as middlemen.  In Sokoto Acida livestock 
market it is almost impossible to sell without using the dillalai (commission agents); similar 
conditions apply re control by landlords in southern Akinyele kraal (Adamu et al.). In Giwa 
maize market potential members of the dillalai association  are carefully screened and put on 
probation (Ahmed and Rikko).  In most studies (e.g.Ezedinma et al. re gari) the trader 
associations do not exclude none association members from markets. 
 
INVESTIGATIONS ON BUILDING A FOOD MARKETING POLICY 
EVIDENCE BASE IN NIGERIA: November 2005 
 
 
180
Recommendations: 
• Local (and state) government should recognise the benefits of the trader 
associations and use them as a way to encourage more trade, competition 
and reduce risk for poor producers, traders and consumers. 
 
 
3. Building producer and consumer associations 
Only limited evidence of functioning producer associations was found, despite 
the considerable amount of funding that has been given to these forms of 
organisations in the past. Alternative means of giving power to producers 
therefore need to be found.  No evidence of active consumer associations 
was discovered in our case studies; this is a major concern given issues 
around food adulteration and other sharp practices which impact most on the 
poor. 
 
Recommendations: 
• Donors and policy makers should be aware that producer associations 
may not be the most effective way of giving bargaining power to poor 
producers:  evidence suggests that well intended resources put into these 
organisations in the past has been wasted.  
• NGOs should be encouraged by donors and government to take a role in 
initiating and developing effective consumer associations which will give 
poor consumers more power. Central Government should support and 
encourage NGOs with these competencies. Consumer associations which 
link to trader associations through informal fora, rather than to municipal 
authorities, and thus support trader self regulation, would be advisable.   
 
4. Recognising the roles of intermediaries 
Intermediaries were found to be playing a key role in mitigating transaction 
risks and costs, especially when there are large numbers of dispersed sellers 
and buyers12. They are also found to provide credit to producers and other 
traders. While there are no other sources of credit and imperfections in the 
marketing systems, intermediaries will continue to play an important role in 
opening opportunities to poor producers and other retailers. 
 
However, the evidence presented in the case studies shows that there are 
situations were there are limited numbers of intermediaries, controls on 
access to markets and limits on the flow of information. This may only occur in 
particular markets, for particular commodities and at particular times of the 
year. Careful analysis of day to day price information in different markets and 
at different points in the commodity chain can be used to identify these 
selected bottlenecks. It should be noted that protests against intermediaries 
are often due to the ethnic domination of the markets rather than the 
intermediary institution itself.  
 
                                                 
12 This is the reason that wholesalers rely so much on commission agents in the Maiduguri cowpea 
trade (i.e. the need to source produce across a wide area) (Adejobi and Ayinde). 
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Recommendations: 
• State and local government should make decisions concerning the impact 
of market and transport intermediaries on poverty alleviation based on the 
locally specific evidence base. This should identify both the benefits of 
intermediaries and those specific occasions where intermediaries exert 
excessive control over market places. 
 
5.  Improving governance of market places 
The studies provide evidence that the control of the market place affects 
access for the poor and can inhibit pro-poor growth. As mentioned above, in 
some circumstances trader associations can exert oligopolistic powers 
through working as cartels. They are able to sustain their powerful positions 
through controlling market space. Most market places are owned by local 
authorities who can play a role in opening up access to a wider range 
stakeholders. 
 
The impact of subsidising the costs of building market stalls is also questioned 
by the evidence presented earlier. In such cases influential indigenous non-
traders were found to get priority and rent the space at considerable profit to 
traders13.  
 
The case studies show widespread resentment amongst all types of traders 
about the lack of investment in markets by local authorities. There is evidence 
that some local authorities (such as in Abeokuta) are looking for innovative 
ways of managing markets and maximising revenue generation through 
contracting out to private companies. 
 
Recommendations: 
• NGOs could provide local governments  with valuable information on 
potential cartel type behaviour affecting poor producers and consumers by 
carrying out price studies of particular markets and commodity chains with 
analysis of daily prices 
• Local governments need to  ensure there is greater trader competition 
through providing more market space. This will result in better prices for 
poor consumers. 
• State and local governments should stop selling subsidised market stalls 
since this does not tend to help the poor. These resources could be better 
targeted. 
• Local governments should explore the benefits, difficulties and processes 
of contracting out revenue collection and market management to private 
companies. This first requires detailed case studies of the few privately 
                                                 
13  E.g. Ezedinma et al. note that most Benin stall owners are not traders: they are wealthier 
indigenes/civil servants who sublet or sell on. For this reason many gari retailers have no stall.  In 
Enugu the landlord may obtain N12,000 +  annual rent but pay only N50 to the local council! In 
Maiduguri cowpea traders apply for stalls from the Local Government through the market association, 
but in most cases the stalls are obtained by influential indigenes who sublet to less influential traders. 
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operated markets by researchers: donor and central government will need 
to commission these. 
 
 
6. Expanding access to market information 
The evidence presented in the cases show that there is a disparity in the 
access to up to date market information on prices and supplies of produce in 
different markets, which reduces the bargaining power of poorer groups. 
Personal relationships were found to be particularly important in accessing 
information from other traders and from drivers. Mobile phones have had a 
dramatic impact on the marketing chain although poorer groups may not have 
access especially in remoter rural areas, and there is a need to have a 
personal relationship with knowledgeable people in other markets who can 
give information14. Radio broadcasts were found to be of only limited use as 
they were not judged to be up to date and trustworthy15.   Traders place little 
confidence in information provided by government. Market information 
systems are limited by the diversity of weights and measures used in different 
markets and for different customers within a market. 
 
Recommendations:  
• Donors and NGOs should encourage linkages between poor producers, 
traders and consumers who need information by funding networking 
meetings and exchanges. This will support consumer access to lower 
priced food and give poor producers and traders access to better 
information which will improve their marketing potential. 
• Donors and NGOs should help support access to telephones for the poor 
in more remote areas where there may not be a critical mass to make the 
service commercially viable 
• NGOs should  investigate ways of developing a trusted supplier of 
information for the poor that is not public sector or donor led.  
 
 
7. Improving credit provision 
Credit is crucial to the effective operation of the food sector and is intimately 
interlinked with food markets.  Formal credit systems, notably the banks, have 
made remarkably little impact on the food sector: the case studies show that 
informal credit regularly provides for producer inputs, trader stock and 
consumption.  Transport markets are less dependent on credit, but even here 
it plays a role (e.g. in vehicle purchase16).  Because the role of informal credit 
                                                 
14  Ezedinma, Okechukwu and Sanni emphasise the role of phones for rich traders in their 
gari studies (Benin and Enugu). Poorer traders here mostly depend on other sources such as 
talking to drivers (many of whom have mobile phones).  Adamu et al. note the crucial 
importance of drivers in relaying price information in the livestock trade.  In the Jos tomato 
trade mobile phone ownership is now widespread among key wholesale traders (e.g. every 
bulk purchaser sending tomatoes to southern Nigeria interviewed has his own mobile phone) 
(Adepetu et al.). 
15  See Ezedinma et al.  re Radio Nigeria Enugu programme which is of limited use because 
of the lack of standardization of measures. 
16  Ezedinma et al. refer to drivers accessing informal hire purchase for vehicles from dealers. 
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is so strong, middlemen (and, to a lesser extent, middle-women) play an 
invaluable role in ensuring the operation of food markets.  
 
There was very little evidence of traders or transporters using banks and other 
formal sources for credit as banks were not willing to lend to them and the 
process was too cumbersome and slow to be useful17. Trust based informal 
credit systems were found to be very important, either with money changing 
hands or goods being given to other traders on credit or to consumers on 
credit. These forms of credit encourage more trading, increased competition 
and benefits to poorer producers though improved prices and new 
opportunities. Traders reported widely that those providing credit were flexible 
in the repayment if the recipient was having financial difficulties18. 
 
Money or goods are often lent for short periods (between a day and several 
weeks): in such cases, the recipient forfeits any discount which might normally 
be paid, or pays higher prices (generally 5-10% more) for the products19. This 
was not considered the same as paying interest and recipients did not 
complain about this higher price. However, the compound rates of interest can 
be calculated as being much higher than that from formal banks.  This 
demonstrates that the cost of credit of credit is less of an issue than its 
timeliness and convenience. However, these informal forms of credit can 
exclude the poorer producers, traders and consumers who are not part of the 
network or do not have trusted guarantors. Poor people who have managed 
to start a trading business may join rotating credit associations to expand their 
trading ventures, but these generally do not provide large sums20. 
 
Recommendations: 
• Donors should support NGOs willing to collaborate with local banks and 
credit unions to experiment with a fast-track system for small loans for 
poorer traders and farmers. Banks could be encouraged to try a pilot 
scheme offering  smaller than usual amounts of money at higher than 
normal bank  interest rates.  This should  cover the costs and risks 
associated with lending to small scale traders and producers over a short 
time period of say six months. Speed is of crucial importance in processing 
bank loans.  
 
                                                 
17  At Jengre market, maize traders complained of waiting over a year for bank loans (which have still 
not been made available) (Ahmed and Rikko).    In Maiduguri wholesalers/bulkers are the main source 
of credi in the cowpea trade: traders admit to keeping large volumes of cash in their stalls because the 
can not risk the delays associated with bank operations (Adejobi and Ayinde).  
18  Especially in the Jos tomato study (Adepetu et al.) 
19  E.g. Ezedinma et al.find in kind loans operate especially between retail and wholesale traders in 
Benin and Enugu.  
20  In Warri, the Ilaje Union has an esusu system which gives loans of 10-20,000 Naira, to be paid back 
within 6-12 months, but traders find this totally inadequate (Ikporukpo). Ezedinma et al. find numerous 
similar systems operating for gari in Enugu and Benin: normally, where loans are involved  guarantors 
of high social standing have to be found; in Jengre maize market weekly adashe schemes are the only 
alternative for maize retailers to accessing credit from dillalai (Ahmed and Rikko); in Abeokuta 
cowpea traders often participate in a similar contributory credit scheme (Adejobi and Ayinde). 
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8. The importance of informal insurance systems 
Formal insurance was not found to be operating except where it is a legal 
requirement for vehicles. There was no evidence found of any cases where 
those having insurance had been able to make a successful claim. Traders 
and drivers have developed their informal trust based insurance systems 
through associations, support from friends and family, and getting preferential 
treatment from suppliers after an accident or loss21. However, these systems 
can not be guaranteed to protect people and poorer people may not have the 
opportunity to get such protection as they do not have access to networks that 
can support them in case of loss.  
 
Recommendations: 
• NGOs, should explore the potential for working with national insurance 
companies to examine whether the existing formal insurance system can 
be adapted to meet the needs of smaller businesses such as traders and 
vehicle owners. 
 
9. Security in the market 
The evidence shows that public funded formal policing within the market place 
is considered more of a hindrance than a help to traders and transporters22. 
Vigilante groups and private security providers are hired by trader 
associations to reduce crime in market places, reduce the costs of marketing 
and thereby attract more customers. However, smaller traders especially 
retailer reported that they had less support from private security compared to 
larger wholesale traders23. 
 
Recommendations: 
• The police need to liaise with vigilante groups more consistently to 
ensure the poor and less influential are also protected.  Formal liaison 
committees meeting at regular intervals may be appropriate, but should 
not be enforced.  
 
 
10. Regulating trading practices and food safety 
                                                 
21  Adamu et al. explain how ‘sutura’ (informal insurance protection) operates in the livestock 
trade: traders who have lost all their stock/money from highway robbers are helped to restock 
by their fellow traders. Informal assistance from friends and trader associations in cases of 
loss was also observed in the tomato trade (Adepetu et al.). 
22  Ezedinma et al. note how the police may force vigilante groups to register with them. See 
Adamu et al. re suspicion of police in Sokoto Acida livestock market. 
23 E.g. Jos tomato retailers (Adepetu et al.) 
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Each commodity study reported a diversity of weights and measures that can 
be used for different customers, and differences between markets. However, 
the extent to which standards are set and enforced by local government 
differs across the country24.  There are legal food safety standards but they 
are not being enforced. ‘Sharp practices’ were found to affect the poor more 
than others as they did not have the knowledge and experience of trading to 
notice this or to demand other measures or weighing scales are used. Those 
buying and selling regularly rely on trust based relations to ensure they are 
not cheated25. 
 
Recommendations 
• Poorer buyers and sellers need to have knowledge and experience of 
what are standard measures and how to identify potentially adulterated 
produce.  Local government should encourage schools to include such 
issues in their curriculum.  NGOs may have a role to play in offering 
market-based education. 
• Local government should  encourage each market association to advertise 
standard measures used in the particular market, together with the name 
of a specific officer as first point of call within the market who deals with 
food measurement and standards. This could do much to improve 
consumer relations.  
• Innovative means of regulating standards need to be developed that do 
not rely on local government involvement. NGOs should collaborate with 
associations of traders, producers and consumers, combined with 
reporting by the media.  Local radio phone-in schemes can play a major 
role (recently seemingly very effective in Accra). 
 
11.  Improving transportation and reducing costs 
Transport costs and the risks of moving produce on poor quality and 
dangerous roads are a major restricting factor in marketing produce and the 
livelihoods of the poor. The deregulation of fuel is widely considered a positive 
factor as access to fuel is improved, but the costs of transport are 
considerably increased through the unofficial ‘taxes’ to police, Vehicle 
Inspection Officers and others, particularly at state boundaries26. The 
insecurity of travel requires that traders travel with their produce unless they 
                                                 
24  Rent-seeking by environmental health officials from gari sellers/restaurant owners was 
observed by Ezedinma et al. In Enugu market restaurant owners have formed an association 
for  self-regulation and protection against  such harassment.  
25  The maize market studies illustrate the diversity of ways in which buyers may be cheated: 
inexperienced buyers consequently need to employ the services of the yan komissio (Ahmed 
and Rikko).  In the cowpea study, reductions from 0.91-2.31% of the standard volume Kongo 
were observed in volume measurements assessed in Abeokuta market (Adejobi and Ayinde). 
26  E.g. Ezedinma et al. note the way numbers of police and government check points 
increase on major routes on market days.  Drivers use mobile phones to warn their 
colleagues about the presence of police etc. along the road.  Adamu et al. refer to bribes 
mostly around N100-200 (but up to N10,000) to avoid delays from informal checkpoints 
(which average from 15-20 on a single journey). 
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have close working relationships with drivers whom they trust to deliver their 
produce to buyers and find ways to receive the money. The use of bank 
transfers and LPOs is increasing the opportunities for this form of trading, 
increasing the financial turnover of traders and therefore increasing 
competition27. 
 
There are also considerable costs in transporting produce within markets and 
between urban markets although this form of transport provides important 
livelihoods for some of the poorest, including otherwise unemployed youth.  
 
Recommendations: 
• NGOs need to work with government and the media to identify ways to 
empower transporters to resist unofficial payments.  Radio phone-in 
programmes may be one approach. 
• Donors and central government should encourage  trader, transport and 
financial institutions to  develop systems that allow traders to send 
produce to buyers without accompanying it 
• When designing and reorganising urban markets, local and state 
governments should ensure that the livelihoods of porters and other 
handlers are secured. 
• State governments need to improve transport conditions (including 
security, frequency, reliability) and reduce transport costs (especially 
illegal charges by state officials) for market access from remoter rural food 
producing areas.  
 
 
12.  Expanding labour markets for the poorest in the food and transport 
sectors 
Poor people occupy specific (informal) spaces in food and transport markets.  
Petty trade, portering and informal security represent crucial employment 
opportunities for the  poorest28.  While petty trade commonly provides an 
outlet for women throughout Nigeria (even in the Hausa heartland, where it is 
conducted from behind the compound wall), portering provides employment 
for both men and – to a lesser extent – women. Only vigilantism appears to 
represent a wholly male (often youth) employment niche.  
 
There are opportunities for producers, processors and traders to deliver new 
products to consumers: these could open new opportunities for the poor to 
                                                 
27  In the maize trade the introduction of waybills and escorts for hired vehicles has reportedly 
eased responsibilities for owners who previously had to travel with their goods (Ahmed and 
Rikko). Drivers play a key role in relaying price information in the livestock trade, where 
highway robbery is a major hazard (Adamu et al.). 
28  See Ahmed and Rikko re porterage as an occupation for young boys from Koranic schools 
in Giwa market. Adamu et al. examine cart pushing and porterage in the livestock/meat trade: 
this includes women meat/carcass porters in Ibadan’s Bodija market. 
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improve their livelihoods, although changes to the existing systems may have 
an adverse affect on some people’s livelihoods. Examples identified in this 
study include the various forms of processed cassava and demand for 
specific meat types for the growing fast food industry.  
 
Recommendations: 
• When reorganizing urban markets, local government needs to take 
particular care not to disturb the employment niches occupied by the 
poorest (or at least not without first ensuring that safety nets are in 
place) 
• State and local governments need to ensure that the livelihoods of the 
poorest are not negatively affected by new processing activities or 
investment.   If this is unavoidable and the majority impact is positive, 
they should support the search for alternative sources of income.  
• State and local government need to give attention to improving 
transport conditions (including security, frequency,  reliability) and 
reducing transport costs (especially illegal charges by state officials) for 
market access from remoter and off-road rural producing areas.  This  
is particularly crucial for pro-poor growth.   
 
 
 
TOWARDS IMPROVING PRO-POOR GROWTH IN THE NIGERIAN FOOD 
SECTOR:   
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS 
 
1. Recommendations for central government 
• Ensure ‘pro-poor proofing’ of all policies relating to the formal and 
informal sector interconnections which link food, credit, transport and 
labour markets when developing policy. Because interlinkages are 
commonly complex, policy developed in one sector can cause adverse 
repercussions for the poor elsewhere.  
• Work towards the development of a more positive relationship between 
all levels of government and the informal trader sector (without which 
Nigeria’s burgeoning urban population would starve).  This requires a 
full examination of current patterns and procedures whereby public 
sector officers take illegal rent from traders and transporters and urgent 
instigation of policy measures and pilot programmes to reduce this 
(since it raises both the cost of produce sold to poor consumers and 
reduces prices paid to poor producers.)  
• Support strengthening of producer and consumer power through 
support and encouragement to NGOs with competencies for working in 
this field (as opposed to direct state support).  NGOs focussed on the 
poor urban consumer sector may have a valuable role to play in raising 
awareness, encouraging joint action and supporting positive interaction 
with trader associations.  
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2. Recommendations for state governments 
• Ensure state policies target food market interventions carefully to avoid 
damaging those parts of marketing systems that are benefiting the 
poor.  Policies must be sensitive to the variation between market 
places and between commodities. 
• Recognise both the formal and the informal sector interconnections 
which link food, credit, transport and labour markets when planning 
interventions. 
• Give immediate attention to reducing the rent-seeking which permeates 
many interactions between businesses and state public sector 
institutions in the food and transport markets. 
• Improve transport conditions (including security, frequency, reliability) 
and reduce transport costs (especially illegal charges by state officials) 
for market access from remoter rural food producing areas.  
 
 
3. Recommendations for local government 
• Give immediate attention to reducing the rent-seeking which 
permeates many interactions between businesses and local 
government in the food and transport markets.  This will require 
greater punctuality in the payment of staff salaries and stronger 
sanctions against miscreant staff 
• Reduce conflict with traders and their associations by providing 
market infrastructure and services from the taxes levied on trade. 
More transparency in use of market taxes could improve relations 
substantially.  
• Consider the potential benefits, difficulties and processes of 
contracting out revenue collection and market management to private 
companies.  
• Recognise the benefits of trader associations and use them as a way 
to encourage more trade and competition 
• Encourage greater competition in markets by providing more selling 
space, but stop selling subsidised market stalls, since this does not 
tend to help the poor. These resources could be better targeted.   
• Encourage the police to liaise with market vigilante groups more 
consistently.  Formal liaison committees meeting at regular intervals 
may be appropriate, but should not be enforced.  
• When designing and reorganising urban markets, ensure that the 
livelihoods of porters and other handlers are secured, since these 
activities are commonly livelihood niches for the very poorest.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NGOs 
 
• Very few NGOs in Nigeria have, as yet, taken any initiatives towards 
supporting produce marketing.  This is an area where there may be 
substantial room for NGO intervention, especially in terms of 
assistance to small producers and petty traders.  
• NGO support would be particularly valuable in areas such as market 
information provision, where state interventions are often viewed with 
suspicion.  They could: 
o Encourage linkages between those who need market 
information by hosting or supporting networking meetings and 
exchanges. 
o Help support access to  telephones in more remote areas where 
there may not be a critical mass to make the service 
commercially viable 
o Investigate ways of developing a trusted supplier of information 
that is not public sector or donor led.  
 
• NGOs could help to develop effective consumer associations which will 
give poor consumers more power (since consumer associations which link 
to trader associations through informal fora, rather than to municipal 
authorities, are likely to work more successfully).   
• Provide local authorities with information on potential cartel type behaviour 
by carrying out price studies of particular markets and commodity chains 
with analysis of daily prices 
• Work with local banks and credit unions to experiment towards a fast-track 
system for small loans for traders and farmers. Banks could be 
encouraged to collaborate in  pilot schemes offering  smaller than usual 
amounts of money at higher than normal bank  interest rates with a short 
time-span on decisions.   
• Work with national insurance companies to test whether insurance 
packages which will allow  small scale produce traders and transport 
enterprise to participate can be developed. 
• Offer market-based education to poor buyers and sellers who need 
knowledge and experience of what are standard measures and how to 
identify potentially adulterated produce. 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
DFID UK Department for International Development 
FGD Focus Group Discussion 
FRSC Federal Road Safety Corps 
IITA International Institute of Tropical Agriculture 
LG Local Government 
LGA Local Government Area 
LPO Local Purchase Order 
NAFDAC National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control 
NURTW National Union of Road Transport Workers 
NUTMA National Union of Traders and Marketing Association 
OPC Odua People’s Congress 
SON Standards Organisation of Nigeria 
VIO Vehicle Inspection Officers 
 
 
